The Struggle for An Hoa, Operation Macon

The First C/ash — The Operation Expands — Macon Continues — Macon Ends but Little Changes
The First Clash

Before Operations Hastings and Prairie diverted Marine forces from the southern TAORs, the three regiments at Da Nang, the 1st, 3d, and 9th Marines, in Operation Liberty, had reached the line of the Ky Lam and Thu Bon Rivers, 20 miles south of the airbase. Behind the advance of the infantry, the engineers followed and opened up new lines of communication. On 4 July, the 3d Engineer Battalion completed the first leg of a road, appropriately named 'Liberty Road', which ran from the 9th Marines CP on Hill 55 south to Route 4, a distance of roughly 3,500 meters. During their southward push, the Marines forced the enemy R-20 Doc Lap Battalion, which had reinfiltrated north of the Thu Bon and Ky Lam during the spring political crisis, to withdraw again south of the two rivers.'

Unexpectedly, the Marines received excellent intelligence which accurately stated the R-20's location and intentions. On 1 July, a 28-year-old squad leader from the 1st Company, R-20 Battalion surrendered in the 9th Marines sector. During interrogation, the prisoner revealed that his unit had retreated south of the Thu Bon when the Marines approached the river. He indicated that the mission of the enemy battalion was to prepare defensive positions and counter any Marine attempt to cross the Ky Lam-Thu Bon line. To secure their defenses, the enemy troops removed the civilian population and built fortifications. The prisoner told his interrogators that the R-20 contained 300 main force troops and guerrillas, armed with rifles and 60mm and 81mm mortars. The prisoner implied that the morale of the battalion had suffered and that the troops were short of both food and ammunition.

The 9th Marines confirmed some of this information from other sources. On 2 July, Captain George R. Griggs, the S-2 of the 9th Marines, received a report from I Corps, stating that a Viet Cong battalion was operating south of the Thu Bon reinforced by two local guerrilla companies. The I Corps report placed the strength of the battalion at 500 men, armed with five 12.7mm antiaircraft machine guns, three 81mm mortars, and an unspecified number of 57mm recoilless rifles, as well as individual weapons. This report also reinforced the impression that the enemy planned to contest any Marine advance south of the rivers. Marine tactical air observers from VMO-2 reported freshly dug trenches and fortifications in the area, more evidence that the Viet Cong were attempting to establish a stout defense of the An Hoa region.

Despite the intelligence that the Marines had obtained of enemy plans, the Viet Cong initiated the action. On 4 July, the same day the Marines opened Liberty Road, two companies of the R-20 Battalion moved west toward the Thu Bon River. 

The Viet Cong commander probably was aware that Marine units were operating in the area and took appropriate precautions. That afternoon, he established a three-sided ambush between the hamlets of My Loc and My Loc, approximately 2,500 meters south of the river and three miles northeast of the An Hoa airstrip.

At this time, the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, which continued to make An Hoa its base of operations since Operation Georgia in May,  was involved in a routine search and clear mission in its sector. On 4 July, Company I had established a blocking position along the northwest fringe of the battalion's TAOR, the southern bank of the Thu Bon, while Company K advanced from the southeast. Company L was held at An Hoa as security for the airstrip and the battalion CP. Company M had been detached and was operating north to the Thu Bon during this period. Through the morning and early afternoon, the most unpleasant aspect of the operation was the oppressive heat.

The transition to battle was sudden and violent. Company K, pushing to the Thu Bon, entered the VC ambush position. At 1520, VC grenade launcher teams fired into the Marine column, knocking out one of the amphibian tractors supporting the company. Simultaneously, the rest of the ambush party opened up with mortars, machine guns, and small arms. The initial burst killed the crew chief of one of the LVTPs and two other Marines were wounded. Captain Valdis V. Pavlovskis, the company commander, reorganized his troops and ordered his men to close on the VC positions, at the same time reporting his situation to the battalion CP.

When he learned about the ambush of his company, Major George H. Grimes, who had assumed command of the battalion at the end of June, ordered Company I to protect the left flank of the engaged unit. Then he asked the regimental commander, Colonel Edwin H. Simmons, to provide helicopters to carry Company L from the airstrip to Hill 42, two kilometers south of My Loc (4). Grimes also asked for the return of Company M to battalion control. Upon the approval of both requests, MAG-16 received the mission to provide the helicopter support.

Company K's situation remained tenuous for the next two hours. Company I tried to move to support Company K, but also ran into heavy Viet Cong opposition. Captain Pavlovskis' company held on, taking every advantage of the cover afforded by the hedgerows and bamboo groves that separated the rice paddies. Seven more Marines were dead, another 14 were wounded, and another tractor was out of commission. Heavy enemy machine gun fire drove off evacuation helicopters. Although the Marines called for artillery fire, Battery F, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, in support of Grimes' battalion, could not fire. The enemy was too close.

