Belt Drive/Liberty

(27 August - 5 September, 1-4 September 1967)

Major Beard returned from hospitalization and reassumed command of BLT 2/3 on 23 August, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Herich. The same day, Major Gregory A. Corliss and his CH-46A squadron, HMM-262, landed on board the USS Tripoli to relieve the departing SLF helicopter squadron, HMM-265. Four days later, SLF Bravo was in action again. At 0545, 27 August, HMM-262 lifted the first elements of Company H from the Tripoli back to the familiar terrain of eastern Quang Tri Province.

The Belt Drive operation's objective area was the densely vegetated high ground on both sides of the small Nhung River, less than nine kilometers south of Quang Tri City. The operation involved a spoiling attack against Communist units that could have interfered with the voting in Quang Tri City during the impending national elections. Small unit actions flared up during the next five days as the battalion encountered minor enemy formations, but no contact involved any determined enemy resistance.

The battalion commander, Major Beard, reported two interesting enemy reactions:  The use of demolitions by the enemy when attacking a defensive position . . . is a tactic with which the battalion had not yet been confronted. It is believed that it was definitely designed to simulate mortar fire in order to keep the defenders down deep in their positions. The exploding charges were almost immediately followed by three or four probers armed with automatic weapons who sought to penetrate the perimeter.

During this operation . . . the enemy failed to . . . leave a clean battlefield after an engagement. This situation is by all means contrary to their principle of battle and the first time in which the BLT was able to capture weapons and equipment without an immediate physical pursuit. Enemy KIAs, one WIA, and weapons.., lay undisturbed overnight in killing zones and were easily recovered at first light on the morning following the encounter. On one occasion, two enemy KIAs and one weapon were recovered almost two days later by a patrol which swept an area in which an air strike had been run. These instances are reflections of the combat discipline and training of the enemy which the BLT engaged in its operating area.

At midnight 4 September, SLF participation in Liberty ended and Belt Drive resumed immediately. The last operational day, 5 September, involved moving the battalion and its supporting units out of the TAOR. By 2000, SLF Bravo had completed re-embarkation.

Four dead Marines and 59 wounded represented the price of Belt Drive and Liberty, but 19 Communists died. The BLT Marines captured one dazed, wounded NVA soldier on the morning of 1 September. Unfortunately the BLT did not fully exploit his knowledge and mistakenly evacuated him to Camp Evans rather than to the Tripoli. What he knew of enemy locations might have changed the outcome of Belt Drive.

Trouble of a different nature developed during Belt Drive, trouble which caused serious problems not only for the SLFs, but for all Marine activities in I Corps. On 31 August, during a medical evacuation, the lead helicopter, a CH-46A, disintegrated in flight while enroute to the Tripoli. The crew and their passenger died. The next day, another CH-46A experienced a similar failure at Marble Mountain Air Facility. These two similar accidents forced III MAF to restrict CH-46A missions to emergency categories. For all practical purposes, they were 'down'. In a matter of hours, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing lost 50 percent of its helicopter capability, and the LPHs became little more than troop transports.

A Change In Scenario - The 46s are Grounded

The grounding of the CH-46As was a severe blow to the SLFs.  SLF Bravo's CH-46A Squadron, HMM-262, was 'down'.  SLF Alpha fared better, since HMM-362 was a UH-34D squadron. However, MAG-16 recalled HMM-362, though another UH 34D squadron, HMM-163, replaced it only 4 days later. The USS Tripoli, the amphibious assault ship carrying SLF Bravo's helicopters, temporarily withdrew from ARG duties to ferry faulty helicopters to Okinawa for modification. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing rescheduled all planned squadron rotations. Emergency requests prompted shipment of 10 CH-53s and 23 more UH-34Ds from west coast U. S. ports, but they would not arrive until October. On 31 August 1967, III MAF had 150 available transport helicopters, and the SLF could muster 39 more. The next day, as the result of the grounding order, III MAF counted only 23 CH-53s and 73 UH-34Ds, while SLF Alpha could provide another 17 UH-34s. Five squadrons of CH-46As could operate under extreme emergency conditions.

Initially, SLF operations suffered from the helicopter strength reduction. Both landing forces, by necessity, operated as conventional ground units until resolution of helicopter allocations. SLF Bravo spent the rest of the year relying upon interim support from HMM-463's CH-53s operating from Marble Mountain. A detachment from HMM-262 remained on board the Tripoli to provide emergency CH-46A support for STY Bravo. This detachment, known as the 'Poor Devils', remained with SLF Bravo until the end of the year, though the rest of the squadron left in mid-October.

Necessarily, SLF operations reflected the reduced flexibility and lift capability. To provide better support for a landing force ashore, a new trend developed. The SLF BLTs would land, conduct a preliminary operation, and then shift to the operational control of a Marine regiment operating in the same area. Though this represented a reasonable solution under the circumstances, during the fall of 1967 STY BLTs found themselves assigned to missions ranging from fortification construction to road security, a far cry from the stoutly defended SLF tenets of early 1967.