Operation Colorado

The Continuing War
Operations Washington and Colorado — The September Election — The Marine TAORs, July-December 1966

As early as 18 July, General Fields informed III MAF that he wanted to exploit this intelligence with a multi-battalion operation in the Que Son region. On 30 July, the 1st Division commander issued his planning directive to Colonel Charles F. Widdecke, the 5th Marines commanding officer, for a search and destroy operation in the Hiep Duc-Song Ly Ly Valleys coordinated with the South Vietnamese 2d ARVN Division.  The date for the beginning of the operation was contingent upon the end of Operation Hastings in the DMZ sector.   While Colonel Widdecke and his staff worked on the plans, General Fields met on 2 August with General Walt, who decided that the reduction of Marine forces in the DMZ would allow the operation to begin in three or four days. By 4 August, the Marine and ARVN commands had completed their arrangements and issued their implementing orders.

Colorado/Lien Ket-52 was to be a combined operation in which Colonel Widdecke's 5th Marines and the 2d ARVN Division were to locate and destroy the 2d NVA Division. The command posts of the Marines and ARVN were to be co-located at Tam Ky.  An ARVN task force, consisting of the 6th ARVN Regimental Headquarters with its 2d and 4th Battalions, reinforced by the 2d and 3d Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Troops of the 4th ARVN Armored Cavalry, was to cross the line of departure near Thang Binh on the morning of 6 August and attack in a southwesterly direction toward Que Son. Southwest of Que Son, a task force of three South Vietnamese Marine battalions was to establish blocking positions to support the western thrust of the 2d ARVN Division task force.

While the Vietnamese mounted their operations north of the road, MAG-36 helicopters were to lift a company from Lieutenant Colonel Walter Moore's 2d Battalion, 5th Marines into a landing zone southwest of Hiep Duc. If Moore's troops made contact, the rest of the battalion was to reinforce the initial landing party and exploit the opportunity. If there was no contact, the helicopters were to shuttle the 2d Battalion into new positions, 1,000 meters east of Hiep Duc and repeat the process. The plan required Lieutenant Colonel Harold L. Coffman's 1st Battalion, 5th Marines to reinforce Moore's battalion if necessary, and, if not, to enter the operation on the next day in an area eight miles due south of Que Son. Both Marine battalions were to use the same tactics — search an area, engage the enemy if possible, and if not move on to another objective, either on foot or by helicopter. Colonel Widdecke's 3d Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Edward J.Bronars, was to remain in reserve, providing security for the proposed artillery positions, just below the Thang Binh-Hiep Duc Road and 2,000 meters west of the railroad. As the operation developed, the battalion was to move southwest to form blocking positions for the southern portion of the Colorado area.  Each of the 5th Marines' battalions left one infantry company behind in the Chu Lai TAOR as part of the defense force there.

A large array of allied supporting arms was prepared to back up this offensive by the 5th Marines and 2d ARVN Division. Three destroyers and a cruiser were offshore ready to engage. The U.S. Air Force provided two B-52 Arc Light strikes on 6 and 7 August against targets in the mountains south of the Colorado area where intelligence agencies believed there was a large enemy base and assembly area. Both the South Vietnamese and the Marines furnished artillery. Lieutenant Colonel Joe B. Stribling's 2d Battalion, 11th Marines was in direct support of the 5th Marines with 30 tubes, ranging from 4.2-inch mortars to 8-inch howitzers. At the same time, the wing commander, Major General Louis B. Robertshaw, ordered both Colonel Richard M. Hunt, the commanding officer of MAG-16, and Colonel William G. Johnson, the commanding officer of MAG-36, to make available for the operation all helicopters that could be spared.  Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Zitnik, the S-3 of  MAG-36, was in the 5th Marines' operations center at Tam Ky to assist in coordinating the helicopters and the infantry.