When Company I finally reached Company K at 1730, the tide turned. The Viet Cong commander, realizing that he would be hemmed in by superior Marine forces, decided to abandon his ambush site. An aerial observer in a VMO-2 UH-1E spotted 200-250 VC moving northwest and called in airstrikes and artillery. Between 1800 and 1900, MAG-12 A-4s and MAG-11. F-4Bs struck the exposed enemy. In addition, Battery F fired 516 105mm rounds at the Viet Cong troops. Although the wing reported '50 VC KBA, confirmed, and 25 KBA probable', ground estimates of the strikes' effectiveness varied between 12 and 62 VC dead.

As enemy resistance diminished, HMM-265's CH 46As were able to land to take out casualties. Two of the helicopters were hit by enemy antiaircraft fire and one crewman suffered minor injuries. The major action was over, but that night both Companies I and K were harassed by mortars and minor probes.

The Marines continued preparations to trap the elusive R-20. In accordance with Major Grimes' plan, MAG-16 helicopter lifted Company L from the An Hoa airstrip to Hill 42 shortly after 1800 and brought Company M back to An Hoa where it became the battalion reserve. At first light 5 July, Companies K and I resumed the offensive against the R-20 Battalion. Throughout the day, both Marine companies encountered light resistance.

Even though the intensity of the firefights never reached that of the previous day, there were several sharp encounters. At 0840, Company K was fired on by a VC squad; one Marine was killed. Captain Pavlovskis requested artillery fire;150 rounds from Battery F fell on the enemy positions. Marines counted 12 VC bodies. Shortly afterward, Company I, operating just to the west of Company K, observed an enemy platoon 1,500 meters to the northeast. Once again the Marines called in artillery. By mid afternoon, Company L had joined the other two companies in the northwest sector of the An Hoa Basin and the search for the Doc Lap Battalion continued. By the end of the day, the Marine battalion reported that it had killed 17 more enemy and estimated another 20 to 30 'possible'.

The Operation Expands

During the afternoon of the 5th, General Walt changed the entire dimension of the operation. He believed that the Marines had the opportunity to eliminate the R-20 Battalion. The III MAF Commander ordered the initiation of Operation Macon, which would involve five Marine battalions in addition to the South Vietnamese forces normally assigned to this sector.

The writing of the Macon operation plan, like so many operations in Vietnam, was completed 24 hours after initial contact had been made. The 3d Marine Division did not publish its frag' order until 1545 on the 5th, but its mission statement read:

'Commencing 4 July 1966 3d MarDiv conducts multi-battalon S&D open in An Hoa area. It was not until the early hours of 6 July, that the 9th Marines, the regiment responsible for the operation, issued orders to its subordinate battalions'.

There were several reasons for the time lag between the issuance of the division and the regimental order. The major one was that the division directive was purposely vague, allowing the regimental commander to fill in the details. The regiments mission was to destroy 'enemy forces, facilities and influence'. Colonel Drew J. Barrett, Jr., newly arrived in Vietnam after graduating from the Army War College, became responsible for the operation when he assumed command of the 9th Marines from Colonel Simmons on 5 July. Barrett, a former battalion commander in Korea and veteran of Guadalcanal, immediately told his staff to determine the area of operations for each unit, and the helicopter landing zones within these areas, as well as landing times.

The concept of operations for Macon called for a three-phased operation. In the first phase, which had already begun with the ambush of Company K, Major Grimes' 3d Battalion would continue operations in the An Hoa northern sector, while the other two battalions of the 9th Marines established blocking positions north of the Thu Bon and Ky Lam Rivers. The second phase would consist of the helicopter lift of two battalions from the 3d Marines into two landing zones, one just east of the main north-south railroad and the other 4,000 meters to the southwest of the first. Grimes' battalion would then attack in a northeasterly direction toward the battalion positioned along the railroad. The third phase, if necessary, would be a one-battalion sweep in the area between the Ky Lam and Chiem Son Rivers, east of the main railroad line. General Walt expected the entire operation to end in 14 days, but the course of events extended Macon into the latter part of October.

For all practical purposes, both the division and regimental orders changed very little for the battalions of the 9th Marines. Major Grimes' battalion continued Phase I operations in the An Hoa region, while Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Jones' 1st Battalion, 9th Marines and Lieutenant Colonel John J. Hess' 2d Battalion, 9th Marines conducted operations in their sector of the TAOR and assumed blocking positions north of the Thu Bon and Ky Lam Rivers.

