Operation Dewey Canyon

After a majority of the regiment deployed into the AO, the operational code name was changed from Dawson River South to Dewey Canyon. The terrain in the operational area was as rugged as any experienced by the Marines in the war. Thick, nearly impenetrable jungle growth cloaked jagged mountains that stretched to more than one thousand meters above sea level. Trees towered hundreds of feet above the ground, and the lower levels were choked with dense foliage that limited visibility to less than three meters. The jungle would prove to be as difficult a foe as the North Vietnamese.

The second phase was kicked off on 25 January when the rifle companies of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 9th Marines pushed out from FSBs Razor and Cunningham to clear the surrounding areas. Once that mission was accomplished, the two battalions would take up positions along the Da Krong, which ran roughly east to west just south of FSB Cunningham. The 3d Battalion would hold the eastern flank while the 2d held the west; the regiment's 1st Battalion would move into the center position once the other two battalions were in place.

The patrolling Marines immediately began making contact with small bands of NVA. One led to the discovery by Company M, 3/9, of a sophisticated four-strand communications wire. A special Marine and army intelligence team tapped into the wire and immediately began intercepting NVA communications. Company F, 2/9, stumbled on a well-equipped 150-bed hospital situated along the Song Da Krong. Complete with eight permanent buildings, the complex was well stocked with surgical instruments, medicine, and foodstuffs. Evidence indicated that the hospital had been abandoned less than 24 hours earlier.

The Co Ka Leuye ridge straddled the border of Laos and South Vietnam at the southwestern edge of the AO. The boundary actually ran down the middle of the promontory that soared steeply 1,500 meters above sea level, allowing anyone on its top to casually stroll between the two countries. Because its height gave an excellent view into either country, it was an important site. However, the steepness of its sides made scaling it impractical for heavily laden infantry men—until 31 January.

Captain David A. Hitzelberger's Company G, 2/9, had been pa trolling the jungle south of LZ Dallas since 26January. The menacing Co Ka Leuye ridge towered over the company the entire time. To Hitzelberger the peak resembled a jagged tooth. When the battalion ordered him, on 3l January, to scale the ridge, he reacted with stunned disbelief. "You've got to be kidding," he responded to the radioed message.

No, they weren't. The importance of the high ground as an observation post could not be overly stressed. Company G would have to scale the peak. After scouting the ridge's approaches, Hitzelberger selected the northeast side as the most promising—it was only a 35 percent grade.

As the company prepared for its climb, the thickening clouds began releasing rain. The now muddy terrain made the climb even more difficult. Hitzelberger organized climbing teams that would scurry uphill, pulling ropes behind them. Once a team had tied a rope around a stout tree, other Marines would use it to pull them- selves uphill. In the meantime, the climbing teams moved farther uphill, securing another length of rope. In this slow, laborious manner the two hundred men of Company G gained the summit at dusk. They found a mountaintop covered by dense jungle. "You couldn't see anything, the foliage was so thick," Hitzelberger said. "There were no signs that anyone had used the top for anything. It was virgin territory."

Over the next two days, the already bad weather continued to deteriorate. Heavy rains, alternating with drizzle and fog, dropped the ceiling to zero and vastly cut visibility. Most of the time Company G was above a thick layer of gray rain-filled clouds. Unable to observe anything, Hitzelberger received orders to abandon the peak.

Late on the morning of 5 February, Hitzelberger sent a reinforced fire team down the ropes first to provide security for the following platoons. As the Marines descended the slippery slope, they spotted enemy soldiers flitting among the trees below them. They weren't flying to hide. They were waiting for the Marines to get closer.

A short distance downhill the NVA opened fire. From behind trees and well-camouflaged positions, about thirty enemy soldiers fired bursts of small arms and automatic weapons fire at the fire team. Re acting quickly, Hitzelberger sent a platoon into the foray. While they slipped and slid downward, Hitzelberger sent a second platoon to the left to flank the enemy. As it approached the battle site, several RPGs swooshed out of the jungle. The rockets erupted in sharp crashes that sent sizzling shards of jagged metal flying everywhere. Several Marines dropped. The quick pop-pop of rifle fire announced the presence of more enemy riflemen.

A company corpsman rushed forward, ignoring the enemy fire, intent only on treating the casualties. As he cared for the wounded, an enemy rifleman drew a bead on him. The corpsman fell, hit several times.