On D-Day, 6 August, both helicopter groups ferried 3,000 allied troops into the battle area while MAG-11 and 12 aircraft made landing zone preparatory strikes and provided air support. Marine F-4s, F-8s, and A-4s flew more than 80 sorties on the first day of the operation expending more than 30 tons of bombs, 8.5 tons of napalm, 924 rockets, and 4,500 20mm rounds. In addition to bringing in the infantry, III MAF helicopters carried more than 50 tons of cargo to supply the ground troops.

The only significant action on the first day occurred in the South Vietnamese Marine sector of the battlefield. All three of the Vietnamese Marine battalions encountered heavy rifle fire when they arrived in the landing zones west of Que Son. During the first few hours of 6 August, the South Vietnamese killed 50 enemy and took 20 prisoners. All of the prisoners were from a signal company attached to the 1st Battalion, 3d NVA Regiment, apparently the rear guard covering the retreat of the rest of the regiment. The South Vietnamese Marines pursued the enemy unit in a northwesterly direction, but contact was lost toward evening. The Vietnamese Marine commander believed that the NVA force had established defenses near the hamlet of Thach Thu'ong close to a small ridgeline 1,000 meters north of the Ly Ly River. The Vietnamese Marines planned to press the attack the next morning. During the first day's action, the South Vietnamese killed 71 enemy troops at a cost of three killed and 23 wounded. One of the wounded was Captain Cornelius H. Ram, the senior U.S. Marine advisor to the 1st Vietnamese Marine Battalion.

On 7 August, the South Vietnamese waited for U.S. Marine aircraft to pound the enemy positions in Thach Thu'ong before attacking, but the weather favored the entrenched NVA. The entire battle during that day was fought in a driving rainstorm, and because of poor visibility, airstrikes could not take place until 1330 that afternoon. Even then they had only a limited effect on the enemy's defenses. Following the air attack, the Marines tried a frontal assault against Thach Thu'ong.  The troops had to cross 400-500 meters of flooded paddy land against heavy fire. After two unsuccessful attempts, the South Vietnamese Marine battalions pulled back to their former positions and called for more air and artillery support. Despite the poor visibility, although the rain had stopped, Marine planes, directed by U.S. advisors on the ground, continued to bomb the enemy positions. Artillery and air blasted the enemy-held hamlet throughout the night and into the morning. At 0930 8 August, the Vietnamese Marines once more attacked, still under the canopy of supporting arms. This time, the South Vietnamese met no opposition; the enemy had retreated. When the South Vietnamese entered Thach Thu'ong they found a trench containing the bodies of seven enemy soldiers, while another ditch held the jumbled remains of 30 more.  Throughout 8 and 9 August, the South Vietnamese continued to search for the NVA, but without success.

During the first three days of Operation Colorado, the 5th Marines encountered little resistance. Lieutenant Colonel Moore's 2d Battalion, 5th Marines explored the southwestern portion of the Colorado TAOR near Hiep Duc during 6 and 7 August and made no contact. On 8 August, the battalion returned to Tam Ky to provide security for the regimental CP, still without meeting any sizeable Viet Cong or NVA force. The next day, the battalion was helilifted into landing zones in the western portion of the Ly Ly River Valley with the mission of cutting off the retreat of the enemy unit which had engaged the Vietnamese Marines. This effort proved futile; on 10 August the battalion returned to Tam Ky.

Lieutenant Colonel Coffman's 1st Battalion, 5th Marines had operated with the same lack of success in its portion of the TAOR east of Que Son and west of Route 1. Coffman's companies had conducted search and destroy missions throughout the area. On the morning of 10 August, he consolidated his battalion near Dai Dong, just south of the Nha Ngu River, approximately six miles west of the railroad. Coffman's objective for the day was the large hamlet of Thon Hai astride the railroad.

