11 July 1965
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 4th Marines (rein)
Subj: After Action Report #9; Three Company Operation 9-10 July 1965
Ref: (a) Map: Viet Nam 1:50,000 Sheet 6757 III
(b) 3rd MarDiv OpO 521-65
Encl: (1) Operation Overlay
1. Unit Involved and Strengths.
A. Company A (rein), 1st Bn, 4th Marines (rein).
(1) Arty FO Team.
(2) 81 FO Team.
(3) FAC Team
(4) 8 LVT’s from 1st Plat, B AmTracs in direct support.
B. 3rd Plat (rein), Co B, 1st Bn, 4th Marines (rein).
(1) Arty FO Team.
(2) 81 FO Team.
(3) S-2 Interpreter.
C. Company B (-)(rein), 1st Bn, 4th Marines (rein).
(1) Arty FO Team
(2) 81 FO Team
(3) FAC Team.
(4) Squad from 1st Plat, B Engineers.
D. Company D (rein), 1st Bn, 4th Marines (rein).
(1) Arty FO Team.
(2) 81 FO Team.
(3) Interpreter.
2. Time.
A. Company A landed 091010H.
B. Company B Landed 091450H.
C. Company A returned 091930H-100445H.
D. Company D landed 100930H.
E. Company B returned 101900H.
F. Company C (-) returned 102010H.
3. Place. Ky Hoa Island vicinity BT 4814, 4914, 5014, 5013, 5012.
4. Casualties.
A. Friendly. Three (3) USMC KIA, fourteen (14) USMC WIA
B. Enemy. Twelve (12) VC killed.
5. Nature of Action. Three company offensive sweep operation.
6. Narrative. Following the early morning enemy attack of 090500H on the Junk Force Headquarters at (BT 502128); Company A was alerted for possible action at 0630. At 090900H, LVT’s became available and transported Company A to the west of Ky Hoa Island, landing at (BT 456137).
Company A attacked north from (BT 459137) and seized Binh An (2) (BT 464144) against no opposition. Search of hamlet and surrounding area resulted in the apprehension of 30 VCS and several hundred rounds of .30-caliber ammunition.
At 0700, 3rd Plat, Company B on an independent, previously assigned mission was ordered to secure its patrolling activities on Ky Xuan Island and concentrate on the northern end of the island (BT 485117) to block any small beat traffic fleeing Ky Hoa attempting to land on Ky Xuan Island. At approximately 1120H, nine (9) individuals were reported at (BT 475129), carrying a mortar base plate and tube. Artillery missions were called on these coordinates. Later sweep of the island disclosed 4 dead Vietnamese but no evidence of mortars.
After completing its search of Binh An (2), Company A continued the attack to the east. At (BT 471141) the Company was fired on by an estimated 3 automatic weapons and 30-40 riflemen. Time was 1145H. Machine guns were firing from Hill 12 (BT 476149) and houses (BT 479142). Artillery was called on both positions and the Company advanced by fire and maneuver, three Platoons on line, to the stream at (BT 474140). Two Platoons laid down base of fire while 3rd Platoon on left commenced assault on Hill 12. One squad was heavily hit by incoming 81mm mortar, and a second squad was then taken under machine gun fire while cutting barbed wire at base of Hill 12. At this time armed HU1E aircraft came on station, and operating under control of the Artillery FO with ‘A’ Company, attacked enemy positions with M-60’s and rockets. Enemy fire ceased. Positions on Hill 12 and (BT 479142) were quickly secured and 6 bodies were found. A Popular Forces Company, transported by LVT from Ly Tin District Headquarters, landed behind A Company at 1245. The two units quickly amalgamated and the combined force continued the attack. Artillery was called on Hill 16 to block and destroy any fleeing VC. Many blood trails were seen leading east, and two more VC killed were found at (BT 493140). Approximately 40 males were picked up as VCS, with all but 2 released after processing by District Officials who accompanied the PF Company. Movement east continued to (BT 495142), where at 1500, Company A was ordered to hold up and assume mission of blocking force. One squad was sent to check island at (BT 488135)3rd Plat, Company B was carried by LVT’s to island at (BT 475124), and picked up 10 VCS and 4 dead males, killed by fire earlier.
At 091450H, Company B (-) landed from 4 LVT’s at (BT 517119) and commenced sweep north. No enemy contact was made as the Company proceeded to the Junk Fleet Headquarters at (BT 502128), where bodies of 16 Vietnamese and 2 U.S. Navy advisors were found. At 091855H contact was made with Company A at (BT 495139). From there Company B continued northeast and reached a point at (BT 512151) at 2020 where it established a perimeter defense for the night.
After Company B had passed its block, Company A and PFs moved to the base at (BT 493139), at 2000, and commenced return to MLR by LVT. 4 LVT’s became stuck in mud in vicinity (BT 495130) and could not be freed until morning; hence all elements did not return until 100445H.
At first light of 10 July, Company B proceeded to and searched the northern tip of island (BT 510163) with no enemy contact.
Company D commenced landing by LVT’s at (BT 473137) at 100930H as Company B began to move south from positions at (BT 513154). At 1015, Company B found 3 caves in (BT 5115) and requested Engineer support. Upon arrival by helicopter Engineer Squad destroyed 2 caves and one connecting tunnel.
The Company apprehended 10 VCS in the days operation which consisted of establishing a block across isthmus at (BT 510147) and after contact with D Company, sweep south to southern tip of Ky Hoa Island in the eastern half of the Battalion Zone. Company D, upon completion of landing, commenced sweep eastward across battlefield of previous day, cutting wire fence at (BT 503142) at 101535H and, forming on line, conducted Search and Clear Operation to (BT 517119) with no enemy contacts.
Company B embarked in LVT’s and returned at 101900H; Company D, at 102015H. In response to orders, Company D left one Reinforced Platoon as security for the Junk Fleet Headquarters (BT 501126) to be relieved on 11 July by an ARVN force.
7. Lessons Learned.
A. In an objective area in which Vietnamese forces (especially non-uniformed Popular Forces) and Viet Cong forces are located, identification of friend from foe and from scurrying, panicky civilians creates insoluble problems under current rules. Thus several profitable targets, which subsequently were identified as retiring raiders, were not brought under artillery fire because of the identification problem.
B. This same problem faces infantry forces in clearing operations, as Company A after organized resistance ceased, because of VC tactic of posing as indigenous people (some with hostage children in their arms) and similar tactic adapted by over-run PF forces of hiding their weapons and posing as peasants.
C. Reliance was placed on District Officials, who accompanied Ly Tin Popular Forces units to the island, to screen on the site all males of military age who were apprehended. In retrospect this appears to have been an error. Local officials all had fled. They are best qualified to screen prisoners. In such circumstances it seems best to apprehend and return through USMC intelligence channels all males of military age. This will inconvenience loyal persons but surely will increase the haul of trapped VC who adopt false guises.
D. Coordination of all forces in the objective area could not be coordinated. Local PF Forces, Junk Force Boats, and some apparent armed civilians engaged in frequent firing at targets known only to themselves. Observation aircraft in the early hours of the action were in the line of artillery fires precluding engagement of some of the few VC targets identified that early. Some means must be found and preplanned to coordinate the actions of several Commands to reduce confusion and increase effectiveness of reactions.
This page last corrected 19 September 2011