AfterActionReport1

1^st Battalion, 4^th Marines (-)(rein)

3d Marines Division (rein), FMF

C/O FPO San Francisco 96601

5 September 1965

From:            Commanding Officer

To:            Commanding Officer, 4^th Marines (-)(Rein)

Subj:   After Action Report #20;

           Two Company Search and Destroy

           1-4 September 1965.

Ref:     (a)            Map: Viet Nam 1:50:000 Sheet 6757 III

Encl:    (1)            Operation Overlay

1.                  Units Involved and Strengths (Officers/Enlisted)

A.    Company A (-)(rein), 1^st Bn, 4^th Marines (-)(rein)(5-118)

1.      1^st platoon (rein) (1-46)

2.      3d platoon (rein) (0-43)

3.      Company Headquarters (2-23)

4.      Arty FO Team (1-1)

5.      FAC Tea(1-4)

6.      Interpreter (0-1)

B.    Company B (rein) 1^st Bn, 4^th Marines (-)(rein) (6-155)

1.      1^st platoon (rein) (1-42)

2.      2d platoon (rein) (1-46)

3.      3d platoon (rein) (1-42)

4.      Company Headquarters (1-16)

5.      Arty FO Team (1-3)

6.      FAC Team (1-4)

7.      Interpreter (0-2)

C.    Battalion Command Group (2-6)

D.    FMAW

2.                  Time.  Company A (-)(rein) landed by helicopter 011600H.  Company B (rein) landed by helicopter 030630H.  Company A (-)(rein) and Company B (-)(rein) heli-lifted to MLR positions at 031500H.  2d platoon (rein), Company B heli-lifted to MLR at 041300H.

3.                  Place.  Western portion of TAOR.  See Operation Overlay.

4.                  Casualties

a.      Friendly – 3 WIA

b.      Enemy – 3 VCK

5.                  Nature of Action.  Two company search and destroy with combat patrols before and after search and destroy operation.

6.                  Narrative.  Company A (-)(rein) heli-lifted into LZ vicinity (BT 403106) at 011600H and commenced combat patrol, moving west along assigned patrol route.  First and 3d platoons moved to company patrol base (BT 407073).  Enroute to patrol base, 1^st platoon, picked up 3 VCS males at (BT 406086).  At 012000H squad ambushes were set at (BT 413077), (BT 402071) and (BT 403078).

At 020745H, 1^st platoon, Company A conducted combat patrol to (BT 413083) and returned.  At 021045H, 3d platoon received sniper fire from (BT 397087).  Returned fire and swept the area with negative results.  At 021108H, 1^st platoon received sniper fire from (BT 415083).  Searched the area and could find no trace of the enemy.  Night of 2 September, 1^st platoon at (BT 411072) and 3d platoon at (BT 401072) set ambushed. At 030615H, Company A started moving to blocking positions.  1^st platoon moved to (BT 437055) at 030800H.  3d platoon moved to (BT 431058) at 030730H.  At 030715H, 3d platoon saw 3 armed VC at (BT 428060).  3d platoon fired but VC escaped.

At 030630H, Company B (rein) heli-lifted to three landing zones.  1^st platoon in LZ (BT 422037).  2d platoon in LZ (BT 429035), and 3d platoon in LZ (BT 445043).  1^st and 2d platoon moved on a dual axis toward Ky Long (2) (BT 435043).  At (BT 420039), 1^st platoon found a 50 lb. Cache of rice and destroyed it and continued up trail.  No immediate LZ available.  Unit was moving too rapidly and lacked suitable containers to carry rice.  At 031105H, 1^st platoon received 3 incoming hand grenades at (BT 429047) from (BT 428048).  One WIA was sustained from grenade fragment.  At 031115H, 2d platoon searched Ky Long (1) (BT 436053) with negative results.  At 031330H, 3d platoon searched village at (BT 445053) with negative results.

At 031300H, one squad from 3d platoon of Company A moved up steam at (BT 427057) to check out results of 1^st platoon, Company B firing.  At (BT 425056) saw 2 VC coming down stream.  Fired and killed one VC.  Other VC escaped.  Continued to area where 1^st platoon fired at earlier (BT 424049).  Found one VC dead from shrapnel wounds.   Believe to be shrapnel wounds from 60mm mortars fired by 1^st platoon of Company B.  At 031500H, Company A (-)(rein) and Company B (-)(rein) moved to LZ (BT 443059).

At 031510H at (BT 438058), 1^st platoon, Company A set off a hand grenade type mine and sustained two WIA’s.  At 031620H, the lift was completed with Company A (-)(rein) and Company B (-)(rein) lifted to MLR.  2d platoon, Company B remained at (BT 439054) for combat patrol the night of 3 September and day of 4 September.

At 031850H, 2d platoon saw 2 armed VC leaving Ky Long (1) at (BT 437054).  Killed one VC and recovered a French MASS-36 rifle from the body.  The other VC appeared to be wounded and was not recovered.  At 031940H, 2d platoon moved to patrol base (BT 437057) and set squad ambushes at (BT 433058) and (BT 441057).  At 040632H, commenced combat patrol along assigned route.  At 040831H received sniper fire from (BT 450053), investigated with negative results.  At 040930H, observed 8 VCS at (BT 446064) and fired small arms at the VCS with negative results.  2d platoon heli-lifted to MLR at 041320H from LZ (BT 468068).

7.                  Lessons Learned

A.    60mm mortars available to company commanders in counter insurgency operations provide a rapid and accurate means of close indirect fire support.  This should increase the rapidity of response to VC sniper fire which is normal at maximum small arms range.

B.    The lack of VN in the are of the operation was noticeable indicating that they take action to hide or depart an area in the proximity of air and artillery prep fires preceding a helicopter landing.

G. T. Beauchamp

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