As the battalion's three companies moved out in column at 0830, they began to encounter opposition. At first, the enemy used only long-range rifle fire. The Marines answered with their own small arms. At 1100, the battalion arrived at Ky Phu hamlet, the scene of a heavy battle the previous year during Operation Harvest Moon. Lieutenant Colonel Coffman halted the battalion. He discussed the situation with his company commanders and ordered them to respond more selectively to enemy harassment. Colonel Widdecke arrived for a short conference and directed Coffman to continue his advance. At 1400, the battalion resumed its march to the east.

Dark clouds massed overhead as the afternoon wore on and soon the Marines were plodding through a heavy rainstorm. Shortly after 1500 the Marines reached the small hamlet of Cam Khe, 1,000 meters northeast of Ky Phu. As Company A pushed through the outskirts of the hamlet, the Marines spotted 30 NVA running across a paddy. In a quick burst of fire, the Marines cut down the enemy force in the open field. Another body of NVA troops took the Marines under fire. All three Marine companies found themselves heavily engaged at close quarters. Armed Hueys from VMO-6 were overhead, but were unable to see, much less provide covering fire for fear of hitting friendly troops. The rain finally stopped at 1730 and the sky cleared, allowing the Hueys and jets to strike. While the armed helicopters provided suppressive fire, two MAG-12 A-4s eliminated two NVA heavy machine guns. Shortly afterward, Company C cleared a trench line of NVA and organized resistance ceased. By nightfall, the enemy had broken contact and the Marines had organized their defenses. Taking no chances, artillery, naval gunfire, and aircraft provided a curtain of fire around the battalion's positions throughout the night.

The next morning, 11 August, the Marines surveyed the results of the previous day's battle. Although suffering 14 dead and 65 wounded, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines had killed more than 100 North Vietnamese. Among the enemy dead was a company commander whose body yielded several documents. The Marines learned that they had engaged two battalions of the 3d NVA Regiment. The Marine battalion continued to patrol the previous day's battlefield, but was met by only occasional snipers. The only surprise occurred that afternoon when General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in Vietnam on an inspection tour, visited the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines' sector. He spoke to 1st Lieutenant Marshall B. (Buck) Darling, the commanding officer of Company C, and asked him about the action of 10 August: 'Well, General', Darling replied, 'we got into a fight with the enemy'. The Commandant then asked what he did. 'General', he said 'we killed them'.

But the Marines had not killed all of the enemy. After the heavy fighting on the 10th, the North Vietnamese battalions retreated to the north where they engaged the South Vietnamese Marines three days later. The Vietnamese Marine task force, supported by ARVN APC units, was attacking to the east toward Thang Binh when the North Vietnamese struck just north of the village of Vinh Huy, four miles west of the railroad and nine miles northwest of Cam Khe where Coffman's battalion had met the enemy. At least two NVA battalions contested the Vietnamese Marine advance. The action, which began at 1030 on 13 August, continued through the afternoon. During that time, 1st MAW aircraft flew more than 50 sorties in support of the South Vietnamese units. After the air strikes, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas T. Kane, senior advisor to the Marine task force, noted a marked decrease in enemy fire.  Still, the issue was in doubt.

At 1600, the 6th ARVN regimental commander ordered one of his APC troops, reinforced by infantry, to attack the flank of the enemy to relieve the pressure on the Vietnamese Marine battalions. The armored personnel carrier attack had mixed results. Opening up with a furious fusillade from their .50 caliber machine guns, the personnel carriers not only took the enemy under fire but also the Marine battalions. Lieutenant Colonel Kane radioed the U.S. Army advisor with the ARVN regiment and told him about the problem, asking him to try to redirect the attack of the APCs. The Army advisor replied that the APCs could not be controlled. Kane then asked the advisor to tell the APCs to cease fire, but received the reply 'that they . . . only ceased fire . . . when they were out of ammunition'. One hour and 50,000 rounds later, the armored personnel carrier assault ended, but not before a number of Marines were casualties. At dusk, the Vietnamese Marine task force commander ordered his battalions to dig in for the night and evacuate the dead and wounded. The Vietnamese Marines lost 26 killed and 54 wounded as a result of this day's action.

