Operation Swift

To see events leading up to this Operation Click Here

As September neared, the Communists faced an increasing loss of control of the population in the coastal region south of Da Nang. The 2dNVA Division again moved into the Que Son Basin.

The Marines anticipated that the Communists would try to increase their strength in this area during this period, since it corresponded with the time of the South Vietnamese national elections, as well as preparations for the fall rice harvest. At the beginning of September, intelligence sources reported that elements of all three regiments of the NVA division had moved into the area. There were increasing indications that these enemy units planned offensive actions to disrupt the elections in Que Son District. The Marines responded with numerous small unit operations to screen the district polling places. Operation Swift was the outgrowth of one of the election day screening sweeps near Dong Son village, eight miles to the southwest of Thang Binh along Route 534.

The operation began when the enemy attacked Captain Robert F. Morgan's Company D, 5th Marines just before dawn on 4 September. The action unfolded slowly. At 0430, the enemy force struck the Marine company with small arms fire and mortar rounds from positions 100 meters northwest and west of the company perimeter. The Marines returned fire and recalled the company outposts. Help arrived in the form of an armed UH- lE, but when the Marines marked their position with a strobe light, the NVA soldiers saw it too. As soon as the light began flashing, the enemy hit the position with even more accurate small arms and mortar fire..

A short time later, Marines discovered enemy infiltrators inside the western segment of the company perimeter. Captain Morgan organized a force to drive the NVA out and by 0620 reestablished the perimeter. As it reorganized, more NVA automatic weapons hit Company D, killing Captain Morgan. The executive officer, First Lieutenant William P. Vacca, called for air strikes, some within 50 meters of the company lines. The enemy pulled back. As the fire let up, Vacca completed the perimeter reorganization and requested helicopter evacuation for his casualties. At the same time, he reported that he faced at least an enemy company and needed help. His battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Peter L. Hilgartner, responded by ordering Captain Thomas D. Reese, Jr.'s Company B, then 4,000 meters to the west and near the battalion CP on Hill 51, to move overland to Vacca's position.

Company B arrived in the vicinity of the battle by 0820, and within the hour it came under fire from another enemy force, apparently a company, entrenched in the town of Dong Son.  Captain Reese asked for a tear gas drop on the dug-in NVA, and "Hueys" from VMO-2 obliged by dropping 400 pounds of the agent on the enemy lines. The Communists broke and ran north toward the Ly Ly River. Company B attacked, killing 26 of the enemy, and secured the eastern end of Dong Son.  While Company B fought in the east end of town HMM-363 helicopters arrived over the battle area to pick up Company D's casualties. The NVA force greeted the aircraft with heavy fire and decoy smoke signals. They hit two UH-34s and shot one down over Company D. They also shot down one of VMO-2's UH-lEs, piloted by Major David L. Ross, who managed to land in the Company D perimeter. Ross changed his "Deadlock" radio call sign to "Deadlock on the deck" and continued to help direct air strikes on the enemy. He also provided ammunition and machine guns from his aircraft to help in the defense of the perimeter.'

At 0925, Lieutenant Colonel Webster's 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, based at the regimental command post seven miles east of Que Son, received orders to prepare two companies for a helilift to the Dong Son area for attachment to Hilgartner's battalion. By 1245 both of the 3d Battalion companies, K and M, and Hilgartner's 1st Battalion command group had landed four kilometers east-northeast of Dong Son and were preparing to move toward Companies B and D. Meanwhile, Company B found another enemy pocket in the west end of Dong Son.  After an air strike, the company moved in and cleared the west end; they killed nine more Communists in this action. Fighting in the town diminished as Companies B and D consolidated their positions in the western edge of the village; Hilgartner's force was less fortunate.

At 1430, Hilgartner's Companies K and M were advancing in column. Company K, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Hilgartner's command group, led the movement. "We were alerted to the impending conflict," said Hilgartner, "when one of our scouts brought in a Chinese-made, magazine-fed, light machine gun which was found teetering back and forth on a large rock." Hilgartner radioed this information to Major Richard J. Alger, the regimental operations officer. Alger replied that he had just received an intelligence report that a large enemy force was in the area.

These two events gave Hilgartner time to begin to change his tactical formation from a column to two companies on line. He ordered Company M to move up on Company K's right. As Company M advanced, both companies came under intense fire from a large NVA force in what the Marines later found to be an L-shaped, entrenched position.

