3 July 1965

From:        Commanding Officer

To:            Commanding Officer, 4^th Marines (rein)

Subj:         After Action Report #7;  Battalion (-) Operation 2-5 July 1965

Ref:     (a)            Map:  Viet Nam 1:50,000 AMS L701 Sheet 6757 III

(b)                        3^rd MarDiv OpO 521-65

Encl:    (1)            Sketch Map #1

            (2)             Sketch Map #2

1.         Units Involved and Strengths.

A.                Company A (rein), 1^st Bn, 4^th Marines (rein).

(1)       FAC Team

(2)               Arty FO Team

(3)               81 FO Team

(4)               Elements from 1^st Plat, B Engineers

B.                Company B (rein), 1^st Bn, 4^th Marines (rein).

(1)               FAC Team

(2)               Arty FO Team

(3)               81 FO Team

(4)               Elements from 1^st Plat, B Engineers

C.                Company D (rein), 1^st Bn, 4^th Marines (rein).

(1)               Arty FO Team

(2)               81 FO Team

(3)               Elements from 1^st Plat, B Engineers

D.                Battalion Command Group (-).

E.                Helicopters from HMM-365.

F.                 CAS aircraft from VMA-214 and other squadrons.

G.                Armed HU1E from VMO-2 and Army squadron.

H.                Two Popular Force Platoons.

2.         Time.

A.                 Co A landed 020700H.

B.                 Co. B landed 021730H.

C.                Co A returned 021800H.

D.                Co D landed 030705H.

E.                 Cos B and D returned 1400-1600.

3.         Place.  Grid squares 4407, 4406, 4405, and 4305.

4.         Casualties.

            A.        Friendly.

(1)               Twelve (12) USMC WIA.

(2)               Two (2) heat casualties.

B.        Enemy.

(1)               No confirmed VC killed.

(2)               Three (3) observed VC wounded.

5.         Nature of Action.  Battalion (-) sized operation, including combat patrol and Search and Clear of three villages.

6.         Narrative.  Commencing at 0700, Company A (rein) landed in LZ BEETLE, GC 440072 and initially encountered no opposition.  Moving south, the Company swept over Hill 51 unopposed and made a detailed search of the hill, finding a trench line running 60 meters NE-NW at GC 459061.

At 0850, 20-25 women and children were observed leaving village at GC 445055 and moving towards houses GC 453052.  The company deployed into a two-up, one-back formation and moved to the edge of the rice paddies GC 445063.  They were taken under fire from the village at 446056 by 1-2 automatic weapons and at least 4 riflemen.  As company took cover, enemy fire (1-2 riflemen) was delivered from high ground at GC 440060.  One platoon maneuvered to ridge line GC 437057 as two platoons on line swept across the paddies and entered village at 445056.  In the village was found a network of trenches, dugouts and deep foxholes.  An Engineer team commenced demolition of those.  Enemy fire continued from village at GC 437053, house at 442051, and ridgeline at 438056.

A blood trail was found leading from firing position at GC 445056 and was followed by a fire team towards village at GC 437053 (Ky Long 1).  At this time a heavy volume of enemy automatic and rifle fire was received, pinning down the fire team, which observed at least twelve (12) enemy vicinity GC 437052.  Enemy was dressed in dark green uniforms and camouflaged helmets.  6-8 rounds of 60mm mortar fire were also received at this time.  At about 1145H an air strike was called on trench line GC 438051 to 436055, followed by artillery and air strike on west end of village.  At 1210 the company deployed on line, moved across paddies and swept through village to GC 434053.  Village was found to be interlaced with holes, tunnels, and bunkers, many of which were subsequently blown by engineers.

Company A was again taken under fire at west end of village by enemy located GC 427047 to 430053, estimated at 1-2 automatic weapons and several riflemen.  Village sweep was competed at 1340H, and villagers that could be removed from tunnels were assembled at GC 438053.  3 men, 21 women and 29 children did not have ID cards.  The 3 men were helo lifted to the Regimental Collection Point.

At 1430H, A return lift was commenced from LZ at GC 438053.  Helicopters immediately received fire from automatic weapon at 435057.  Fire became more intense with each successive flight, resulting in one helicopter hit.  Volume of enemy fire increased and prevented the helicopters from entering the LZ.  One platoon and Company Headquarters remained on the deck vicinity of LZ.  Air strikes were called at approximately 1700H on GC 439045 and 443046.  The enemy fire diminished considerably.  Armed HU1E aircraft arrived and swept the ridgeline with M-60 fire at GC 432059 to 438057.  All enemy fire ceased.