On the morning of 14 August, one Vietnamese Marine battalion and the APC troop swept the battle area; the enemy was no longer there, but had left behind 140 of its dead. For the South Vietnamese, this was the last major engagement in Colorado/Lien Ket-52. The Vietnamese Marines ended the Vietnamese portion of the operation when they arrived at Thang Binh that evening.

The U.S. Marines finished Colorado/Lien Ket-52 seven days later. After the heavy action of 10 August, the 5th Marines encountered little opposition. On 12 August, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines moved to the eastern portion of the Colorado area and conducted a search and destroy mission in the 'Pineapple Forest', so named because of its shape on tactical maps. 'The Pineapple Forest', southeast of Ky Phu and Cam Khe, is studded with low lying hills, interspersed by rice paddies and hamlets. The battalion found a large rice cache, but encountered only fleeting resistance from local guerrillas. Before ending their mission in the 'forest', the Marines moved most of the civilian population to more secure areas. In the meantime, on the 13th, Lieutenant Colonel Moore's 2d Battalion established blocking positions southwest of the Vietnamese Marines when they made contact with the enemy. The North Vietnamese remained far afield from the 2d Battalion and the situation was, 'perimeter alert and secure; night ambushes being sent in; no enemy contact'.  Moore's battalion returned to Tam Ky on 15 August and all battalions of the 5th Marines began displacing to the Chu Lai TAOR three days later. Colorado officially ended on 22 August.

Although Colorado! Lien Ket-52 had succeeded in driving the NVA 2d Division out of the Que Son Valley temporarily, the allies only accomplished half of their task. Colorado was supposed to be the first of a series of operations to bring the entire Hiep Duc-Que Son area under the blanket of III MAE security. Because of the increasing commitment of Marine forces near the DMZ after August, General Walt's plans for pacifying the valley at this time were preempted. In fact, it was not to be until April 1967 that the Marines once more entered the region in force.

The September Election

Despite the North Vietnamese incursion into the DMZ during the fall of 1966, the South Vietnamese were still able to take the first steps toward representative government and attempt to redeem the promises of the Honolulu Conference. On 11 September, a nationwide election selected delegates to form a Constituent Assembly and draw up a new constitution for the nation.

The decision to hold an election in Vietnam during this period was a precarious undertaking, especially in I Corps. Memories of the spring 'Struggle Movement' which had so disrupted the cities of Da Nang and Hue only a few months before were still fresh. Certain Buddhist leaders who had been in the forefront of the opposition asked the people to boycott the election. There was no doubt that the VC also would try to disrupt the electoral process. The fact that the North Vietnamese had drawn several Marine units away from the populated regions into the DMZ area complicated the situation. It was expected that the VC would attempt to exploit any void in local security caused by the departure of Marine units. Considering all of these handicaps, the electoral turnout in I Corps was surprising. Approximately 87 percent of the 900,000 eligible voters, who lived in relatively secure areas where government control existed at least during daylight, voted, compared to 81 percent eligible voter participation in the country at large. In the cities of Hue and Da Nang, voter participation percentages were 81 and 85 respectively.

The success of the electoral process in I Corps was partially attributable to the close cooperation and careful preparation on the part of the Marines, the U.S. civilian advisory organization, and the Vietnamese authorities. As early as July, the Marines noted an increasing awareness of the election among the people. Even in remote areas of Quang Nam Province, the government had distributed posters and banners announcing the election  While the Vietnamese were responsible for conducting the elections and providing security for the polling places, American troops were to see that the enemy was unable to take advantage of the situation.

