7 June 1967
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 9th Marines
Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation Prairie IV)
Ref: (a) Maps. Viet Nam, AMS Series L7014, 1:50,ooo; Sheets 6442 IV, III, 6342 I, II.
(b) 9th Marines MSG 301408Z May 1967
(c) 3rd Mar DivO 3100.1C
1. Operation Prairie IV. Search and Destroy.
2. Dates of Operation.
a. 200001H April to 162400H May 1967. 280001H – 300900H May 67. (The period 17-28 May Operations Hickory)
3. Location. Gio Linh District, Cam Lo District, Quang Tri Province, Republic of South Viet Nam.
4. Task Organization.
1st Battalion 4th Marines (-) Lt Col T. Willis (20 Apr-12 May)
Maj R.C. Bell (12-30 May)
Company A Capt R.F. Corcoran (20 Apr-17 May)
2nd Lt D.J. Campbell (17-21 May)
Capt G.A. Stern (21-30 May)
Company B Capt K.R. Ramsey
Company C Capt J.A. Edwards
Company D Capt J.F. Juul (20 Apr-8 May)
1st Lt H.L. Preston (8-26 May)
Capt A.B. Crosby (26-30 May)
H&S Company Capt D.K. Rumsey
3rd Plt (rein) Co A (rein) 3rd Tk Bn
4th Plt, Co B, 1st AmTrac Bn
Co D, 11th Engr Bn
Det, Battery B, 1st Bn 44th Arty (USA)
Det, 104th ARVN Engr Bn
5. Supporting Forces.
a. Artillery. D Battery 2nd Battalion 12th Marines was placed in direct support of this Battalion for the period covered with this report. This battery was very responsive to the fire requests from the forward observers with the companies. Reinforcing fires were available from the 175mm guns of the U.S. Army 94th Field Artillery Battalion. Communications were good throughout the period covered with no time lost for relaying fire missions. Heavy volumes of day and night H&I’s were fired and prep fires were used extensively. Counter mortar fires were delivered quickly with the result that no mortar attack lasted longer than 5 minutes. FSCC was in the field and requested and controlled these fires.
b. Air Support. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing provided air support for the period covered. Helicopter support was used extensively for resupply med-evac, reconnaissance and miscellaneous. Fixed wing aircraft were requested for CAS and TPQ’s. Requests were sent in by the FAC teams to the Battalion COC, which relayed to the controlling agency. Med-evac requests were handled in the same manner.
6. Intelligence.
a. The enemy encountered in the Gio Linh-Con Thien area was NVA. The enemy infantry units were regular line infantry, equipped with AK-47 assault rifles, SKS carbines, RPD LMG, B-40 (RPG) rocket launchers and ChiCom grenades. These units were reinforced with sapper units, whose mission was to breach defensive wire with satchel charges to make way for the assault forces. Transportation units were attached to move casualties to the enemy’s rear. Fire support was provided by 60mm and 82mm mortars and 82mm RR (model B-10). During the 8 May attack on Con Thien, intelligence sources stated that the wounded NVA were transported to a hospital at An Nha (YD 123725). Besides NVA infantry, North Vietnamese artillery (suspected 76mm and 100mm) was used to shell Con Thien almost daily (receiving from 20 to 60 rounds a day).
Interrogation of NVA POW’s captured 8 May at Con Thien, identified the enemy units which attacked Con Thien as 4th Bn 812th Regt, 324B NVA Div; 6th Bn 812th Regt, 324B NVA Div (AKA Thu Bn or Ba Vi Regt).
b. Terrain.
(1) Critical Terrain Features. These included the high ground at Con Thien (YD 114792) strong point for friendly forces, Hills 56 (YD 140733) and 48 (YD 114734) used by the enemy for mortar and RR attacks upon Con Thien.
(2) Cover and concealment. Thick undergrowth, heavy shrubbery, knee-high to man-high, and elephant grass offered good concealment. Underground cover and sandbag bunkers were necessary due to lack of natural cover.
