Operation Georgia

The spring political crisis caused a serious disruption of Marine offensive operations at Da Nang. With the sudden arrival of Vietnamese Marine battalions at the Da Nang Airbase in April, the U.S. Marine regiments in Quang Nam Province suddenly found themselves with a a new mission. They not only had to fight a war against the Communists, but also to prevent one between government troops and the Struggle Forces. Colonel Simmons compared the role of his regiment to that of the “ham in the sandwich,” the filler to absorb the shock of the confrontation between the two opposing sides~

This situation could only benefit the Communists. The 9th Marines had to revert to the defensive because of the threat to the security of Da Nang created by the polarization of the ARVN forces into hostile factions. With the abandonment of several government outposts along Route 4 and vast amounts of ammunition, the VC not only rearmed a GVN expense, but reentered the area the Marines had just cleared during Operation Kings.

On 16 April, an old enemy, the R-20 “Doc Lap” Battalion, attacked one of the companies from Lieutenant Colonel Donahue’s 2d Battalion, 9th Marines in position north of the abandoned 39th Ranger outpost at PhongThu. Company H, commanded by Captain Everette S. Roane, had established defensive positions north of Route 4, and put a squad ambush south of the road. Suddenly, a 0400, the enemy opened up with recoilless rifle and mortar fire. Simultaneously, the enemy launched two company-size assaults, one from the southeast and the other from the southwest. The attack from the southwest, about 100 men, ran into a Marine ambush and stalled. According to the Marine squad leader, his men shot 12-15 VC for sure—most likely more.” At dawn the following morning, the squad found two enemy bodies in front of its position.

The approximately 150-man force attacking from the southeast reached the north side of Route 4, but was unable to penetrate the Marine company s perimeter. As soon as the attackers crossed the road:

Marine aerial observers arrived overhead and as Marine artillery responded, the enemies supporting mortars and recoilless rifles fell silent. The VC ground assault dissipated, and the attacking force broke up into small groups. Enemy probes continued along the Marine company perimeter, but, “this most likely was to cover the collection of VC casualties and the withdrawal of the main force.”

At first light, the Marines counted 12 enemy bodies, but estimated killing another 63. Company H had not gone unscathed, suffering seven dead and 37 wounded, largely as a result of the enemies recoilless rifle and mortar attack.’

In mid-April the 9th Marines resumed the initiative, following the temporary standoff of the political crisis. Originally, the regiment planned to follow Kings with a one-battalion operation beginning on 10 April in the An Hoa region south of the Ky Lam and Thu Bon. Thus, the Marines would carry out General Walt's promise to Mr. Can, the An Hoa project leader, that III MAF would protect the industrial complex there. Though unable to meet the original date, the 9th Marines completed its revised order for Operation Georgia by 14 April. The mission was assigned to Lieutenant Colonel Taylor's 3d Battalion, 9th Marines.

With the completion of the planning, the 9th Marines battalions began preliminary preparations for the operation. On 18 April, Lieutenant Colonel Kelley ‘s 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, which had arrived at Da Nang three days earlier, relieved the 3d Battalion on the eastern flank of the 9th Marines area of operations. Both Lieutenant Colonel Donahue’s 2d Battalion and Taylor’s 3d Battalion then reentered the former Kings area of operations in conjunction with ARVN and Vietnamese militia forces. Their assignment was not only to eradicate the VC but to determine suitable LVT river-crossing sites and assembly and re-supply points for the forthcoming operation.

Although the operation had not officially begun, lieutenant Colonel Taylor established a forward base at the An Hoa airstrip on 20 April. Helicopters from MAG- 16 lifted the command group and Company L from Marble Mountain while Air Force C-123s, as in Operation Mallard, flew in an artillery battery, Battery F, 12th Marines.

On the 21st, the designated date for the start of the operation, the rear headquarters and two rifle companies, supported by a platoon of LVTHs from Company B, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, moved overland toward the objective area. A third company, Company I, 9th Marines arrived at An Hoa by helicopter and Air Force transports brought in a second 105mm battery, Battery B, 12th Marines. Both fixed-wing transports and helicopters continued to fly in supplies for the An Hoa buildup. On 22 April, Company L linked up with the LVT convoy after it had crossed the Thu Bon River.

With the establishment of the An Hoa base, the battalion began the second phase of the operation. Lieutenant Colonel Taylor had divided the An Hoa region into 20 well-defined, company-size TAORs and the Marines, with local ARVN and South Vietnamese Popular Forces, began a series of actions, using tactics similar to those used during Operation Kings. Combining County Fair and Golden Fleece techniques, the Marines attempted to secure the

Despite intelligence reports indicating the presence of the VC V-2S (5th VC) Battalion in the western sector of the Georgia zone of action, that area between the Va Gia and Thu Bon Rivers, the Marines encountered little opposition through the end of April, only harassing fire and mines. Marine aerial observers and a platoon from the 3d Recon-naissance Battalion, supporting the operation, ac-counted for most of the VC sightings at this stage. Air observers and reconnaissance Marines “frequent-ly detected movement of small enemy forces at long range and directed artillery fire at the VC with telling effect.” Major Samuel M. Morrow, commander of the provisional artillery group at An Hoa, commented that although some:

very fine targets were observed and some excellent missions~ . . fired, there was a tendency on the part of these untrained observers [the reconnaissance Marines] to enter fire for effect too early and attempt to chase the target” rather than reenter the adjustment phase.

western fringes of the Georgia operating area con-trolled 36 artillery missions and six air strikes, resulting in an least 30 enemy dead. Lieutenant Colonel Paul C. Trammell, who relieved Lieutenant Colonel Taylor in early May as the commanding officer of the 3d Battalion, later recalled that although Major Morrow expressed his doubts about the” effectiveness of the recon teams in fire adjustment,~’ the artillery commander afterwards “conceded that the concept worked well.”

The heaviest action of Operation Georgia occurred on 3 May. Captain George R. Griggs’ Company M, 9th Marines, which had just relieved another company during the operation, prepared to cross the Thu Bon. Its objective was the hamlet O Phu Long on the northern bank of the river in the north-central sector of the Georgia area During the river crossing, an estimated one- to two-company enemy force, later identified as being from the ubiquitousR-20 Battalion, opened fire on the Marine company in LVTs. In a four-hour firefight lasting through the afternoon, Griggs Company, reinforced by two other Marine companies and supported by air and artillery, finally secured Phu Long (1 ).LVTHs, which accompanied the Marines in the river crossing, brought direct fire upon the enemy positions and was ’instrumental in neutralizing enemy fire and preventing more casualties.”” During the engagement, the Marines suffered five dead and 54 wound-ed. They killed 15 of the VC and estimated that they had inflicted another 100 casualties.

Although technically ending on 10 May, Georgia, like Kings before it, was in reality an extension of the Marine area of operations. Lieutenant Colonel Trammell held his command post and two rifle companies, reinforced by an artillery battery from the 12th Marines at the An Hoa base. The final reports of Georgia indicated that a favorable kill ratio had been achieved, 103 confirmed VC dead at a cost of nine Marines killed and 94 wounded.