Operation Chinook

At Chu Lai, the 1st Division established an entirely new command structure. On 10 October, the new division commander, Major General Herman Nickerson, Jr., a holder of the Silver Star and veteran of World War II and Korea, who had just relieved General Fields, moved his headquarters to Da Nang. He spoke with some regret about leaving Chu Lai, 'Very pleasant CP, beautiful, but I didn't get to stay there very long'.

Brigadier General Stiles, the assistant division commander, then assumed command of the Chu Lai TAOR. Stiles reformed his Task Force X-Ray command which now consisted of four Marine infantry battalions and supporting forces. The 7th Marines had operational control of the four infantry battalions at Chu Lai while the 5th Marines Headquarters served as a coordinating headquarters for the task force.

At best this was an ad hoc arrangement. The strain on the overly extended units at Chu Lai remained great. Battalions still operated miles from Chu Lai and yet remained responsible for their sector of the TAOR. Lieutenant Colonel Warren P. Kitterman, who commanded the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, remembered that during an operation in southern Quang Ngai Province during late 1966, he, in effect, maintained three separate command posts. His executive officer 'ran the TAOR, at Chu Lai, with four platoons from four different battalions', while his operations officer had 'tactical control' of the battalion in the operation. Kitterman, himself, 'was coordinating 2/7 with an ARVN Bn, an ARVN Parachute Company, an ARVN arty battery', and much the same situation existed in the Phu Bai TAOR. Although General Kyle had established the 3d Division Headquarters at the Phu Bai base in October, only one or two battalions actually operated in or near the TAOR. The 3d Division Headquarters took over from the 4th Marines, which regiment up to that point had maintained a rear headquarters at Phu Bai and direct control of the TAOR and the units there. This included the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, a provisional artillery battery, and support elements. On 11 October, the newly arrived 2d Battalion, 26th Marines moved from Da Nang to Phu Bai. After operating for a short period just south of the Phu Bai TAOR, the latter battalion began on 29 October Operation Pawnee III in Phu Loc District, north of the strategic Hai Van Pass, with the mission to keep Route 1 open between Da Nang and Phu Bai. In November, the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines relieved at Phu Bai the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines which returned to Okinawa under the recently resumed intratheater battalion rotation policy.  Finally in early December, the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines replaced the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, which in turn rotated to Okinawa.

With a lull in Operation Prairie in the north, General Kyle, in mid-December, decided to move a battalion back into the Co Bi-Thanh Tan sector, the old Cherokee and Florida operating area, 13 miles northwest of Hue, and where the enemy was once more active. On 10 December, VC units in well-coordinated attacks struck three South Vietnamese strong points, including the Phong Dien District Headquarters and the An Lao Bridge across the Bo River. Suspecting that elements of the 6th NVA again were attempting to infiltrate from their mountain base areas into the coastal populated region, General Kyle, on 17 December, ordered the just-arrived 3d Battalion, 26th Marines from Dong Ha into the Co Bi-Thanh Tan corridor. Traveling by truck from Dong Ha and with an attached artillery battery, the 3d Battalion established, on 19 December, its CP west of Route 1, some 3,000 meters south of Phong Dien. After minor skirmishes with the Marines during the first two days, the enemy 802d VC Battalion launched two sizeable attacks against the Marine positions in the early morning hours of 22 and 23 December. In both cases, the enemy employed the same tactics; a mortar barrage, followed by a ground probe of the Marine perimeter. The VC then would withdraw, taking most of their casualties with them.

At this stage, 23 December, General Kyle elected to expand the operation, now codenamed Chinook, in the Co Bi-Thanh Tan, even further. He reinforced the 3d Battalion with the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines, which moved from the Pawnee area into the Chinook sector, north of the 0 Lau River. At the same time, he ordered the 4th Marines Headquarters to deploy from Prairie and to take control of the units in Chinook. These now included, in addition to the two infantry battalions, the 3d Battalion, 12th Marines, reconnaissance troops from Phu Bai, and support units. Colonel Cereghino, the 4th Marines commander, opened his CP in the Chinook area on Christmas day. Hampered by the northeast monsoon, which limited the availability of both fixed-wing and helicopter support, the two infantry battalions encountered few enemy troops during the rest of the month. The most dramatic event occurred during the supposed New Year's truce period. On 31 December, Marine reconnaissance patrols, screening the foothills to the south of the Co Bi-Thanh Tan, observed more than 1,000 enemy troops, taking advantage of the terms of the standdown and moving north toward the lowlands.

