Operation Florida

 

On 5 June, Colonel Sherman with members of his staff visited the 1st Division Headquarters at Hue to coordinate the operation, codenamed Florida, with the South Vietnamese. Based on intelligence that the 6th NVA Regimental Headquarters and the 800th VC Battalion were in the Co Bi-Thanh Tan area, the planners selected a 54-square-mile area sandwiched between the two rivers, the 0 Lau on the west and the Bo on the east. Two Marine battalions, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines already in the area, and Kelley's 2d Battalion, which was to be helilifted from Dong Ha to the Co Bi-Thanh Tan sector, were to attack south from Route 1. Colonel Sherman was to move his forward headquarters into the objective area and the 3d Battalion, 12th Marines was to provide artillery support. In a companion operation, Doan Ket, the 1st ARVN Division with two of its own battalions, a Vietnamese Marine Corps battalion, and two airborne battalions, was to secure the high ground to the south, the Marines rear to the north, and the Marines left flank to the east. Marine reconnaissance teams were to screen the area west of the Song 0 Lau

First on, then off, and then on 4am, the operation was beset with problems at the outset. The tense political situation caused the allies to postpone the operation, originally scheduled to begin on the 7th. Dissidents clogged the streets of Hue and Route 1 with Buddhist altars, blocking both military and civilian traffic. Brigadier General English, the 3d Marine Division assistant commander, and Colonel Sherman went to Hue on the 7th to discuss the situation with the South Vietnamese authorities. Because of General Lam's reluctance to delay the operation further, the allied commanders decided to test the situation on the following day by sending two Marine convoys down Route 1. One supply column, which had been stuck at the 1st ramp in Hue, would try to travel south to Phu Bai. The second convoy consisting of Battery B, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, which had been in support of Kelley's battalion in Reno, would attempt to move from Dong Ha south to the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines CP in the Co Bi-Thanh Tan sector. ARVN troops would escort both convoys.

The test proved inconclusive. Although stopped for a time south of Quang Tri, the artillery column from Dong Ha reached its destination on 8 June with few complications. The supply convoy from Hue ran into more difficulty. More than 2,000 statues and altars were strewn along Route 1 between Hue and the Marine base. At one point when the Marine vehicles could not move, ARVN soldiers demolished a concrete culvert to make a by-pass. A 'friendly monk' then guided the trucks 'around the altars...and there was no unpleasant incident'. The convoy arrived at Phu Bai at 2100 that evening. The allied commanders, nevertheless, elected to go with the operation on 9 June.

Again, on the 9th, Buddhist roadblocks delayed the beginning of the operation. Although both infantry battalions supported by two 105mm batteries were already in the Florida operating area, the 4th Marines Command Group, the artillery Command Group, and a 155mm battery were to move by convoy along Route 1 from Phu Bai into the Co Bi Thanh Tan sector. The operation was scheduled to start at 0730, but Buddhist altars on a bridge halted the Marine column from Phu Bai. Buddhist and student demonstrators refused to remove the items and the ARVN escort was apparently under orders not to disturb the religious artifacts. At 1100, after failing to resolve the impasse with the dissidents, Colonel Sherman decided to return to Phu Bai and forego the support of the medium artillery battery for the operation.  MAG-16 helicopters lifted the two Marine Command Groups from the Phu Bai Airfield into the operational area.

Operation Florida finally got underway at 1630 on 9 June. As could be expected with the fits and starts that characterized the beginning of the operation, any enemy unit in the area had long left. The Marines and the South Vietnamese ended Florida! Doan Ket on 12 June with only minimal military results. At a cost of four wounded because of mines and booby traps, the two Marine battalions in Florida accounted for 15 VC dead. Yet there was another aspect to the operation that Colonel Sherman pointed out:  It is considered that from the ARVN standpoint, the primary operation was political in nature and was achieved, that objective being the displacement of the 1st ARVN Division out of the city of Hue and into the field.

The denouement of the political situation soon followed. With the arrival of additional police at Hue and the massing of Vietnamese Marines and air borne troops at Phu Bai, the government was about to make its move. On 14June, General Lam told the American command that he planned to go into Hue, 'with whatever force required, arrest the leaders of the Struggle Group, clear the streets of the Buddhist altars, and reestablish government control'. Although the dissident leaders called for demonstrations and for South Vietnamese troops to stop fighting, only two battalions of the 1st Division heeded the call. On 17 June the battalions left an ARVN operation and headed for Hue, but stopped before reaching their destination after being strafed by Vietnamese aircraft. The following day, a South Vietnamese airborne brigade and a two-battalion Vietnamese Marine task force entered the city and occupied key positions. At the same time, the Vietnamese Joint General Staff replaced the equivocating General Nhuan as commander of the 1st Division with the airborne commander, Colonel Ngo Quang Truong. By morning on the 19th, Hue was quiet."

Despite the aborted mutiny of the two battalions, the 1st Division recovered remarkably fast from its embroilment with the 'Struggle Movement'. Shortly after the breakup of the dissident group in Hue, the division, with two of its own battalions together with two South Vietnamese Marine battalions and supported by its armored troops and U.S. Marine air, defeated the 808th NVA Battalion. Apparently emboldened by the political crisis, the enemy unit, one of the battalions of the 6th NVA Regiment, had entered the Quang Tri coastal plain from its mountainous base area on a rice-gathering mission and was willing to take on the South Vietnamese in a stand up fight.   In a two-day engagement, lasting from 21-23 June, seven kilometers northeast of Quang Tri City, the ARVN division killed 312 of the enemy while sustaining casualties of 37 killed and 104 wounded. In addition, the South Vietnamese captured 40 NVA troops including one company commander. The 1st Division had returned to the war with a vengeance.