Intelligence

A.                 General. (Period covered: 1 May to 31 May 1967).  During the reporting period the Battalion was located at Dong Ha Combat Base with forward elements providing security for the engineer project on the Gio Linh-Con Thien firebreak.  On 15 May the Battalion assumed OPCON of the CAC-P units in the Dong Ha area.  During this period the Intelligence Section was engaged in supporting the forward elements at Gio Linh-Con Thien and the CAC-P units.

B.                 Enemy Situation in the Battalion Operating Area.

1.                The enemy encountered in the Gio Linh-Con Thien area was NVA.  The enemy infantry units were regular line infantry, equipped with AK-47 assault rifles, SKS carbines, RPD LMG, B-40 (RPG) rocket launchers and ChiCom grenades.   These units were reinforced with Sapper units, whose mission was to breach defensive wire with satchel charges to make way for the assault forces.  Transportation units were attached to move casualties to the enemy’s rear.  Fire support was provided by 60mm and 82mm mortars and 82mm recoilless guns (model B-10).

During the 8 May attack on Con Thien, intelligence sources stated that the wounded NVA were transported to a hospital at An Nha (YD 123725).  Besides NVA infantry, North Vietnamese artillery (suspected 76mm and 100mm) was used to shell Con Thien almost daily (receiving from 2 to 60 rounds a day).

Interrogation of NVA POW’s, captured 8 May at Con Thien, identified the enemy units which attacked Con Thien as 4^th Bn, 812^th Regt, 324B NVA Div; 6^th Bn, 812^th Regt, 324B NVA Div (AKA Thu Bon or Ba-VI Regt).

2.           Terrain.

a.                  Critical Terrain Feature.  These included the high ground at Con Thien (YD 114702), which served as a strong point for friendly forces; Hill 56 (Y 140733) an 48 (YD 114734), which were used by the enemy for mortar and RR, attack upon Con Thien.

b.                  Cover and Concealment.  Thick undergrowth, heavy shrubbery, which was knee-high to man-high, and elephant grass, offered good concealment.  Underground cover and sandbag bunkers were necessary due to lack of natural cover.

c.                  Avenue of Approach.  The main avenue of approach was a 10-kilometer dirt road from Cam Lo to Con Thien.  Others were the Fire Break dozed from Gio Linh to Con Thien, and footpaths and trails interlaced in the area to the immediate south of the DMZ.

3.                  Weather.  The start of the rainy season influenced the weather in the operation area.  Rising temperature (to 105 degrees) with humidity averaging 80%, were normal for the reporting period.  Visibility was good, with the exception of 3 or 4 days of haze.  Cumulative rainfall was light, through heavy rain of 1 or 2 hours duration occurred in the mid-afternoon.

4.             Enemy Personnel and Equipment Losses.

a.                  NVA (conf)         240

NVA (prob)        215

NVA captives         8

Weapons captured

      Individual         79

      Crew served     3

ChiCom grenades captured         100

AT mines detonated/destroyed      12

ChiCom radios captured                   1

5.        Items of Significant Intelligence Value.

a.                  On 10 May, the 2^nd Platoon of Company A located a guidance section of a Russian SA-2 (SAM) missile.  It was recovered and forwarded to higher headquarters for analysis.

This page last corrected 29 August 2011