25 July 1965
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 4th Marines (-) (rein)
Subj: After Action Report #13, Company (-) Combat Patrol 23-24 July 1965
Ref: (a) Map: Viet Nam 1:50,000 Sheet 6757 III
(b) 3rd MarDiv OpO 321-65
Encl: (1) Operation Overlay
1. Units Involved and Strengths.
A. Company B (-)(rein), 1st Bn, 4th Marines (-)(rein).
(1) 1st Platoon (rein) and 2nd Platoon (rein).
(2) Company Headquarters.
(3) FAC Team, Arty FO Team, 81 FO Team.
(4) S-2 interpreter.
B. Supporting Units.
(1) 3rd Bn, 12th Marines (rein).
(2) FMAW
(3) Company C, 3rd MT Bn.
(4) 1st Plat, Co B, 3rd AT Bn.
(5) 1st Plat, Co B, 3rd Engr Bn.
2. Time.
A. Landed 231530H.
B. Returned 241300H.
3. Place. Western portion of TAOR. See Operation Overlay
4. Casualties.
A. Friendly. One (1) USMC WIA.
B. Enemy. Five (5) VC killed, one (1) VC wounded.
5. Nature of Action. Company (-) combat patrol.
6. Narrative. At 231530H, Company B (-)(rein) heli-lifted into LZ (BT 445045) and commenced combat patrol. A large group of approximately 100 to 150 persons were seen vicinity (BT 440054). Majority were women and fled towards hamlet at (BT 445054), while 40 to 50 men, of whom five or six were armed, headed for Ky Long-1 (BT 436054). Artillery fire mission was called on (BT 437055). 1st Platoon subsequently moved into hamlet at this location and conducted thorough search, finding nothing.
2nd Platoon moved out to the southwest, encountering punji pits and minefield at (BT 437042). One Marine sustained minor injury from punji stake. Path was cleared through minefield and platoon was taken under fire in same location from both flanks by moderate small arms and automatic weapons fire. More small arms fire was received by 2nd Platoon at (BT 439039) and by 1st Platoon at (BT 440050). In each case enemy rapidly withdrew from contact. At 231745H, Two VC were seen at (BT 438038) and were quickly taken under fire by point. One was killed, one escaped through brush.
Two platoons continued Search and Clear of area in and surrounding hamlets at (BT 4304) and (BT 4305), apprehending two VCS about 231930H at (BT 438046) and (BT 438055). More sniper fire was received at (BT 430054) and (BT 440042).
Company (-) moved to high ground at (BT 435054) and set in perimeter until after dark. Two squad (rein) ambushes were established at (BT 422065) and (BT 431059), and were secured at 240200H with negative enemy contact. At this time 2nd Platoon continued northwest along trail (BT 424063) to (BT 412072) and set in ambush positions at (BT 410073) and (BT 414075). At 240100H, 1st Platoon moved from harbor site (BT 438055) east and north along trails to position at (BT 425077).
At 240640H, 2nd Platoon executed ambush as patrol of seven VC were observed at (BT 411073). Three VC were killed, three escaped along trail leading north, and one escaped west. Two weapons, an M-1 carbine and a MASS-36 rifle, were picked up from VCKs.
At 240745H, 1st Platoon, in position at (BT 423077), fired at four VC fleeing along trail at (BT 421079), wounding two, one critically. One wounded VC leaving blood trail, and two others, escaped into brush. One M-1 carbine, two grenades, and several uniform items were picked up as result of encounter. VC in critical condition died at 240930H. At the same time 2nd Platoon observed four VC along trail at (BT 413072) and eight more moving north at (BT 403074), and called artillery in those areas. Results were unknown. Platoon then moved out, forward on line, and swept from (BT 410072) to (BT 413074), checking area for blood trails. Negative results. At 240800H, Patrol was continued by 2nd Platoon to Hill 10 (BT 417083). Flank security element spotted fifteen armed VC moving north at (BT 403075). Artillery was called along trail leading north from that location. Results were unknown.
At 240930H, 2nd Platoon swept over Hill 10 (BT 417083), with negative contact and continued northeast along trail. 1st Platoon moved out on parallel axis, and two platoons continued to point at (BT 451088) for pickup by trucks with Ontos convoy at 241200H. Return to MLR positions was completed by 241300H.
7. Lessons Learned.
A. The success of the patrol, in terms of number of VC casualties, can be largely attributed to the fact that Company B’s Platoons moved at night and were in ambush position before first light. VC seemed to be relatively susceptible to ambush tactics, particularly in an area where they felt relatively secure because of the absence of Marine units heretofore.
B. Instead of moving together, the two platoons moved along generally parallel axes so as to be in position to assist one another if necessary. This facilitated movement, increased the element of secrecy, and resulted in shooting at (BT 425077) of two VC who were fleeing from 2nd Platoon’s ambush at (BT 414075).
C. In each contact the number of VC encountered could have effectively been neutralized by a Marine rifle squad. The likelihood exists that squad operating from a clandestine platoon harbor site would experience a greater degree of success in terms of number of contacts and number of VC killed.
D. On extended patrols three canteens full of water are practically a necessity. Company B and other units have expressed their desire that an additional canteen be made part of the individual Marine’s T/E.
This page last corrected 19 September 2011