Company B (rein) and Command Group (-) was landed at GC 443057 commencing at 1730H and moved towards Company A.  At 1800H, Company A moved through Company B to LZ, GC 443057 for return to 1/4 CP.  Company B promptly moved one Platoon to the ridge at GC 435058 and a second Platoon to the edge of the village at 443052.  The remaining Platoon stayed in the LZ.  Artillery was delivered against high ground at 427048.  Prior to dark, Company B and Battalion Command Group (-) pulled back, one Platoon at a time, to Hill 51, where a perimeter defense was assumed.  There were no enemy probes during the night.

At 0830H, One Platoon moved out to regain the high ground at GC 435058.  Another Platoon moved across to the village at GC 445056 and at 0730H commenced search.  The remaining Platoon made contact with PF platoon and moved on trail to 442052.

At 0705H, Company D (rein) commenced landing in LZ Grouse, GC 451051.  As machine guns covered, the Company moved across paddies to high ground at GC 445045 and 442043.  One Platoon was sent to search portion of village from 440045 to 442047.  As Company D commenced search, Company D moved one Platoon down to GC 432057 and began receiving fire from GC 429055.  Enemy, estimated at 7-8 in strength, was wearing camouflaged utilities and helmets.  One Platoon and PF Platoon moved across to Ky Long (1), while third Platoon remained at edge of village GC 443053.  Fire was received from 430053 to 430059 and 435046.  Fire was returned including M-79 and 3.5 WP on GC 430055.  Enemy fire was sporadic.  VT artillery was called in on GC 428055.  Village sweep was completed utilizing PF personnel for actual search of village and screening of personnel.  Approximately 50 people were apprehended mostly women and children.  None were brought back to Regimental Collection Point.

At 1100H, Company D contacted Engineers, who began blowing holes and tunnels at eastern end of Ky Long (2).  One Platoon of PF was contact, and two Platoons of Company D on line commenced sweep in a southwesterly direction, guiding on trail.  Platoon of PF followed, making search of village and screening personnel.  A trip-wire booby-trap was set off during the sweep at GC 435046, resulting in two WIA.  Engineers following in trace also set off a similar device, resulting in two additional WIA.  Sweep of village was completed at 1230H, with a total of 30 women and children screened and released.  Several holes and tunnels were blown, and approximately 50% of the huts were burned by PF Platoon.

Elements of Companies B and D commenced movement back toward LZ at 0400, covering each other while maintaining control of high ground.  Lift was in order Company B, PF Platoons, Company D and was completed by 1515.

7.         Lessons Learned.

A.        On 2 July fire was received from surrounding high ground and across paddies from adjacent villages, which were interlaced with tunnels and holes.  High ground must be secured and sweeping force must be properly covered either by infantry or air before troops can enter village to conduct sweep.

B.        The village at GC 445054 is the same hamlet entered by Company C on 28 June.  Complete destruction of village and tunnel complex at that time would have eliminated defensive positions for enemy at that location.

C.        Arty FO Team was lifted out prior to the last helo flight on afternoon of 2 July and was not on the ground to call fire missions for the remaining platoon.  The FO Team must be lifted out with the last element.

D.        The delay in fire support at 021700H could have been avoided by using artillery.  Artillery should be called before air unless CAS is actually on station.

E.        Resupply of water and ammunition must be preplanned and scheduled.  Water resupply requested at 021500H did not arrive until approximately 021700H.

F.         AO’s should be kept on station during conduct of entire patrol in order to call fire mission on retreating enemy.

G.        VC have great respect for HU1E aircraft.  Wherever they were present troops did not received enemy ground fire.

H.        All hedgerows and bushes must be thoroughly searched for hidden spider holes and tunnels.  These have been employed by the enemy to enable him to hide while troops pass by his position.

I.                    Infantry weapons the M-79 can be effectively used in assault fires.  Maximum use of the 3.5 inch Rocket Launcher should be made to destroy enemy firing positions.  Maximum number of 3.5 inch WP rounds should be carried to assist CAS spot enemy positions.

J.                  Enemy is employing booby traps in this area which are difficult to detect.  Troops must be vigilant when using trails or other likely routes of approach.

K.                A number of secondary explosions were noted by Engineers when blasting holes and tunnels.  Enemy is either booby trapping holes or using them for ammunition storage.

This page last corrected 19 September 2011