(3) Avenues of Approach. The main avenue of approach was a 10-kilometer dirt road from Cam Lo to Con Thien. Others were the firebreak from Gio Linh to Con Thien, and footpaths and trails interlaced in the area to the immediate south of the DMZ.
c. Weather. The start of the dry season influenced the weather in the operating area. Rising temperatures with humidity averaging 80%, were the norm for the reporting period. Visibility was good with the exception of 3 or 4 days of haze. Cumulative rainfall was slight, though heavy rain of 1 or 2 hours duration occurred in the mid-afternoon.
d. Enemy Personnel and Equipment Losses.
(1) NVA (conf) 240
NVA (prob) 215
NVA captured 8
Weapons Captured
Individual 79
Crew served 3
ChiCom grenades Captured 100
AT mines detonated/destroyed 12
e. Items of Significant Intelligence Value.
(1) On 10 May, the 2nd Platoon of Company A located a guidance section of a Russian built SA-2 (SAM) missile. It was recovered and forwarded to higher headquarters for analysis.
7. Mission. Continue construction a 200-meter wide strip cleared of all vegetation from Gio Linh to Con Thien; provide security for Engineer equipment; and clear enemy elements from around the strip area. Upon arrival Con Thien perform necessary maintenance of equipment then clear a 300-meter wide strip of all vegetation around the perimeter at Con Thien.
8. Concept of Operation. Companies A, C, and Alpha Command Group with attached supporting elements provide security and control headquarters for the construction of a 200 meter strip from Gio Linh to Con Thien. Conduct patrols to flank and front to locate and destroy enemy forces, equipment and supplies.
9. Execution. Companies A, C, D and Alpha Command Group continued providing security and control of 200 meter wide strip. At the point the strip was approx 50% completed, Company B remained at Gio Linh under OPCON 12th Marines.
At 211200H April, 1st Bn 4th Marines Bravo Command Group was relieved of perimeter defense responsibility at Dong Ha by 1st Bn 9th Marines. During the day of 21 April Company D patrols discovered 72 rounds of 82mm ammo at YD 174716 and YD 156716. Two ChiCom carbines, 2 cartridge belts, 3 ChiCom grenades were found at YD 165715 and returned to Battalion S-2.
On 22 April the lead truck of a convoy moving down the strip from Gio Linh detonated a mine causing extensive damage to the truck and 1 FR/WIA. The area had been swept prior to the convoy entering the area.
At 221300H Company C received moderate S/A fire and several rounds mortar fire at YD 145725 from unknown size enemy force. Company C returned fire and called Arty. Swept area and found 2 NVA/KIA (c), Company C sustained 9 FR/WIA’s.
At 221430H Company A unit received heavy S/A fire, 15 rounds RPG rocket fire and 7 ChiCom grenades from YD 145719. Returned fire with S/A and M-79 rounds. Swept area and found 2 NVA/KIA (c), 1 ChiCom rifle and one RPG rocket launcher with ammo. Company A sustained 2 minor WIA’s.
At 221545H a tank moving in Vic YD 151718 hit a mine blowing off a track. Company A was passing through elements of C Company in the vic of the tank and both companies received 15 WIA’s from shrapnel, 9 of which were med-evaced.
At 231215H a Company A unit discovered a cache of 45 82mm mortar rounds under the floor of a hut. All were destroyed in place.
At 231345H Company D moved to Con Thien outpost to occupy the portion of the perimeter vacated by an ARVN unit. This left only Company A and C to provide security for the engineer effort.
At 231645H another tank hit a mine at YD 181731 while escorting a damaged tank back to the Gio Linh artillery complex. The tank was repaired and continued to Gio Linh.
At 241400H a Company C unit discovered 14 graves approx 2-3 days old containing one NVA body each at YD 144723. This discovery was believed to be the results of the Company C contact in that area on 22 April. Company A found 48 graves at YD 156712, 2 of which contained 4 NVA bodies and 46 containing 2 bodies each a total of 104 bodies. All were wearing khaki uniforms and had been dead for 3 or 4 weeks. Some graves had markers with a man’s name, date of death and unit. Grave markers were returned to Bn S-2 and forwarded to 9th Marines S-2. This discovery believed to be a result of operation Beacon Hill I 20-30 March 1967.
