Operation Houston, Operation Worth, Operation Allen Brook, Operation Mameluke, Operation MauiPeak, Operation Meade River, Operation Taylor Common

 

The 2d NVA Division had planned to participate in the attack on Da Nang, but Marine recon teams picked up their movement while they were still in the mountains west of An Hoa. The recon teams called in air strikes and artillery missions. Then, division headquarters dispatched 3/5 and 2/3 to follow up the bombardments. Faced with this formidable force, the remaining NVA melted back into the mountains.

Since the opening days of the Tet Offensive, General Westmoreland had been under considerable pressure from Washington to quickly contain the enemy. To do so, he requested the immediate deployment of an additional 206,000 troops. Though this call for reinforcements shocked both Washington and the American public, and would have far-reaching political ramifications for the U.S. effort in South Vietnam, for III MAF it meant the addition of another Marine regiment to its order of battle.

When the 27th Marines was alerted for movement to the war zone, two of its battalions, the 2d and 3d, were stationed at Camp Pendleton in California and one was afloat in the Pacific. The regiment's 2d Battalion arrived at Da Nang by air on 17 February. Three days later, 3/27 landed at Da Nang. The 1st Battalion, 27th Marines was at sea on a training exercise with the Hawaii-based 1st Marine Brigade when word came to go to DaNang. The Marines arrived in South Vietnam on 28 February.

The deployment of the 27th Marines was planned by MACV to be temporary; General Westmoreland felt that it could be released in no more than four months. The new arrivals were assigned a TAOR along the coast south of Marble Mountain and north of Hoi An. This freed the 5th Marines to concentrate its efforts in the area from the Hai Van Pass north to Phu Bai. Accordingly, it opened Operation Houston on 26 February with 2/3 and 3/5 to sweep the area adjacent to Highway 1.

Continued concern about the Marine commands' ability to effectively control the tactical situation in I Corps finally prompted General Westmoreland to open an MACV sub-headquarters at Phu Bai. He appointed his hard-charging deputy, Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., as the commander of MACV-Forward on 9 February. Abrams would directly oversee III MAF and the soon-to-be-formed Provisional Corps, Vietnam. Neither General Cushman nor his subordinates were pleased with this move.

Additional reinforcements for III MAF arrived on 19 February in the form of two U.S. Army airborne brigades—the 101st Airborne Division's 1st Brigade and the 82d Airborne Division's 3d Brigade— directly from the United States. Both units were assigned to the 101st Airborne Division, which was operating north of Hue. With these additions, MACV decided that control of five-plus scattered divisions was too great a span. Accordingly, on 10 March, Lt. Gen. William B. Rosson, the former commander of I Field Force, Vietnam, was given command of the newly created Provisional Corps, Vietnam. Marine Major General Raymond G. Davis was appointed his deputy. The Provisional Corps assumed operational control of the army's 1st Cavalry Division and 101st Airborne Division, as well as the 3d Marine Division. Operational control of the Provisional Corps was, in turn, given to General Cushman. With the activation of the Provisional Corps, the MACV-Forward headquarters was inactivated, and General Abrams returned to Saigon. On 15 August 1968, the Provisional Corps would be re-designated XXIV Corps, with an army general in command.


To keep pressure on the enemy, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 7th Marines began Operation Worth on 12 March, twenty kilometers southwest of Da Nang. It soon became apparent that the NVA had a full division in the operational region. The enemy forces seemed to be concentrated in the Go Noi Island area, a delta west of Hoi An formed by the meanderings of the Ky Lam River and bisected by Highway 1 and a bermed railroad.

Eager to tangle with the enemy, Col. Reverdy M. Hall ended his 7th Marines' Operation Worth and began Operation Allen Brook on 4 May. On that morning, CH-46s carried 2/7 into LZs along the western edge of Go Noi Island. Proceeding eastbound, the rifle companies encountered only light resistance for the first four days. Then, enemy resistance picked up as they neared Xuan Dai, a hamlet just south of the river and west of the bermed railroad. The Marines fought for most of 9 May, making generous use of air and artillery support before they overran the defenders. Eighty dead NVA attested to the viciousness of the fighting.

On 13 May, 3/7 replaced 2/7, reversed direction, and started sweeping back to the west. Two days later the battalion found the enemy in bunkers in Phu Dong, two kilometers west of Xuan Dai. It took most of the day for the rifle companies to clear the hamlet.

