27 July 1965

From:        Commanding Officer

To:             Commanding Officer, 4^th Marines (-)(rein)

Subj:          After Action Report #14; three-company Operation 25 July 1965

Ref:     (a)           Map: Viet Nam 1:50,000 Sheets 6757 III and 6757 IV

(b)                      3^rd MarDiv OpO 321-65

Encl:    (1)           Operation Overlay

            (2)            ARVN Operation Overlay

1.         Units Involved and Strengths.

A.                Company A (rein), 1^st Bn, 4^th Marines (-)(rein).  (Off/Enl) (6-130)

(1)               Company A. (5-126)

(2)               Arty FO Team.  (1-2)

(3)               81 FO Team.  (0-2)

B.        Company B (rein), 1^st Bn, 4^th Marines (-)(rein).            (7-143)

            (1)       Company B.     (6-131)

(2)               Arty FO Team.  (1-2)

(3)               Detachment, Popular Forces (0-9)

(4)               Interpreter.  (0-1)

C.        Company D (rein), 1^st Bn, 4^th Marines (-)(rein)  (7-156)

(1)               Company D.  (5-142)

(2)               Arty FO Team.  (1-3)

(3)               81 FO Team.  (0-2)

(4)               Detachment, Popular Forces  (0-9)

(5)               ARVN liaison officer from 1^st Bn, 4^th Marines  (1-0)

D.        Detachment, H&S Company, 1^st Bn 4^th Mar (-)(rein)

(1)               Forward Command Group  (4-10)

(2)               FAC Team.  (1-4)

(3)               Battalion Collection Point, Forward  (2-8)

(a)               S-2 Detachment.  (1-3)

(b)               Detachment, 3^rd ITT.  (0-2)

(c)               Detachment, 3^rd CI Team.  (1-3)

E.         Detachment, Company C, 1^st Bn, 4^th Mar (-)(rein).  (1-16)

(1)               One squad of prisoner handlers.  (0-10)

(2)               Machine gun squad on LCM.  (1-6)

F.         Supporting Units.

(1)               Detachment, Howtar Btry, 3/12 (D/S).  (2-33)

(2)               Composite Platoon, Co A, 1^st AmTrac Bn.  (1-36)

(3)               H Btry, 3/12 (G/S).  (2-22)

(4)               Detachment, 8-inch How. Plat, 3/12  (4-70)

(5)               1^st Plat, Co B, 3^rd Engr Bn.  (1-19)

(6)               FMAW for Air Support, Helos and CAS.

(7)               Detachment, NBC-10 (One LCM-8).

G.        Two Battalions (-), 6^th ARVN Regiment, conducting coordinated operations.  Two USMC Arty FOs attached to 6^th Regiment for liaison and conduct of Marine artillery fires.

2.         Time.  First elements of 1^st Battalion, 4^th Marines commenced landing in target area at 250625H.  Last elements of 1^st Battalion, 4^th Marines departed area approximately 251630H.  Last element arrived MLR position 252130H.  (This element was in an LVT, which suffered a mechanical difficulty on return trip.)

3.         Place.  Ky Hoa Village, from (BT 422185) to (BT 474145).

4.         Casualties.

            A.        Friendly.  None.

B.                Enemy.  One (1) VC killed, one (1) VC wounded.

5.         Nature of Operation.  Search and Destroy of target area, moving from NW to SE toward block; conducted simultaneously and in coordination with 6^th ARVN Regiment’s Search and Destroy Operation on adjacent Island centered (BT 4215).

6.         Narrative.

A.        Planning.  1^st Battalion, 4^th Marines received verbal order that a joint operation was to be conducted on 25 July.  Details of the nature and location were not specified.  Fourth Marines provided transportation to Headquarters, 6^th ARVN Regiment at 230800H where planning conference with CO, 6^th Regiment was held 230900H-231015H.  Tentative plans for the operation were agreed to at this conference.  Confirmation and coordination of details were accomplished at final meeting of CO, 1^st Battalion, 4^th Marines and CO, 6^th Regiment on the latter’s visit to the formers CP at 241100H.

B.        Command Relationships and Liaison.  Neither Commander involved assumed Operational Control of the other’s forces.  Each provided his own fire support; however, the capability of Marine artillery to fire in support of the ARVN Regiment was planned for use if needed.  Coordinated action was provided for by: (1) Specific delineation of the boundary between units of the two major forces and agreement that neither force would deliver fires into, fly aircraft over, or fire weapons whose trajectory passed over the zone on the other without first obtaining concurrence; (2) Marines provided one artillery FO/liaison officer, whose radio was set on H/3/12, Conduct of Fire Net, to each of the two ARVN Battalions; (3) Marines maintained a radio on the U.S. Advisors’ Tactical/Coordination Net; (4) Informing U.S. Advisory Team of the Battalion Tactical Net frequency so they could enter the net if necessary; (5) Coordination and actual understanding of the times of each other’s commencement of operations and schemes of maneuver.