At 241500H the scattered wreckage of a F4B aircraft was discovered near the Bn CP Vic YD 158719. Further search of area revealed a burned ID card and dog tags, parts of 2 life vests and parts of a human body. This was believed to be a plane shot down in that area on 13 March 1967. All personal items were forwarded to 9th Marines S-1.
By 25 April the 200 meter wide strip was 70% complete and no enemy contact was made during the day.
At 260700H the Bn CP received 4 rounds 155mm friendly Artillery sustaining 1 Fr/KIA (USA) and 11 WIA’s of which 6 were med-evaced. The Battalion Commander, Lt Col T.J. Willis was also wounded and med-evaced. The Battalion Executive Officer moved to the field immediately and assumed command of the Battalion.
At 261245H the Battalion assumed OPCON of the 3rd Co, 3rd Bn, 2nd ARVN Regt, 1st ARVN Div. This unit was given a portion of the perimeter defense for the night.
At 262110H Company D on Con Thien outpost received sporadic S/A fire from the north. Returned fire with S/A and 81mm mortars. No casualties.
On 27 April the ARVN Company was moved back to Vic YD 197734 to provide security for the tower being installed on the strip. The Battalion sent a liaison team with them for control and communications. The ARVN unit chopped OPCON back to its parent unit on 28 April and the liaison team returned to the Battalion.
At 271030H Company C received S/A and 60mm mortar fire at YD 154716. Fire was returned with 81mm and artillery. Company C assaulted the enemy position finding 3 NVA/KIA (c). The Company sustained 1 KIA, 12 WIA’s, 7 of which were med-evaced.
At approximately 1815H the Battalion CP witnessed Gio Linh artillery positions receiving artillery fire from across the DMZ.
At 272010H the 1/4 Fwd CP received 30-40 rounds 82mm mortar fire. Fire was returned immediately with 81mm mortars. Mortar fire ceased. 17 WIA’s were sustained, 4 of which were evaced. One of the med-evac helicopters crashed while attempting to land in the LZ. The crew was not injured and remained at the CP overnight.
On 28 April six more bulldozers were sent out from Gio Linh. The 3rd Platoon Company A provided security for their movement down the strip to the engineer work area arriving at 1630H.
At 282015H Company D on Con Thien received approx 30 rounds mortar fire from vic YD 112720. Fire was immediately returned with 81mm and artillery. Mortar ceased. No friendly casualties.
By 29 April the 200 meter wide cleared strip from Gio Linh to Con Thien was 90% completed.
At 311050H the Gio Linh-Con Thien strip was completed. Company A and part of the Command Group returned to Dong Ha. Company C and a small Command Group remained to provide security for equipment.
From 31 April-3 May preventative maintenance was performed on all equipment in preparation for further operations. Some vehicle and equipment crews were exchanged during this period. Some vehicles were moved to Gio Linh via the strip and exchanged there and returned to Con Thien. Company C provided security for this movement.
On 4 May the Engineers began clearing a 300-meter wide strip around Con Thien.
On 5 May Company A returned to Con Thien to relieve Company C, which returned to Dong Ha. Work continued on the 300-meter wide strip around Con Thien. Some booby-trapped grenades left by ARVN unit’s were encountered and destroyed. Sporadic 82mm mortar fire was experienced during this period. Seabees began installing look out towers along the strip starting from Gio Linh.