Following that fight, the 7th Marines passed control of Operation Allen Brook to the 27th Marines. The fresh regiment's 3d Battalion air assaulted into LZs two kilometers west of Phu Dong. Almost immediately it encountered strong enemy forces. Heavy fighting raged for the next ten days as the Marines steadily moved westward toward An Hoa.

Once removed from the Allen Brook operation, the 7th Marines opened Operation Mameluke Thrust on 18 May. This new operation focused on the area west and south of Da Nang, known to the Marines as Happy Valley.

The dual operations screened the enemy's avenues of approach to Da Nang throughout the summer. In the Go Noi Island TAOR, the two infantry battalions assigned to the 27th Marines, 1/26 and 1/27, maneuvered back and forth in search of the enemy. Though most days passed without any contact, when the Marines did find the foe the fighting was vicious.

In early June, General Robertson relinquished command of the 1st Marine Division to Maj. Gen. Carl A. Youngdale. A Marine since1936, Youngdale brought his considerable combat experience from both World War II and Korea to his new post.

The 5th Marines assumed responsibility for Operation Mameluke Thrust in mid-July. It shifted the operation's focus south to An Hoa. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 5th Marines pushed east out of An Hoa on 16 August, sweeping toward positions held by 2/7 (Special Landing Force Bravo). On day two of the sweep, 200 enemy soldiers were pushed into 2/7's position; 50 of them were killed in the subsequent fighting.

The 27th Marines ended Operation Allen Brook on 24 August. Tallies for the campaign showed 1,017 enemy killed. Marine casualties were 172 dead and 1,124 wounded.

Despite the best efforts of the Marines involved in these twin operations, the enemy again managed to maneuver to within striking distance of Da Nang. In the early morning hours of 23 August, the 402d VC Sapper Battalion, charging behind a cloud of mortar shells and rockets, overran the Popular Forces detachment guarding the Cam Le Bridge over the Song Cau Do south of Da Nang. However, before the enemy could exploit its victory, Company C, 1st Marine MP Battalion came roaring up in trucks and jeeps and took positions on the north end of the bridge. Fighting valiantly, the policemen stopped the VC from crossing the bridge. Later that morning, Cornpany A, 1/27, attacked the enemy from the south. Squeezed between the two forces, the sappers broke contact and fled.

In early September, the 1st Marines, which had been operating with the 3d Marine Division along the DMZ, returned to the Da Nang TAOR. This, in turn, permitted the 27th Marines to begin preparations for its return to Camp Pendleton. The regiment's 2d and 3d Battalions began their redeployment on 10 September; the movement was completed six days later. The 1st Battalion completed its move to Hawaii a few days later.

In late September, the NVA attacked a U.S. Army Special Forces camp at Thuong Duc. Situated in a picturesque river valley in central Quang Nam Province, the Green Beret camp had long been an irritant to enemy forces intent on traversing the area. On 28 September, enemy infantry struck two of the camp's outposts. The quick response of Marine A-6As broke up the attack before the NVA could do further damage.

To help stabilize the tenuous situation, on 6 October, General Youngdale authorized the 7th Marines to launch Operation Maui Peak. With the enemy holding the high ground on three sides of the camp, any overland relief force would be prone to ambush by the NVA. The Marines responded to this often-used NVA tactic by setting a trap of their own. A relief column would head down Route 4 toward the camp to fix the enemy in place. Then, helicopters would bring other Marines behind the NVA in strength.

By noon on 6 October, the overland force, 2/5, had indeed slammed into fortified enemy positions six kilometers east of Thuong Duc. Meanwhile; 2/7and two battalions of ARVN soldiers landed unopposed at LZ Vulture, five kilometers northwest of the camp. Landing Zone Sparrow, five kilometers southeast of the camp, proved to be too well protected by enemy antiaircraft fire for 3/5 to land. In stead, 3/5 diverted to an alternate LZ five kilometers farther east.

In the meantime, the column easily pushed through the enemy roadblocks. The next day the column attacked an NVA force emplaced on Hill 163, just east of the camp. It finally cleared the hill on 8 October. The other Marine and ARVN battalions encountered only minor resistance as they swept the high ground overlooking the camp. The NVA tried to retake Hill 163 on 12 October, but Company E, 2/5, easily repulsed the attackers. With the Special Forces camp once again secure, Operation Maui Peak came to an end on 19 October; 28 Marines died in the operation and 100 were wounded.

The ongoing operation Mameluke Thrust was closed out a few days later, on 23 October. The Marines claimed 2,728 enemy killed versus 267 dead of their own and 1,730 wounded.