Company M's 1st Platoon was crossing a rice paddy about 1430 when it first came under heavy fire from an estimated enemy company. First Lieutenant John D. Murray, commanding Company M, sent his 2d Platoon to assist the 1st Platoon. While crossing a small knoll near the village of Chau Lam, the 2d Platoon ran head-on into still another entrenched NVA company. The 1st Platoon's commander, Second Lieutenant Edward L. Blecksmith, ordered his Marines to pull back to the top of the knoll. While the 2d Platoon fought the by now attacking North Vietnamese, Lieutenant Murray ordered the remainder of the company to move onto the knoll with the 1st Platoon and set up a perimeter. The enemy quickly encircled Company M and pounded it with more than 200 mortar rounds, as well as extremely heavy automatic weapons fire. Murray requested a tear gas drop on the enemy positions to help the 2d Platoon disengage. While the gas did slow up the Communist assaults, it did not help the many Marines who had lost or discarded their gas masks during the action.

As the gas lifted, the NVA renewed their attack and, on at least -one occasion, succeeded in penetrating the 2d Platoon's lines. Sergeant Lawrence D. Peters, a squad leader, stood up to point out NVA positions until hit in the leg. Despite his wound, he led his men until they drove the enemy from the position. Sergeant Peters died later that evening from a fragment wound.

The enemy attacks separated Hilgartner's two companies; each had to fight independently. Cap tain Joseph R. Tenny, commanding Company K, fought and maneuvered his company against the enemy in a firefight that lasted until nightfall. Finally, he had to back off and set up night positions with Hilgartner's command group.

As darkness fell over the Que Son Valley, the Marines called for air strikes. Captain Roberr J. Fitzsimmons and his aerial observer, First Lieutenant Robert H. Whitlow, arrived over the battlefield in a Cessna 0-1 Bird Dog to control the strike.  Napalm and 500-pound bombs exploded as close as 50 meters to Company M's lines. To the west, Marine artillery from Que Son fired in support of Companies B and D. Early in the evening the fighting reached a crescendo when the North Vietnamese opened up against the attacking planes with heavy machine guns. Marine A.6A Intruders, directed by Whitlow, attacked the main cluster of enemy antiaircraft positions on Hill 63. After silencing these guns, the A-6As struck at Communist mortars within 60 meters of Company K. By 2000 the one- sided air-ground duel was over. Although scattered action continued on the ground, the destruction of the NVA antiaircraft positions signaled the end of major fighting. Corporal Joseph E. Fuller, a Company M squad leader, was one of many infantrymen who recognized the value of Marine close air support during the night of 4 September. Referring to the strikes, Fuller later commented, "I'd like to thank the FAC that called it in . . . I think that is what real ly saved us.

Marine artillery fire from Que Son and Thang Binh continued to pound the North Vietnamese after the heaviest fighting subsided. Under the cover of artillery fire, UH-34 helicopters from Lieutenant Colonel Robert Lewis, Jr.'s HMM-363 delivered supplies and evacuated casualties. At 0100, Captain Francis M. Burke's Company I, 5th Marines fought its way to Hilgartner's positions. After its arrival, the enemy backed off and the rest of the night passed quietly.

While these events took place, Lieutenant Colonel Webster's 3d Battalion Command Group and Company D, 1st Marines received orders to join Companies B and D to the west. Early on 5 September, Webster's force reached the two companies, at which time he assumed operational control.

Although the NVA broke contact with the Marines, they did not leave the basin area. The 5th Marines commander, Colonel Davis, ordered his 1st and 3d Battalions to sweep toward the foothills bordering the southern edge of the basin. The morning of the 6th, the two battalion command groups exchanged operational control of their respective companies and the 5th Marines continued the attack to the southeast. At 1515 that afternoon Hilgartner's companies ran into two battalions of the 1st VC Regiment near Vinh Huy.  Lead elements of the Marine battalion came under fire from snipers and as the Marines continued to advance, heavy automatic weapons fire stopped the lead platoon, the 3d Platoon of Company B, in an open rice paddy. Captain Reese sent his 2d Platoon around to the right of the stalemated platoon to provide covering fire so that it could withdraw, but the 2d Platoon also came under extremely heavy and accurate fire which stopped its advance. The Marines took cover behind some graves and a hedgerow and once more tried to establish a base of fire to cover the 3d Platoon's withdrawal. Again, enemy fire superiority prevailed. Reese then sent the 1st Platoon further to the right in still another attempt to outflank the NVA. As the 1st Platoon moved, it found itself outflanked and almost surrounded. Forced to pull back almost immediately, the platoon had to leave some of its dead behind, but managed to bring out all of the wound ed. While the North Vietnamese concentrated on the 1st Platoon, there was a lull in the firing in front of the 3d Platoon, so at last, it managed to pull back from the exposed paddy.