The second phase of Macon began on the morning of 6 July as the 12th Marines fired over 500 rounds of landing zone preparation fire and MAG-12 A-4s strafed the LZs for 20 minutes. At 1000 that morning, 20 CH-46s from HMMs-164 and 265 began the lift of two companies from Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Dickey Ill's 1st Battalion, 3d Marines to Landing Zone Dixie, 1,500 meters south of the Ky Lam River and east of the railroad track. An hour later, the Marine helicopters completed the lift of two companies of the other battalion, the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, into Landing Zone Savannah, southwest of Dixie. In that one hour, Lieutenant Colonel Herbert E. Mendenhall's HMM-265 and Lieutenant Colonel Warren C. Watson's HMM-164 had ferried over 650 troops into the battle area without incident.

The only complication was a mix up in the flight schedule which resulted in a 30-minute delay in the arrival of Lieutenant Colonel Earl "Pappy" R. Delong, the commanding officer of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, and the rest of his command group. Two of his infantry companies were already in the objective area.  By noon, both battalions had reached their assigned blocking positions. Dickey's 1st Battalion established defenses along the north-south railroad track, while Delong's 3d Battalion protected the approaches to the southern foothills.

As the two 3d Marines battalions sealed off the eastern and southern exits of the battlefield on the morning of the 6th, the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines attacked from Route 537, its line of departure, toward the northeast. The battalion was reinforced by tanks and amphibian tractors. On 7July, six tanks and two LVTs crossed the Thu Bon and entered the operation, later joined by eight tanks, one tank retriever, five LVTP-Ss and two LVTP-6s. By 10 July, the infantry and mechanized units reached the lines of the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines at the railroad. The second phase of Macon came to an end.

The VC had offered little resistance. The Marines encountered snipers, but no large VC force. Occasionally enemy gunners lobbed mortar rounds into Marine formations, but the anticipated large contact did not materialize. By the end of Phase II, the 9th Marines claimed to have killed 87 enemy, at the cost of eight Marines dead and 33 wounded.

After consulting with General Kyle, on the afternoon of 10 July, Colonel Barrett issued orders to begin Phase III. The next morning, the 9th Marines commander ordered Dickey's battalion to attack east of the railroad together with the 51st ARVN Regiment, while Major Grimes' 3d Battalion, 9th Marines retraced its steps to the west from the railroad. At the same time, Colonel Barrett made some adjustment in his forces. One company and the command group from the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines were released from Macon and the other company was attached to Dickey's 1st Battalion, 3d Marines. Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines and the mechanized units also reinforced Lieutenant Colonel Dickey's unit."

Phase III of Macon began shortly after 0600 on the 11th, when two companies of the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines crossed the line of departure. From 11 to 14 July, the only significant encounter occurred in the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines area of operations west of the railroad tracks. A VC platoon mortared the battalion command post early on 12 July. At 0250 that morning, 40 to 60 mortar rounds and small arms fire hit in the CP area. Major Grimes called for an artillery mission on the suspected VC mortar site; no results could be observed. Three Marines were slightly wounded by the VC attack.

In the eastern sector of Macon, Lieutenant Colonel Dickey's 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, supported by the tanks and LVTs, reached its objective, 7,000 meters east of the railroad on the afternoon of 13 July. The battalion commander summed up his unit's participation succinctly: 'The results of this operation were negligible. . . . During a three-day sweep of the area no VC were encountered'.

At this point, it appeared to General Kyle that no large VC units were operating in the An Hoa area. On the afternoon of the 13th, he ordered Colonel Barrett to terminate Macon the next day and return the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines to its parent organization Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines was to return to its own battalion and accompany the armored column to the Thu Bon River. At 0800 l4July, Colonel Barrett reported that Operation Macon was over.

Suddenly, the situation changed. A Marine reconnaissance patrol, operating in the southern foothills, spotted 300-400 Viet Cong moving through a pass into an assembly area seven miles east of the An Hoa airstrip. The patrol called for both artillery and air support. Marine aircraft hit the enemy with napalm, rockets, and bombs, while four supporting artillery batteries fired 105mm, 8-inch, and 155mm shells into the area.   This air and ground bombardment killed at least 30 R-20 Battalion soldiers, once more frustrating that unit's attempt to move into the An Hoa region.

Macon Continues

Faced with the evident enemy presence in the southern foothills near An Hoa, Generals Walt and Kyle decided not to close out Operation Macon. The III MAF commander reported to General Westmoreland on 14 July that Macon would continue and later that evening General Kyle told the 9th Marines to disregard his previous order to terminate the operation.   He advised Colonel Barrett:

'Operation in the An Hoa operating area outside presently established 3d MarDiv TAOR will continue to be named Operation Macon on an indefinite basis.  The next morning, Colonel Barrett ordered his 3d Battalion to continue operations in the An Hoa area'.

