9 August 1965
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 4th Marines (-)(rein)
Subj: After Action Report #17; Company (-) Combat patrol 7-8 August 1965
Ref: (a) Map: Viet Nam 1:50,000 Sheet 6757 III
(b) 3rd MarDiv OpO 321-65
Encl: (1) Operation Overlay
1. Units Involved and Strengths.
A. Company D (-)(rein), 1st Battalion, 4th Marines (-)(rein). (Off/Enl) (6-101)
(1) 2nd and 3rd Platoons. (2-86)
(2) Company Headquarters. (2-8)
(3) Arty FO Team. (1-3)
(4) FAC Team. (1-4)
B. Detachment, 1st Plat, Co A 1st AmTrac Bn. (1-18)
C. FMAW.
2. Time. Company B (-)(rein) landed by LVTs 070840H. Pickup by helicopter was effected 081120H. All units returned to defensive positions by 081157H.
3. Place. Within and beyond TAOR, east of Grid Line 39 and west of gGrid Line 44. See Operations Overlay.
4. Casualties.
A. Friendly. One (1) USMC WIA.
B. Enemy. One (1) VCK, three (3) VCW.
5. Nature of Action. Company (-) combat patrol.
6. Narrative. Company D (-)(rein) landed by LVTs vicinity (BT 415125) at 070840H and commenced combat patrol, along two-platoon axis south and southwest along assigned patrol route. Third Platoon (rein), advancing along western axis, swept through village centered (BT 408114) and were taken under fire at 071000H by snipers in tree line at (BT 404114). Three individuals were seen running from trees and were ordered to halt. Warning shots were fired and unheeded, whereupon one individual was shot and a second captured. Third escaped. Two VCS were returned to 1/4 CP by helicopter, but wounded VCS died enroute.
As Company (-) moved to vicinity of Xuan Ngoc (2) Hamlet (BT 398112), fire was received simultaneously from vicinity (BT 393113), (BT 400108), and (BT 407108). One WIA was sustained vicinity (BT 402118). Artillery was called on estimated 10-15 VC, with negative effect on target. Platoons deployed, forcing VC to withdraw from contact, and subsequently found pools of blood at (BT 393113) and (BT 400109).
Platoons continued along parallel axis to point of juncture at (BT 402083), making several contacts with small VC units. Snipers fire from estimated 1-3 snipers was received at (BT 393103) and again at (BT 392097). Four-armed VC were spotted by point fire team in clearing at (BT 395095) and were taken under fire. One VC was hit as four fled east. More sniper fire was received at (BT 397088) and (BT 400084).
As Company (-) continued to (BT 412073), fire was received from estimated 2-3 snipers vicinity (BT 415076). Company (-) moved to (BT 418084), established patrol base there at 071850H, and set out ambushes after dark at (BT 415077), (BT 415080), and (BT 420084).
Ambushes secured at 080500H and returned to patrol base. Company (-) moved out at 080600H and received aerial resupply vicinity (BT 425081) at 080745H. Helicopter was fired upon by snipers at (BT 420089). No more enemy units were encountered as patrol preceded along two platoon routes to helicopter landing zone at (BT 436089). Company (-) commenced return lift at 081120H. One helicopter encountered small arms fire from vicinity (BT 442082. Return to MLR positions was completed by 081157H.
7. Lessons Learned.
A. As has been the case with previous combat patrols in the same vicinity, all enemy contacts were made during daylight hours. More consideration will be given in the future to moving units into patrol bases and ambush positions during the hours of darkness, to await enemy units from concealed ambush site during the daytime.
B. All enemy units encountered were of a size to be effectively encountered and destroyed by a Marine rifle squad. Greater success in future operations in this area will be experienced through the utilization of smaller units, which by their nature can enjoy a greater degree of stealth ad secrecy.
This page last corrected 16 September 2011