Next, the NVA hit the 2d Platoon position with a frontal assault, as well as an envelopment of the right flank. Lance Corporal Lonnie R. Henshaw recalled:  We looked up and saw many NVA in full uniforms, packs, and cartridge belts running across the rice paddy at us. We started shooting and we could see them falling, but they didn't stop and more and more of them kept coming. Nothing could stop them, it was like they were doped up.

By now the enemy, in strength, was so close that Lieutenant Brackeen realized he could not hold the position much longer. He requested tear gas to cover the withdrawal of what was left of the platoon to the battalion perimeter. The tear gas worked and the Marines moved back to the battalion position with their wounded, but not their dead.

After the gas attack to support Brackeen's withdrawal, enemy fare slackened, but as the gas dissipated the NVA renewed their assault. Artillery fare from Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Hunter, Jr.'s 2d Battalion, 11th Marines landed within 50 meters of the Marine lines, while air strikes hit as close as 100 meters from the position. The NVA assaults stopped; however, as night fell the battalion came under heavy mortar and rocket fire. NVA soldiers, crawling as close as 15 meters to the perimeter, began. lobbing grenades into the lines, while others attempted to slip through the defenses. The battalion's S-3, Major Charles H. Black, checking a sector of Company D's lines, discovered some of the infiltrators. Major Black killed several of them as he rallied nearby Marines to drive out the others. The enemy attacked until about 0200, at which time they withdrew, leaving behind 61 bodies. The Marines had lost 35 killed and 92 wounded in the action.

Northeast of the 1st Battalion action, the 3d Battalion also became heavily engaged on the afternoon of 6 September. By 1400, Lieutenant Colonel Webster's Marines had seized Hill 48, without meeting significant resistance. Webster then ordered Captain Francis M. Burke's Company I to seize Hill 43, 1,100 meters southeast of Hill 48. When Burke's company was about 200 meters from the base of the hill, the lead elements saw two camouflaged NVA soldiers and opened fire on them. Automatic weapons fire erupted from the left front, but initial Communist resistance was light and the lead platoon continued to push through. Resistance began to stiffen and Captain Burke ordered his other two platoons up on either flank of the lead platoon. All three platoons continued to push on. At 1630, heavy machine gun fire hit Burke's left platoon. The advance stopped. Burke ordered the other two platoons to shift over to help the stalled platoon, but they also became heavily engaged. Finally the company managed to consolidate its position. Lieutenant Colonel Webster ordered Company K to go to Burke's assistance. By the time that Company K had fought its way to Burke's position, Company I had many casualties, some of whom were still forward of the company front. With the arrival of the second company, the Marines recovered most of their casualties and established a better perimeter.

Between 1900 and 2300, Companies I and K repulsed two determined NVA assaults. Heavy machine guns supported both attacks and the second broke into the Marine positions before the Marines threw it back after furious hand-to-hand fighting. At 2300, Lieutenant Murray's Company M, the battalion reserve, joined Companies I and K. The enemy pressed the position until just after midnight when the Marines used tear gas to drive them off. Only a few mortar rounds interrupted the rest of the night. Dawn revealed 88 enemy bodies around the position. Webster's losses were 34 killed and 109 wounded.

At first light on 7 September, both battalions began searching the enemy dead for items of intelligence value. They found a map which revealed the defensive positions of a battalion of the 1st VC Regiment.  'It pinpointed company and command post locations, as well as mortar positions and ammunition storage sites. This information triggered an attack to the east by Hilgartner's battalion. Sup porting arms blasted the plotted enemy positions and then the infantry swept through them. As the operation progressed, on the 9th, the 1st Battalion Marines found 91 cases of small arms ammunition, 27 cases of mortar rounds, hundreds of hand grenades, and 6 cases of 75mm recoilless rifle rounds as well as a vast assortment of loose ordnance. The Marines saved samples for intelligence purposes, and blew the rest in place.

At this time, General Robertson again activated Task Force X-Ray under the command of Brigadier General LaHue.  X-Ray now included the U.S. Army's 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Peter P. Petro, USA. Simultaneously, the Vietnamese started their companion Operation Lien Ket 116.

There were two more significant encounters during the last days of Operation Swift. The first occurred on 10 September during a patrol northeast of Hill 43 by Captain Gene W. Bowers' Company H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines.

Early in the afternoon, Company H searched a small village and found it empty except for a few women and children. The Marines noted, however, that the enemy had fortified the village with bunkers, interlocking trenches, and barbed wire.

Upon completion of its search of the village, Company H continued its patrol. After moving another 1,500 meters, the company established a defensive position on a small hill at about 1400 and requested re-supply by helicopter. To provide additional securitry, Captain Bowers ordered Second Lieutenant Allan J. Herman's 3d Platoon to patrol around the hill in a circle with about a one-mile radius. The 3d Platoon departed the perimeter and a heavy rain began falling.