At 0245H on 8 May Companies A and D with the Alpha Command Group at Con Thien came under an intensive 82mm mortar attack, followed by a ground attack from the east in Company D sector. Sapper units breached the wire under cover of a mortar barrage with Bangalore Torpedoes and moved small units inside the wire. These small elements were heavily armed with satchel charges and TNT charges and used them to blow bunkers and trench lines. At approximately 0400H, two battalions of NVA attacked the perimeter through the breach made by the sapper units armed with flamethrowers, RPG rocket launcher and various assortments of small arms, explosives, etc. The attached Engineer Platoon was moved to reinforce Company D’s right flank where the attack seemed to be centered. All 81mm illumination was utilized. Artillery illumination could not reach Con Thien from their positions at Gio Linh. A flare ship arrived after some delay and provided illumination until daylight. Company A was directed to send a platoon reaction force to assist Company D as well as escort two LVT’s and two M-42’s with ammo resupply. Enroute to Company D’s right flank the right rear sprocket of the leading LVT became enmeshed in barged wire, freezing and stopping the vehicle. The vehicle came under fire and the M-42’s and one LVTH were struck by RPG rockets and set afire trapping personnel inside. The other LVTH was set afire with a satchel charge. The penetration was limited and the breach in the perimeter was closed just prior to daylight, cutting off the escape route of this enemy element inside of the wire. By approximately 0900H all of these elements were either killed or captured. Tanks and LVTH-6’s firing Bee Hive and conventional ammo inflicted heavy enemy casualties both during the attack and during the withdrawal. The enemy was caught in the open crossing the recently cleared strip and provided an excellent target for direct fire weapons. After the area had been cleared of enemy stragglers and helicopters could land, evacuation of the friendly casualties began. The Battalion and supporting elements suffered 44 KIA’s and 110 WIA’s as a result of this attack. During the remainder of the day enemy bodies and equipment were collected. 226 enemy bodies were buried and covered by bulldozers. 8 NVA were captured and returned to Dong Ha. 43 AK-47, 19 RPG rockets, 2 flame throwers, 1 radio, 400 lbs of explosive, and over 100 ChiCom grenades were collected in and around the perimeter. Company D was relieved in place by Company C late the afternoon of 8 May and returned to Dong Ha and relieved 1/9 as Sparrow Hawk responsibility.
At 082010H a fire at one of the towers on the strip was observed and at 082030H an explosion was observed in the vicinity of another tower. Company B at Gio Linh confirmed that one of the towers was being burned. On 9 May an AO reported that 3 towers were down and only the tower nearest Gio Linh was standing.
At approximately 102100H the FWD CP observed what appeared to be a (SAM) missile strike at a TPQ aircraft northwest of Con Thien. The aircraft exploded and crashed. At 1400H on 11 April a large object was found by a Company A patrol at YD 103683 believed to be part of a SAM missile. The object was helo lifted to Dong Ha.
At 111500H a Nung patrol vic YD 135710 began receiving 82mm mortar fire and made contact with an estimated Company of NVA. The patrol quickly withdrew to the Con Thien perimeter under cover of 81mm mortar and artillery fire. Con Thien outpost received 40-50 rounds 82mm mortar fire sustaining 4 WIA non-evac. Five mortar positions were spotted by an AO and called an air strike destroying all five positions. At 1700H Con Thien received 35-40 82mm rounds of mortar fire sustaining 1 WIA, non-evac.
At 121600H the rear COC opened and assumed OPCON of CAC 1, 2, 3 and a platoon security at Cam Lo Bridge.
From 121530H-121605H Con Thien received 25-30 rounds 82mm mortar fire resulting in 1 KIA and 10 WIA’s. Lt Col Willis, the Battalion Commander was wounded for the third time and evacuated. The Battalion executive Officer assumed Command of the Battalion in the field.
At 121655H a resupply helicopter was struck by a recoilless rifle in mid air. The helicopter crashed and burned. Two crewmembers were WIA and 2 were MIA presumed to be in the wreckage. On the morning of 13 May the wreckage was searched and the two MIA’s were found. The bodies were hardly identifiable due to the intense heat of the burning helicopter. The bodies were evacuated to D-med for identification.
During the day of 13 May the Con Thien outpost received a total of 93 rounds of artillery and mortar fire resulting in 1 KIA and 13 WIA’s. The new Battalion Commander Major R.C. Bell took command of the Battalion in the field. One LVTP-5 received a direct hit from an artillery round at 0830H resulting in 1 KIA and 2 WIA. The LVTP-5 was damaged but still operable.