C.                Operations.  Floating dump cargo and scheduled resupply cargo were loaded respectively into LCM-8 and two LVTs prior to dark on 24 July.  These consisted of Engineer explosives, water, and prisoner compound materials.  Company D, Detachment, Company C, and 1^st Platoon, B Engineers commenced embarkation into LCM at 250330H and departed causeway at 250455H.  Company A and Howtar Platoon embarked in LVTs at 250510H and departed for objective area at 250520H.  Company A and Howtar Platoon landed at 250625H.  Company A immediately established assigned blocking position and provided security to the Howtar Platoon as it went into firing positions.  The Howtar Platoon reported ‘all guns ready to fire’ at 250645H.

Two helicopters, with Battalion Command Group embarked, departed LZ Firefly (BT 526092) at 250630H.  No sign of the LCM-8 could be found.  After searching for forty minutes for the LCM, the Command Group landed and began ascertaining location of the LCM by tenuous radio contact and adjusting plans.  As the Battalion Commander decided to land the heliborne Company (Company B), word was received that that company’s first wave had landed in Landing Zone at (BT 422185).  This vital decision appears to have been made unilaterally by the Commander of the helicopter unit.  It resulted in this instance in a landing into an unprepared Landing Zone, which was successfully accomplished with no enemy resistance.  On receipt of this information, the Command Group flew to the Landing Zone, landing at 250745H.

Company D, being unlocated in the LCM, could not meet its 250700H, H-hour.  The cause was a navigational error by boat crew which took the boat some fifteen to twenty miles off course.

Company B, the heli-lifted force, was not to be landed until Company D had secured its Landing Zone and then only on call of the Battalion Commander.  As related above, Company B landed in unsecured and unprepared Landing Zone at 250720H.  Upon his arrival in the Landing Zone, the Battalion Commander ordered CO, Company B to assume the planned mission of Company D and to block by fire enemy movement into the open sand area at that location which marked the planned boundary between units.

Company B deployed in response to the new orders and commenced moving southeast at 250805H.  The Company had moved approximately 1000 meters when Company D landed vicinity (BT 434183) at 250850H.  CO, Company D was ordered to assume the planned mission and zone of Company B, to deploy immediately, and pass through the left flank element of Company B as soon as possible, establishing contact and moving with Company B.  Contact and guide were right to left.

Both companies were on line and moving at 250857H.  At 250923H, Company B apprehended three VCS at (BT 427175).  A packet of money containing 158,000 units of currency was dug up at (BT 428176).  Caves were discovered vicinity (BT 431174).  One VCS was shot and killed at 251059H, when he was spotted fleeing at (BT 439170).  Warning shots had been fired but were ignored.  At 251130H, two VCS one armed with a MASS-36 rifle, were apprehended by Company B at (BT 443165).  Two VCS subsequently indicated the location of four shotguns upon interrogation by attached PF personnel.

Search and Destroy continued to southeast end of peninsula with few contacts.  Caves were discovered by Company D Vicinity (BT 443170) and were destroyed by Engineers at 251235H.  One VCS was shot in foot while attempting to escape vicinity (BT 467150) at 251327H.  At 251400H, Company A captured four VCS in boat vicinity (BT 470143).  Boat also contained large amount of currency.

A total of forty-one local nationals were detained during the operation.  Upon screening and interrogation by ITT and CI personnel, twelve were determined to be VCC and twenty VCS.  Remaining nine were released.

Progress of the 6^th Regiments' Operation was monitored at the 1/4 CP in the field.  No artillery missions were fired in support of either force after the ARVN Landing Zone preparatory fires ended at about 250700H.  There was no infringement or friction between the two forces.

7.         Lessons Learned

A.        The decision to land a heliborne force must be mutually agreed upon rather then be made unilaterally by either Commander.  The fortunate outcome in this case, i.e., that the landing was unopposed, does not negate the importance of this lesson.

B.        A heliborne infantry Commander must have reliable communications with his units.  The AN/PRC-10 radio is not satisfactory for use in Command helicopter.

C.        The Battalion would have benefited by having the services of a Liaison Officer from the ARVN Regiment.

D.                Operations with ARVN units can be conducted as coordinated operations with two separate Commands in contrast to a joint operation placing one Command under Operational Control of the other.  However, the facility of the coordinated Command during this operation may have been largely a result of the fact that natural terrain boundaries were obvious.

E.                Popular Force units, because of their proclivity to setting fire to so-called ‘VC villages’ and their brutal treatment of VCS, have been a repeated source of embarrassment to our unit Commanders.  Company Commanders have expressed the desire that Marines be assigned the work of searching villages and interpreters be attached to handle and interrogate local nationals.

This page last corrected 19 September 2011