From behind a nearby boulder, L/Cpl. Thomas P. Noonan watched in horror as blood spurted from the corpsman's neck wound. Concerned only with saving his friend, Noonan ignored the heavy volume of fire to squirm downhill to him. With torrents of rain washing across his face, Noonan slid next to the wounded man and started pulling him to safety. Digging his heels into the soft earth, Noonan struggled to tug the man behind a nearby tree. Hit once, Noonan flopped over backward. Shaking off the shock and pain, he continued his self-appointed task. He'd nearly reached his goal when he was shot again. This time he didn't get up.

While this drama played out, Hitzelberger had his remaining platoon maneuver farther to the left. From this position the Marines crept up a small ravine that led directly to the enemy's positions. Breaking through the NVA's defensive line, the platoon drove off the enemy. A check of the area turned up two enemy bodies. Company G suffered five dead and eighteen wounded in the skirmish. Lance Corporal Noonan's gallant conduct brought him a posthumous Medal of Honor.

The thick canopy of trees and worsening weather prevented helicopters from evacuating the casualties. They'd have to be carried out. Using improvised stretchers, Hitzelberger's men started down the ridge. The pace was agonizingly slow due to the rugged terrain and bad weather. More than half the company was needed to carry the stretchers down the steep, slippery slope. As darkness descended on the jungle, Hitzelberger called for flare ships. Every time a flare dropped below the clouds, the tattered c₉lumn would surge forward forty to fifty meters. In this manner the company proceeded until 0200 the next morning when they halted for a brief rest.

At dawn, Hitzelberger had his men moving. They were headed for a rendezvous with a reinforcing platoon from Company E. The terrain continued to present incredible obstacles. "At times the stretcher cases were moving up and down slopes in excess of seventy degrees," Hitzelberger said. "We had to use up to ten men to carry a stretcher, and it would take us over thirty minutes to move one stretcher case over one bad area."

At 1400 Company G began the most difficult phase of its journey. Over the next few hours, the able-bodied men used ropes to lower the stretcher cases and walking wounded down a steep cliff face. In the driving rain the casualties were carefully lowered to where the relief platoon waited with medical supplies and the first food that Company G had in three days. Once the linkup was made, the force still had a thirty-six-hour hike to the Da Krong. As the company reached the river, a pair of brave CH-46 pilots descended through the clouds to pick up the casualties. Then the combined unit set out for LZ Dallas, finally reaching it late on 8 February. Battalion cormmander Lt. Col. George C. Fox called Company G's ordeal "a tremendous performance in leadership and discipline."

The continued heavy rain, alternating with drizzle and fog, kept most helicopters on the ground. As a result, the 9th Marines commander, Col. Robert H. Barrow (a future commandant of the Marine Corps), had 6rdered all units to hold in place as of 4 February. Not until 10 February did the weather clear sufficiently to allow helicopters to re-supply the ground troops and move them into position to begin phase three. Unfortunately, the week-long weather de lay not only cost the 9th Marines its momentum but also allowed the NVA to strengthen its positions.

The final phase of Operation Dewey Canyon began early on the morning of 11 February when 3/9 crossed the Song Da Krong. The battalion's objectives were Hills 1228 and 1224, the dominant hill masses separating the Song Da Krong Valley from the A Shau Valley, about eight kilometers to the southeast. The next day, the 1st and 2d Battalions crossed the river, too. Each battalion would move generally south until it reached the Vietnamese-Laotian border.

Almost immediately the Marines ran into the NVA. In fact, the 1st Battalion bumped right into a force of enemy preparing for a ground assault on FSB Erskine. Heavy fighting raged for several hours before the NVA withdrew, leaving behind twenty-five dead. On the east, Company M lost two Marines in repulsing a ground attack that cost the NVA eighteen dead. Company C fought a day-long skirmish on 13 February against NVA dug in along its route of march. That evening the enemy hit Company C's night defensive position but did not break through.

All the involved infantry units found their foe to be well disciplined and determined. Most NVA held to their positions until killed. Enemy snipers tied high in treetops fired at close range or dropped grenades on Marines passing beneath them. At night, NVA sappers probed and harassed the Marines' NDPs. It was obvious that the NVA were doing all they could to keep the Marines from tampering with their vital supply bases.

The rifle companies continued their sparring with the enemy as they pushed farther south through the thick, triple-canopied jungle. Company K was particularly hard hit on 16 February, when North Vietnamese forces attacked it from both the front and the rear. Under a barrage of RPGs, rockets, and automatic weapons fire, the company responded with a formidable array of artillery and air strikes. The results were seventeen dead NVA and only a handful of wounded Marines. A still-weak Company G fought a running battle with an enemy company all day on 17 February; the encounter cost five Marines and thirty-nine NVA their lives.