Con Thien outpost received 45 rounds of mortar and artillery fire during the day of 14 May resulting in 7 WIA’s non-evac.
At 142100H an ambush patrol departed Gio Linh artillery position became lost while moving through the minefield around the perimeter. One man stepped on a mine resulting in 1 FR/KIA and 2 WIA’s med-evaced.
At 150305H CAC-3 came under heavy mortar and satchel charge attack by approximately 2 platoons of VC. Five penetrated the defensive wire and blew an ammo bunker. At 0330H the VC withdrew. Sporadic S/A fire continued on CAC-3 and the PF’s at he bridge at YD 182588 until approximately 0515H. Artillery fire was called on suspected enemy mortar positions and enemy withdrawal routes. Casualties were evacuated at 0545H after several tries. Results of this action were, 1 FR/KIA, 15 FR/WIA 4 of which were evaced. In addition 3 PF’s were KIA’s and 1 PF MIA, 1 civilian WIA, and 6 KIA’s. One VC KIA was found on the defensive wire and the villagers said the VC carried approximately 25 dead or wounded VC through the village on their withdrawal.
During the day of 15 May the Con Thien outpost received a total of 96 rounds of artillery and recoilless rifle fire resulting in 2 WIA’s one of which was med-evaced. This harassing fire was fired in volleys from 4-30 rounds each sporadically throughout the day.
During the day of 16 May the Con Thien outpost received 60 rounds of artillery and recoilless rifle fire sporadically in volleys from 4-15 rounds resulting in 6 WIA’s; two were med-evaced.
At 170001H the Battalion began operation Hickory IAW 9th Marines Operation Order 5-67.
At 282400H the Battalion terminated operation Hickory and continued Prairie IV at 290001H. The Battalion was providing security for the 9th Marines CP complex at YD 147614. At 1300H on 30 April the Battalion was relieved by 2/3 and returned to Dong Ha.
At 300900H the Battalion was relieved of the defense responsibilities at Dong Ha by 2/9 and prepared to move to CO Bi Thanh Tan. Prairie IV terminated for the Battalion 300900H.
10. Results.
a. Friendly Losses.
(1) The following is a recapitulation of friendly casualties incurred by the 1st Battalion 4th Marines (rein) during Operation Prairie IV covering the period 20 April 1967 through 16 May 1967 and 29 May 1967 through 30 May 1967.
USMC USN
Off/Enl Off/Enl
KIA 0/39 0/2
WIA 10/192 1/4
MIA 0/0 0/0
DOW 0/1 0/0
11. Treatment of casualties and evacuations and hospitalization.
First echelon medical care was performed in the field by hospital corpsman attached to the various line companies. Following field first aid, those patients requiring further care were evacuated via helicopter to the nearest available medical facility. The definitive treatment centers being: 3rd Medical Battalion, Delta Company and Alpha Company; Naval Support Activity in Da Nang; the USS Sanctuary AH-17 Hospital Ship and the USS Repose AH-16 Hospital Ship. In addition the Battalion Aid Station was utilized along with a ‘Forward BAS’, which included a medical officer for caring for patients with minor wounds.
All casualties for this period were processed through definitive treatment centers. The Battalion Aid station was not notified of the dispositions, treatment or conditions of the casualties’ med-evaced to commands other than this command.
There were 39 Marines killed, two (2)-hospital corpsman killed and 207 wounded in action from hostile fire reported. One Marine died of wounds.
The Battalion Aid Station Ward having 10 beds was utilized for patients not requiring intensive care. Those patients released from the various medical facilities were treated daily at the Battalion Aid Station and returned to duty as soon as possible.
There were 857 patients seen at sick call. Thirty one-combat injuries and fifty-six combat injuries were evaced to BAS during this period. There were two patients from Golf Battery 3/12 treated at Battalion Aid Station during this period.