On 26 August, General Walt established the policy that his forces were to follow during the election. He told his subordinate commanders that they should avoid any semblance of interference in the electoral process. American troops were to stay away from the immediate vicinity of polling places and populated areas. The general observed that the South Vietnamese Army was to stand down from major operations during the electoral period and assume responsibility for protecting the election. Each Marine regiment was to maintain one battalion command group and three rifle companies on an alert status to assist the Vietnamese in the event the VC attacked. Although no large Marine units were to remain in the populated areas, Marine helicopters were to provide aerial surveillance of the III MAF TAOR. In addition, Marine artillery was to increase its harassment and interdiction of suspected enemy lines of communications and at the same time be prepared to support the Vietnamese Army. Most importantly, the Marine infantry battalions were to conduct large screening operations to prevent VC or NVA main force units from entering the populated areas. It was expected that the widely dispersed ARVN forces would be able to handle the local guerrillas.

During the period 1-11 September, General Walt put nine battalions in the field to conduct search and. destroy operations away from the populated areas.  The purpose of these operations was to keep the large enemy units off balance and away from the people. They were successful. Although there were 34 Viet Cong incidents on the day of the election in I Corps, no large enemy unit broke through the Marine screen. Most of the enemy incidents were isolated attacks. For example, the 1st Marines reported that two polling areas in its TAOR were hit by mortar fire, three rounds falling on each of the sites, but causing only minor disruption.

Perhaps Colonel Barrett offered the best explanation for the Communist failure to stop the election when he declared:  It is felt that the Viet Cong had never intended to conduct an extensive anti-election campaign of a military nature since he did not possess sufficient resources to over come the preventive measures initiated by the GVN, but rather he hoped that through propaganda against the election and threat of violence against those who participated he would successfully intimidate large numbers of voters and discourage them from going to the polls. His bluff was called as the results show.

The Marine TAORs, Jul-Dec 1966

Despite the success of the election, there were few victories for the Marine Corps pacification campaign in central and southern I Corps in late 1966. Pacification progress depended upon the individual Marine battalion. The Marine pacification concept dictated that the Marine battalions provide security for local villages and hamlets by constant small unit patrolling. From March through August 1966, III MAF units conducted more than 68,000 patrols, ranging in size from four to 40 men. Only 10 percent of these patrols made contact with the enemy, but the Marines maintained that the remaining 90 per cent were equally beneficial. As Colonel Chaisson, the III MAF G-3, explained, 'all of these small unit operations are conducted in the guerrilla environment. They are trying not only to kill the guerrillas but to curtail his freedom of movement'.

There were other reasons for the extensive patrolling of the Marine TAORs, not the least of which related to base defense. On the night of 23 July, Viet Cong gunners, from positions behind a Buddhist temple 2,600 meters southwest of the Marble Mountain Facility, lobbed 40-50 81mm mortar shells in a seven-minute barrage onto the airfield parking apron. Although little damage occurred, the attack exposed the vulnerability of the base to such hit and run tactics.  Lieutenant Colonel Emerson A. Walker, whose 3d Battalion, 1st Marines was responsible for the southeastern sector of the Da Nang TAOR, recalled that 'General Walt let all echelons know that he did not expect this to happen again'. Walker remembered that the engineers constructed two 50-foot wood towers in his sector. According to the battalion commander, his Marines mounted a rocket launcher and machine gun on the towers and manned both weapons around the clock. Walker claimed that: 'The towers proved to be such a formidable threat that all Viet Cong mortar activity ceased in that area'.

The opening of the new front along the DMZ together with the heavy emphasis on base defense and pacification in the southern TAORs placed a heavy strain on Marine manpower resources. This was somewhat alleviated with the long-planned deployment of the 2d Korean Marine Brigade to I Corps. The first echelons of the Korean Brigade arrived on 18 August and were assigned a TAOR in northern Quang Ngai Province on the Batangan Peninsula, 17 miles southeast of the Chu Lai Air field. By the end of the month, the full brigade was established on the peninsula which was incorporated into the Chu Lai TAOR. The command relationship between the Koreans and the American Marines was delicate. General Walt did not have operational control of the Korean Brigade, but he did have coordinating authority. Although the III MAF commander could not order the Koreans to do anything, he and Brigadier General Lee Bong Chool, the Korean Brigade commander, who had attended the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, formed a working arrangement that satisfied both sides.