Determined to hurt the invaders of their sanctuary, the North Vietnamese sent a reinforced company against FSB Cunningham early on the morning of 17 February. Weighed down with high explosives, sappers slipped through the perimeter wire and wrecked havoc in- side the base. Not only was one howitzer of the 2d Battalion, 12th Marines destroyed in the attack, the enemy also knocked out the fire direction center. Before the enemy sappers were hunted down and killed, four Marines died and forty-six were wounded in the three- hour fight. The bodies of thirteen sappers were found inside the base, and another thirty-seven lay outside.

In the meantime, the regiment's maneuver elements were nearing the east-west—running border and Highway 922. The closer they came, the stiffer the enemy resistance grew. Particularly hard hit was the 1st Battalion. On the morning of 18 February, Company A fought a pitched battle with NVA ensconced in reinforced bunkers dug into a heavily forested ridgeline. Following air and artillery strikes, the grunts finally overwhelmed the force, killing thirty NVA while losing one Marine. The next morning, Company C moved through Company A and continued the advance. On the twentieth, it encountered another fortified enemy position. After pummeling the hillside with all available supporting arms, the infantry attacked. When the fight ended, seventy-one dead NVA were added to operation's body count; five Marines died and twenty-eight were wounded.

Using rotation tactics, Company A resumed the lead. Almost immediately it slammed into yet another dug-in enemy force. When that fight ended, seventeen NVA were dead; one Marine was killed and two were wounded. During these various actions the rifle companies also captured a considerable quantity of enemy weapons and equipment. Among the trophies were two 122mm field guns, the largest taken in the war, a five-ton prime mover, several trucks, and tons of ammo.

On 20 February, to the west of the 1st Battalion fights, two 2d Battalion units finally reached positions that overlooked Route 922 and the international border. The men of Companies E and H could actually see enemy convoys moving on the dirt road below them.

Until now, the allies had been forbidden from crossing the inter national border. Although U.S. Army Special Forces and Marine recon teams had run clandestine cross-border operations for years, political considerations had kept any major infantry units from crossing the border. Now, as the NVA freely moved his forces across the border under the watchful eyes of the Marines, it was obvious to all involved that something would have to be done about that policy.

General Davis sent the request to cross into Laos to III MAF, who, in turn, forwarded it to MACV General Abrams said no.  However, on the afternoon of 21 February, Capt. David F. Winecoff, commander of Company H, 2/9, received a classified message authorizing him to conduct an ambush on Highway 922. Taking just two platoons, Winecoff personally led them downhill. By midnight they were in place in the thick brush that lay between the dirt road and a paralleling stream. At 0230 on 22 February, a convoy of eight enemy trucks entered the kill zone. Winecoff opened the ambush by firing his Claymore mine. With a loud roar and a cloud of inky black smoke, thousands of steel balls shredded the second truck and its occupants. An instant later a cacophony of M16 and M60 fire exploded from the brush. As Winecoff said, "Everybody had been waiting a long time and the excitement was keen."

The firing continued for several minutes. An eerie quiet then descended on the jungle road as Winecoff waited for the dust to settle. He then signaled his men to inspect the convoy. Eight dead North Vietnamese were found; three of the trucks were completely destroyed. Not a single Marine was injured. Satisfied with their work, Winecoff ordered his platoons back into the jungle. By mid morning, they had rejoined the rest of the company on the top of the ridge.

Once Winecoff was safely back inside South Vietnam, word of his cross-border incursion swiftly made its way up the chain of command.  Permission to expand operations in Laos against enemy forces using Highway 922 was sought by III MAF. Faced with the realities of the tactical situation, General Abrams reluctantly agreed, although he restricted the efforts to this small portion of the border. Also, he imposed gag orders on any public discussion of the incursions.

Before the 2d Battalion could move back into Laos, though, heavy fighting erupted in the 1st Battalion's area. On the morning of 22 February, the 1st Platoon of Company A fought a quick battle with an NVA squad dug in on a hillside. When the skirmish was over, the company commander, 1st Lt. Wesley L. Fox, sent a detail to fill canteens at a nearby creek. No sooner had the twenty-man detail reached the water when it suddenly came under intense machine- gun and mortar fire. Lieutenant Fox immediately recalled the de tail and sent the 1st Platoon forward in an attack.