Significant medical entities encountered were limited to:
Diarrhea, acute 17 Hemorrhoids 6
Heat Exhaustion 6 Gonorrhea 11
Fungal infections 1 NSU 2
Cellulites 10 Cancroid’s 2
FUO 2 Herpes Genital 2
Perforated Ear Drum 12
Consults were sent as follows:
Dental 32 Ortho 2
EENT 8 Neurological 2
Consults were sent to the following facilities;
Company D, 3rd Medical Battalion 44
Company A, 3rd Medical Battalion 9
Naval Support Activity, Da Nang 10
USS Sanctuary (AH-17) 7
USS Repose (AH-16) 4
There were no cases of Malaria, Scrub Typhus or other significant infections encountered.
12. Administrative Matters. The administrative concept was that units operating in the Gio Linh-Con Thien barrier strip area would request resupply through the S-4 representative at the forward area. The S-4 would forward these requests to the LSA Dong Ha, via the HST resupply net. Supplies were then collected and staged for helicopter delivery at the LSA helicopter pad by the Battalion supply section. The use of the HST resupply net for administrative traffic prevented the Battalion tactical net from being overloaded.
a. Supply techniques, combat loads, ammunitions and weapons Carried by Assault Troops.
(1) All resupply for the units operating in the Gio Linh-Con Thien barrier strip area were resupplied by helicopter lift. On two occasions parachute airdrops were performed by C-130 aircraft but this was discontinued due to heavy and effective enemy fire. The planes took extensive small arms hits. Due to extensive artillery fires on the LZ helicopters would not land but performed ramp drops.
(2) The logistical requirements during this period required large amounts of POL due to the engineer type task force operation POL using vehicles consisted of 28 Bulldozers, 4-M-42’s dual 40mm vehicles, 5 tanks M48A3, 1 LVTC, 6 LVTP-5, 2 LVTH-6, 6 LIWC, and 1 M-109. The POL resupply averaged 14,000 pounds per day.
(3) All units operating on the Gio Linh-Con Thien barrier strip carried the full B/A. On 8 May due to a prolonged action 90% of the B/A was expended by the entire task force and a emergency resupply request was delivered. This emergency resupply was a complete B/A and weighed 92,000 pounds.
b. Maintenance. Third and fourth echelon maintenance was performed by FLSU, Dong Ha. Due to the lack of spare parts at FLSU, the battalions LIWC’s are remaining in 3rd echelon repair for long periods of time.
c. Communications. Communications were satisfactory through out Prairie IV. Some difficulty was experienced due to the close proximities of radio nets operating on frequencies unavoidable too close to each other within the FSCC and other unintentional interferences occurs usually during increased periods of activity but little could be done to alleviate the problem without an administrative net. KY-8 closed voice circuit was employed extensively with excellent results. (And the introduction of TPS-21 radar equipment proved highly successful along the strip between Gio Linh and Con Thien).
(1) Five radio nets were activated during Prairie IV: Battalion TAC #2, provided internal radio communications, Regimental TAC #1, linked the Battalion with Regiment, the Sector Defense net which later was changed to the next higher echelon, the perimeter Defense Net was used for local security of Dong Ha Combat Base and the CAC Force Control Net for establishing coordination between Dong Ha CAC Forces under our operational control.
(2) External wire communications provided continuous operation within the 3rd Marine Division/ III MAF telephone system. Internal wire communications were established at all CP locations.
12. Special Equipment and Techniques. None
13. Commanders Analysis. All forms of combat support and combat service support were effective throughout the period and assigned missions and tasks were accomplished. When one Company was attached to provide security for Gio Linh and it became necessary to move one to Con Thien, the remaining companies were hard pressed to field sufficient patrols and ambushes while providing security for the engineer efforts.
14. Recommendation. On similar situations where a Battalion is operating independently and the enemy has the capability to mass large numbers of troops, it is recommended that not less than three rifle companies of the Battalion be employed in support of engineer elements.
This page last corrected 29 August 2011