Deckhouse VI and Desoto  

(16 February - 3 March 1967)

 

 

During late January the two main components of the SLF changed. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth E. Huntington's HMM-363 relieved HMM-362 and Lieutenant Colonel Jack Westerman's BLT 1 / 4 replaced BLT 1 / 9. Sailing from the Philippines, the newly constituted SLF arrived off the coast of Vietnam on the 14th of February.

While the SLF underwent its transition, significant changes occurred in I Corps. To release more ARVN troops for pacification work, U.S. Marine Task Force X-Ray, commanded by Brigadier General William A. Stiles, relieved Vietnamese troops of combat duties in southern Quang Ngai Province in January. General Stiles promptly initiated Operation Desoto, a search and destroy operation directed against known Communist strongholds in the region. To augment Desoto, the SLF received orders to operate in an area south of Task Force X-Ray's AO. The STY operation was Deckhouse VI. As in Deckhouse V, Colonel Wortman commanded the SLF and Captain Westervelt, the ARG.

The mission assigned to the SLF ground element, BLT 1/4, called for it to disrupt enemy movement in the Sa Huynh salt flats, search northward in the Nui Dau area, and, finally, link up with the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, then operating around Nui Dau in Operation Desoto.

At 0800 on 16 February, two rocket-firing landing ships started the naval gunfire preparation for the Deckhouse VI landings. Fifty-five minutes later, the first wave of HMM-363's helicopters lifted off the deck of the Iwo Jima and headed inland with the assault company, Company A. Company C landed in LVTs near Tach By and helicopters ferried the rest of the battalion inland. The landings were unopposed.

Brigadier General Louis Metzger, the commanding general of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade based on Okinawa, was there to observe this landing and commented later on the assault phase. He wrote:

Because of the insistence of MACV a NOTAM [Notice to Airmen] was published several days before each amphibious operation, I suppose to protect any commercial air in the area. It didn't take a very effective intelligence system for the Viet Cong and/or NVA to know just where and when a landing was going to take place. Secondly, I was concerned that even though this landing was taking place in a populated area, the amphibious force carried out routine naval gunfire and air strikes. . . . Civilian casualties did result. Following the operation, I discussed the matter with Commander 7th Fleet [Admiral John H. Hyland] and he supported my position. At least as long as I was CG 9th MAB the NGF and Air Strikes in future landings in populated areas were on call.

Captain Westervelt later commented on a number of problems encountered during the assault landing in Deckhouse VI. He wrote:  Deckhouse VI was treated as a regular assault landing complete with heavy pre-assault fires for the boat landings. In retrospect, because of the U.S. Army forces operating just to the south and west and U.S. Marines operating to the north and west of the assault area, the pre-assault fires should have been 'on call'. There were weather problems at Deckhouse VI when heavy fog and rain obscured the landing zones on D-Day and caused a one-day postponement. Surface landings could have been carried out. The cruiser firing pre-assault fires commenced fire in spite of D-Day cancellation and probably gave some indication to any VC in the area that something unusual might be scheduled. However, this was improbable because the area was normally frequented by gunfire support destroyers.

The population of the villages just south of Sa Huynh congregated on the eastern face of a ridge, which sloped up from the boat landing area, to watch the Marine landing show. Originally, the pre-assault fires had included this area, but this had been changed on the advice of a representative from the Province Chiefs staff on board the flagship. He pointed with a dirty finger to the ridge and forced out his interpretation of 'Friend' in English. We took him at his word and put those particular fires 'on call'.

The opening phase of Deckhouse VI was uneventful. The SLF planners had suspected this would be the case. True to form, local Communist units concentrated on delaying and harassing tactics. The BLT confirmed the Communist presence in the area by destroying 167 fortifications and capturing 20 tons of assorted supplies during the 32 days of Phase I. Though there never were any major contacts, the BLT claimed 201 VC killed during this period; only six Marines died. Unfortunately, on 25 February, the HMM-363 commander, Lieutenant Colonel Huntington, and his copilot received wounds during a troop lift; the squadron executive officer, Major Marvin E. Day, assumed command on the 28th and continued in command for the duration of Deckhouse VI. Phase I ended on 26 February when the STY Commander, Colonel Wortman, ordered a tactical withdrawal of the STY from the Sa Huynh area to its ships to prepare for Phase II.

Only 14 and one-half hours after the last element of the battalion left the Sa Huynh salt flats, the SLF landed again, this time 10 kilometers north of Sa Huynh. Phase II of Deckhouse VI, by now integrated as part of the combined 7th Marines and ARVN Operation Desoto, started at 0830 on 27 February.

As the SLF helicopters approached 12 Bat, five miles inland from the beach, they met heavy fire which hit eight of the 14 helicopters in the assault lift, and put six out of action. All other loaded helicopters diverted to the beach area while supporting Marine aircraft strafed and rocketed the VC defenders. Fortunately for the isolated Marines of the assault element, the Communists pulled out and that afternoon the rest of the battalion linked up with its first wave. By dark the BLT had consolidated near 12 Bat and began preparations for the next day's search and destroy operation.

Other than the opposed landing at LZ Bat, Phase II action almost repeated Phase I. Occasional contact and intermittent sniper fire marked the only enemy reactions. In the six days required to accomplish the second phase, the battalion killed 78 more VC, destroyed 145 fortifications, and captured an additional five tons of supplies. Similarly, as in Phase I, the price totaled six more Marines dead. Deckhouse VI concluded on 3 March and the STY promptly sailed for the Philippines; it returned to Vietnam, however, long before the month ended.