After III MAF convinced MACV that the enemy force presented a clear and present danger to the Marines in Operation Chinook, Marine air and artillery bombarded the Communist troops. Operation Chinook continued into 1967.

In the heavily populated Da Nang TAOR, pacification continued to be the prime concern of the Marine forces there. The TAOR contained both the I Corps National Priority Area and fledgling An Hoa industrial site. During the spring and early summer, the Marine battalions had challenged the long-standing Communist domination south of the air base. This entire pacification effort, however, depended in great part on the ability of the Marines to provide the necessary security in the villages and hamlets.

When General Nickerson's 1st Marine Division assumed responsibility for the Da Nang TAOR, the 3d Marines was the only infantry regiment to leave Da Nang; both the 1st and 9th Marines remained. Colonel Donald L. Mallory's 1st Marines reverted to 1st Marine Division operational control and retained responsibility for the southeastern portion of the Da Nang TAOR. Colonel Mallory, holder of the Navy Cross and former Assistant G-3 of the 1st Division, had assumed command of the regiment from Colonel Mitchell in August. Colonel. Robert M. Richards' 9th Marines took over the western and southern portions of the TAOR formerly held by the 3d Marines. Richards, a 1942 Naval Academy graduate, relieved Colonel Barrett as the regimental commander on 8 October. The U.S. Army's 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry occupied the northern sector of the Da Nang TAOR, including the Hai Van Pass area.  The Army battalion was not under the operational control of a Marine regiment, but operated directly under General Nickerson. It was planned to hold at least eight infantry battalions in the Da Nang TAOR.s'

Despite the demands on Marine resources at Da Nang, General Walt continued his unstinted effort to make the An Hoa industrial complex a show case for pacification. He held at least one Marine battalion in An Hoa and pressured the government and MACV to support the industrial development there. Colonel Edward L. Bale, Jr., the 1st Marine Division G-4, remembered that the 'extensive efforts of the 1st Marine Division and the Force Logistic Command to supply and support the An Hoa industrial complex.., at times reduced our own forces.. . as to approach the danger point. Yet, it demonstrated the willingness of III MAF to support the only industrial development in the area'.

The An Hoa project had as much difficulty, if not more, with the South Vietnamese Government than with the Viet Cong. Some members of the government believed that the industrial complex was doomed to failure. General Westmoreland had proposed that the U.S. Embassy use its influence with the Vietnamese authorities to support the project. In the meantime, US AID officials began studies to determine the economic feasibility for the industrial exploitation of An Hoa.

The future of An Hoa was still unclear at the end of 1966. The industrial complex depended on coal from the Nong Son mine, 12 miles southwest of the factory site. Viet Cong guerrillas operated in some strength near the mine. Transporting the coal to An Hoa was also a problem. Activities at the industrial complex during this period were largely confined to renovating the plant and obtaining spare parts so the fertilizer factory could start production. According to Lieutenant Colonel Donald L. Evans, Jr., the recorder for the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council during much of 1966 and later head of the Civil Affairs Branch at Headquarters Marine Corps: 'At this point, December 1966, very little had been accomplished except to focus attention on An Hoa as a potential industrial site.

According to allied plans, the Vietnamese were to take over more of the pacification program in 1967. In I Corps, the ARVN forces were to have the primary mission of supporting Revolutionary Development, while Marine forces were to be deployed more and more against the enemy main force units. Yet, the Marines were still to secure their TAORs and clear the areas in the vicinity of the established bases. In a sense this could be called the beginning of Vietnamization, but several senior Marine officers doubted that the Vietnamese Army was prepared to take over the pacification program. In any event, pacification ended on a sour note in 1966; III MAF reported that no hamlets were added to the secure category in I Corps during December.  General English summed up the Marine frustrations for the year: '. .. too much real estate — do not have enough troops'.