At the beginning of November, the South Vietnamese government began the Le Loi, or Accelerated Pacification, Program. It was designed to restore within the rural population by 3l January 1969 the pre-Tet level of security. As an active participant in Le Loi, the 1st Marine Division decreased its search and destroy operations and focused on village cordons designed to promote area security. Essentially, the tactics were the same as the County Fair operations that had been used by the Marines since they had been in-country.

The most successful of the 1st Marine Division's Le Loi sweeps was Operation Meade River, begun on 20 November. Meade River's target area, known to the grunts as Dodge City for its 'shoot-em-up' atmosphere, was twenty kilometers south of Da Nang. Long a hotbed of VC activity, Dodge City was forty square kilometers of hostile terrain. A lowland dotted with rice paddies and swamps, Dodge City was honeycombed with camouflaged caves and tunnels. Eight villages were spaced across the area. Marine intelligence estimated that elements of three NVA regiments,the 36th, 38th, and 368B,called Dodge City home. In addition, one hundred named VC operated a tight infrastructure within the target area.

Operating under control of the 1st Marines for Operation Meade River were six infantry battalions: 1 / 1; 2d and 3d Battalions, 5th Marines; 3/26; BLT 2/26 from SLF Alpha; and BLT 2/27 from SLF Bravo. The Marine commanders knew that in order for the cordon to be effective it had to be put into place rapidly. Underscoring the superb coordination that existed between the air and ground forces, the Marine helicopter squadrons responded with precision and speed. On the morning of 20 November, in the Marines' largest air-mobile operation of the war, 76 helicopters ferried 3,500 Marines into 47 different LZs in just two hours. Truck convoys hauled other Marines, ARVN, and Korean soldiers to their positions. Before the enemy could react, more than 7,000 allied troops had encircled them in a 30-kilometer cordon so tight that there was one three-man fire team positioned every 15 meters.

Once in position, the Marines eventually evacuated 2,600 civilians to an interrogation center operated by the ARVN. There the civilians were fed, given needed medical attention, screened, and issued new ID cards. So effective was the sweep that 71 of the 100 known VC cadre were picked up and held.

The Marines spent each day of the operation searching for bunkers and tunnels. When enemy positions were found, supporting arms were called in to blast them. Initially, the fighting was light as small bands of enemy soldiers tried to slip through the cordon at night. As the cordon shrank, however, enemy resistance stiffened. Desperate NVA and VC soldiers boldly attacked the Marines closing in on them. Once again working with superb coordination, Marine riflemen, air support, and accurate artillery fire decimated the last ditch defenders.

Operation Meade River ended on 9 December. Enemy losses were 841 killed and 182 captured. The Marines lost 107 killed and 385 wounded.

As a follow-up to the successful Operation Mameluke Thrust, Operation Taylor Common began on 7 December. Controlled by Task Force Yankee, six infantry battalions from the 3d and 5th Marines poured into the area north of An Hoa known as the Arizona Territory. Once they completed the sweep of that long-hostile area, the Marines planned to penetrate the high ground to the west and southwest. This area, known as Base Area (BA) 112, was believed to be the home of the 21st and 141st NVA Regiments.

Operation Taylor Common continued into 1969. The major result of the operation up to the end of 1968 was the establishment of a secure supply line all the way from Da Nang to An Hoa.

The fourth year of U.S. Marine Corps involvement in the war in South Vietnam is easily divided into two distinct halves. In the first half of the year the enemy launched several strong offensive operations, primarily focused on I Corps' two northern provinces. The brutal combat that followed sent the enemy reeling.

The NVA tried to return to the offensive in August, particularly around Da Nang, but was once again soundly beaten. As a result, he pulled his major units back across the border into their sanctuaries. Rather than pursue victory through costly large-scale attacks, the enemy resorted to small-unit assaults combined with mortar and rocket attacks on major bases and population centers.

The casualty figures reflect the change in enemy tactics. Marine records show 40,144 enemy killed in the year's first six months; 22,093 were claimed for the last half. Marine casualties fell by nearly 50 percent in the second half of the year, too. The first six months of 1968 showed 3,057 Marines killed and 18,281 wounded. In the second half, 1,561 Marines died and 11,039 were wounded.

The Marines didn't know it at the time, but the Tet Offensive marked the beginning of the end for U.S. involvement in South Vietnam's civil war. With General Abrams replacing General Westmoreland, and the new U.S. president elected in November 1968 pledging to end the war, its intensity would never again reach the height of previous years.

 

Information for operations on this page from book Titled "Semper Fi Vietnam, 
from DaNang to the DMZ
Marine Corps Campaigns, 1965-1975"
By Edward F. Murphy