The patrol route took the 3d Platoon back to the small village which Company H had recently search ed. In the interim, however, a reinforced North Vietnamese company had slipped back and reoccupied the well-constructed defensive positions. Herman's platoon reached the vicinity of the village around 1430 and began crossing the rice paddies around it. The North Vietnamese company remain ed quiet until the lead squad of Marines was about to enter the village, then opened up with sudden, intense, automatic weapons fire, including .50-caliber machine guns, and virtually eliminated lead Marine squad. The heavy file, supplemented by 60mm mortars, gave the North Vietnamese fire superiority over the rest of the Marine platoon and it could not move. The platoon was soon leaderless; Lieutenant Herman died trying to rescue a wounded Marine in the rice paddy.

Company H had just received its supplies by helicopter when Captain Bowers heard the sound of automatic weapons and mortars from the direction of the village. Since he could not contact the 3d Platoon by radio, Captain Bowers left a small contingent to guard the supplies and quickly moved the rest of his company toward the sound of the firing. Enroute, Bowers made radio contact with a wounded corporal from the 3d Platoon who described the situation, including the death of Lieutenant Herman.

Captain Bowers sent the 2d Platoon around to the left where it could provide a base of fire as well as cover by fire the enemy escape route from the rear of the village. The company headquarters and the 1st Platoon continued toward the 3d Platoon and at tempted to gain fire superiority over the NVA unit. "Mortar and artillery fire," wrote Bowers, "was brought to bear on the enemy. . . with fife landing within 50 meters of friendly positions. Helicopter gunships arrived to rocket and strafe the NVA positions while artillery sealed the rear of the village.

Company M, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, which the battalion commander sent to assist Company H, arrived on the scene and joined the fight. After several air strikes by fixed-wing aircraft armed with 250-pound bombs, two A-4 aircraft dropped rear gas on the enemy. The two rifle companies then made a successful, coordinated assault on the village. Only a few NVA soldiers escaped out the other side of the village.

After the assault, the Marines searched the village and counted 40 dead NVA soldiers above ground. Others, Bowers reported, probably lay buried in the bunkers and trenches collapsed by the artillery and air strikes.

Nine Marines died in the action, six of them in the rice paddies just in front of the enemy fortifications. "They were found," noted Bowers in 1981, "with their M- 16 rifles broken down in an attempt to remove cartridges jammed in the chambers. They had powder-burned bullet holes in their heads.

The second engagement at the end of Operation Swift started at 0330 the morning of 12 September. Two NVA companies attacked Captain Burke's Company I patrol base. Burke's Marines repulsed the attack, but as the enemy withdrew they bumped in to one of Captain Tenney's Company K platoon out posts and received a further battering. NVA losses were 35 killed and four captured.

Elements of two enemy battalions hit the rangers again at 1700 on the 13th. The enemy closed to grenade range and heavy action continued until about 1900. That night, more ARVN units arrived in the area in helicopters to help the rangers. Both the 1st and 3d Battalions, 5th Marines debarked from helicopters in a secure LZ northeast of the engaged ranger group. The Marine battalions attack ed south-southeast to relieve the pressure on the rangers, and by dawn, the NVA broke contact leaving 49 bodies on the battlefield. The rangers suffered 69 wounded and 15 killed in the engagement. This action was the last sizable encounter of both Swift and Lien Ket 116.

Operation Swift ended on 15 September. Once more allied forces had driven the 2d NVA Division from the basin. The enemy's 1967 dry season offensive in the southern part of I Corps had failed. By the end of September allied commands regarded the 1st VC and 3d NVA Regiments unfit for combat. More than 4,000 enemy troops reportedly died between 21 April, when Union I began, and the last day of September. A prime reason for this turn of events was the sudden arrival of a large U.S. Army force in Southern I Corps, which allowed III MAF units to operate in the Que Son Basin on a permanent basis, thereby breaking the Communist stranglehold on the area.

Operation Swift's heavy, sustained combat created personnel accounting problems which were unusual in the kind of war most of the 1st Marine Division fought in 1967. The 5th Marines and the division encountered many difficulties during Swift with casualty reporting, recovery, evacuation, and disposition of the dead, as well as with what Colonel William R. Earney termed "the big No-No," missing in action. "They [5th Marines] could tell you," commented Colonel Earney, "where the enemy was and their body count [of enemy dead] but not a comprehensive report as to what their own condition was.  The task of answering many of the personnel questions fell to the division staff, including, according to Colonel Earney, determining which morgue held the corpse of Medal of Honor recipient Capadonno before his brother arrived in South Vietnam to view the body."