Even with the reinforcement of the Koreans, the increasing demands of the war in the north caused a serious setback to Marine pacification plans. The move of the 3d Marine Division to Phu Bai and the shift of the 1st Marine Division Headquarters to Da Nang not only disrupted the pacification campaign, but ended any chance to join the Da Nang and Chu Lai TAORs by the end of the year.

At Chu Lai, the 1st Division established an entirely new command structure. On 10 October, the new division commander, Major General Herman Nickerson, Jr., a holder of the Silver Star and veteran of World War II and Korea, who had just relieved General Fields, moved his headquarters to Da Nang. He spoke with some regret about leaving Chu Lai, 'Very pleasant CP, beautiful, but I didn't get to stay there very long'.

Brigadier General Stiles, the assistant division commander, then assumed command of the Chu Lai TAOR. Stiles reformed his Task Force X-Ray command which now consisted of four Marine infantry battalions and supporting forces. The 7th Marines had operational control of the four infantry battalions at Chu Lai while the 5th Marines Headquarters served as a coordinating headquarters for the task force.

At best this was an ad hoc arrangement. The strain on the overly extended units at Chu Lai remained great. Battalions still operated miles from Chu Lai and yet remained responsible for their sector of the TAOR. Lieutenant Colonel Warren P. Kitterman, who commanded the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, remembered that during an operation in southern Quang Ngai Province during late 1966, he, in effect, maintained three separate command posts. His executive officer 'ran the TAOR, at Chu Lai, with four platoons from four different battalions,, while his operations officer had 'tactical control' of the battalion in the operation. Kitterman, himself, 'was coordinating 2/7 with an ARVN Bn, an ARVN Parachute Company, an ARVN arty battery, and much the same situation existed in the Phu Bai TAOR. Although General Kyle had established the 3d Division Headquarters at the Phu Bai base in October, only one or two battalions actually operated in or near the TAOR. The 3d Division Headquarters took over from the 4th Marines, which regiment up to that point had maintained a rear headquarters at Phu Bai and direct control of the TAOR and the units there. This included the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, a provisional artillery battery, and support elements. On 11 October, the newly arrived 2d Battalion, 26th Marines moved from Da Nang to Phu Bai. After operating for a short period just south of the Phu Bai TAOR, the latter battalion began on 29 October Operation Pawnee III in Phu Loc District, north of the strategic Hai Van Pass, with the mission to keep Route 1 open between Da Nang and Phu Bai. In November, the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines relieved at Phu Bai the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines which returned to Okinawa under the recently resumed intra-theater battalion rotation policy.  Finally in early December, the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines replaced the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, which in turn rotated to Okinawa.

With a lull in Operation Prairie in the north, General Kyle, in mid-December, decided to move a battalion back into the Co Bi-Thanh Tan sector, the old Cherokee and Florida operating area, 13 miles northwest of Hue, and where the enemy was once more active. On 10 December, VC units in well-coordinated attacks struck three South Vietnamese strong points, including the Phong Dien District Headquarters and the An Lao Bridge across the Bo River. Suspecting that elements of the 6th NVA again were attempting to infiltrate from their mountain base areas into the coastal populated region, General Kyle, on 17 December, ordered the just-arrived 3d Battalion, 26th Marines from Dong Ha into the Co Bi-Thanh Tan corridor. Traveling by truck from Dong Ha and with an attached artillery battery, the 3d Battalion established, on 19 December, its CP west of Route 1, some 3,000 meters south of Phong Dien. After minor skirmishes with the Marines during the first two days, the enemy 802d VC Battalion launched two sizeable attacks against the Marine positions in the early morning hours of 22 and 23 December. In both cases, the enemy employed the same tactics; a mortar barrage, followed by a ground probe of the Marine perimeter. The VC then would withdraw, taking most of their casualties with them.