After advancing just a short distance through the thick jungle, the platoon ran smack into a reinforced NVA company occupying well- prepared, mutually supporting bunkers. As the Marines maneuvered forward, NVA machine guns, RPGs, and mortars emplaced on a ridgeline behind them suddenly opened' up. Unable to use air sup port because of the bad weather or artillery support due to the close proximity of the enemy, Fox knew that he had to maintain the momentum of the attack. Quickly advancing to the front, he personally led his remaining platoons in a spirited assault.

A few minutes later, Fox's command group was devastated when an enemy mortar round landed in their midst. Everyone except the executive officer, 1st Lt. Lee R. Herron, was killed or wounded. Herron immediately took over for the mortally wounded 2d Platoon leader while Fox, despite painful wounds, continued in command of the company. His grunts fought valiantly in the bitter, close- quarters combat that followed. Fox himself destroyed several enemy positions and was wounded twice more before the fight ended. The results of what would prove to be the last major engagement of Operation Dewey Canyon yielded 105 dead NVA and more than two dozen automatic weapons captured. However, the victory came at a high price. Company A suffered 11 killed and 72 wounded; in all, more than half the company were casualties. For their personal valor, Lieutenant Fox received a Medal of Honor, and Lieutenant Herron, who did not survive the fight, received a Navy Cross.

Five days later, Company D, operating several kilometers east of where Company A fought, uncovered one of the largest enemy weapons and ammo caches of the year. Near the base of Hill 1044 the Marines found more than 600 rifles, 60 machine guns, 14 mortars, 15 recoilless rifles, 19 antiaircraft guns, and more than 100 tons of ammunition. It took the men two days to catalog and destroy the cache.

The 3d Battalion made substantial finds, too, as it moved east and south. On 18 February, Company L discovered a cemetery containing the remains of 185 NVA, most of whom had been buried in June 1968. Three days later, in the Tam Boi Mountain complex astride the border, Company M found a well-equipped maintenance facility containing repair pits, a front loader, several complete engines, and a huge supply of fuel. On the twenty-third, the battalion came upon several damaged 122mm field guns, a prime mover, and vast quantities of ammo near Hill 1228. Further exploration revealed a head quarters and administrative facility composed of 11 huge tunnels. Ex tending up to 250 meters into the solid rock, the cross-connected tunnels contained extensive repair shops, storage facilities, and even a hospital. The latter had been evacuated so rapidly that one patient was actually abandoned in mid operation.

In the meantime, once General Abrams had given his reluctant approval, 2/9 was ordered back into Laos. According to the plan, Company H, followed by Companies E and F, would push eastward along Highway 922, forcing any NVA into the waiting 1st and 3d Battalions.  Neither Captain Winecoff nor his men were excited at the news, but on the night of 24 February, they obediently set up another ambush along Highway 922.  Before too long they opened fire on six NVA, killing four. At dawn Company H headed eastward. Winecoff's riflemen killed another eight enemy that day and captured a 122mm field gun and two 40mm antiaircraft guns. Two Marines were killed and seven were wounded in that firefight. Later the same day, the WA ambushed one of Company H's flanking patrols, killing three Marines and wounding five. One of the dead was Cpl. William D. Morgan, who earned a Medal of Honor by deliberately sacrificing his life to allow two of the wounded men to be pulled to safety.

The three companies continued their rapid-paced trek, covering five kilometers in five days and killing forty-eight enemy soldiers. As they neared the South Vietnamese border, enemy resistance all but disappeared. On 3 March, the battalion was airlifted out of Laos back to the Vandegrift Combat Base. In accordance with General Abrams's dictates, all references to the incursion were withheld from the official record. To sustain the deceit, the families of casualties were informed that their loved ones' injuries had occurred in South Vietnam. Even Corporal Morgan's parents were presented their son's posthumous Medal of Honor with a citation stating that the action had taken place "southeast of Vandegrift Combat Base."

Once the 2d Battalion was removed from the AO, the extraction of the other units, and the closings of the numerous fire support bases, began. Originally scheduled to be completed by 7 March, the extractions were slowed by extremely bad weather. Not until 18 March was the last part of the 1st Battalion pulled out of FSB Cunningham.  Final results for Operation Dewey Canyon tallied 1,617 enemy killed and huge quantities of supplies, weapons, and munitions destroyed. The 9th Marines lost 130 killed and 920 wounded. But, for those losses the Marines greatly disrupted the enemy's presence in this border region and blocked his ability to move on major civilian and military targets to the east.