The continuation of Macon did not disrupt the plans of the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. The battalion had intended to keep its command post at the An Hoa airstrip and conduct clearing operations to support the engineers who had started the extension of Liberty Road beyond the Thu Bon. In fact, at this time, the engineers were working on two extensions of the road, one leading south from Route 4 to the Thu Bon, while the other led north from An Hoa to the river. Macon was reduced to a one-battalion search and clear operation with the missions of keeping the lines of communication open in the An Hoa region and providing security for both the Marine engineers and civilian construction workers.

Interest in the An Hoa region and the extension of the road was not confined to the Marine Command. During one of his periodic visits to III MAF, General Westmoreland toured An Hoa in the latter part of July and specifically asked Colonel Barrett what forces were necessary to secure Liberty Road. The Marine colonel replied 'We intend to secure it by using the forces we are now using, elements of two Marine companies and part of the 2d Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment on the south side . . . of the river'.

Nevertheless, through August, contact with the enemy in Operation Macon was only sporadic and few enemy units of any size were engaged. Indeed the major action for the 3d Battalion occurred out side of the Macon area of operations in support of a Navy detachment conducting a hydrographic survey of the Thu Bon River. On the morning of 20 August, the battalion with two of its own companies and a company from the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines reinforced by tanks and amphibian tractors crossed the river onto the peninsula formed by the Vu Gia and Thu Bon Rivers — the so-called "Arizona Territory" where Operation Mallard had taken place earlier.

Shortly after noon, the battalion encountered about 100 VC from the R-20 Battalion in the hamlets of Giang Hoa and Phu Long and on the western banks of the Thu Bon. Unwilling to stand up to the Marines who were supported by air and artillery, the VC fought a series of delaying actions and made good their escape to the west and north. The Marines sustained casualties of five dead and 16 wounded while killing at least 10 of the enemy. Most of the Marine casualties were a result of enemy mines. With the completion of the survey, the 3d Battalion returned to its An Hoa base that evening.

In Operation Macon during the month, the battalion confined its activities to ambushes, patrols, and outpost operations along Liberty Road while the VC attempted to disrupt its construction. On three occasions, the Marines caught enemy troops in the open. Enemy mining incidents and ambushes increased markedly during this period, but progress on the road continued. Major Fred D. MacLean, Jr., who relieved Major Grimes at the beginning of the month, later remembered that on 27 August, "the first convoy from Da Nang rolled into An Hoa using the completed Liberty Road'.

Macon remained at a low level of activity until 3 September when the 3d Battalion once more met its old adversary, the R-20 Battalion. Shortly after 1200, a platoon from Company I encountered a VC company near Cu Ban on the Thu Bon River. In a fire fight that lasted nearly two hours, the Marine platoon sustained 15 casualties including five dead. Although the Viet Cong unit escaped to the east, it left behind 32 bodies.

This. action was not to be an isolated incident. On 5 September, the 3d Company, 2d Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment and Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines engaged the rest of the R-20 Battalion along Route 537, two kilometers southeast of the site of the fighting on the 3d. Both the American and South Vietnamese companies had just left blocking positions from which they supported a clearing operation by other elements of the Vietnamese battalion. Both Company K and the Vietnamese 3d Company were moving west along the road when enemy troops in sites paralleling the highway opened fire on the ARVN company. The Marines tried to assist the South Vietnamese, but soon were unable to maneuver. Battery D, 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, north of the Thu Bon, fired at the enemy positions. Major MacLean ordered Company I to attack southeast from its outpost at Phu Lac to pinch the VC between it and the two engaged companies. Apparently the VC expected the American reaction. No sooner had Company I advanced when enemy gunners, firing a 57mm recoilless rifle, disabled an Ontos supporting the company. By 1130, both Marine companies and the ARVN unit were heavily engaged.

Major MacLean requested more support, both artillery and air. Battery D responded with 158 rounds and was rewarded with 'excellent effect on target'.  At 1330, Marine planes appeared and repeatedly struck the enemy forces, but the VC fought back stubbornly. Marine 8-inch howitzers and 155mm guns reinforced the fires of Battery D and Marine air again bombed and strafed the enemy.

Slowly the Marine and ARVN companies gripped the VC between them in a pincer movement, but Companies I and K were not able to link up and surround the enemy before nightfall. At dawn the next morning, the three allied companies moved forward once more. To no one's surprise, the VC were gone. The Marines did find 29 enemy dead, and surmised that the VC had suffered so many casualties that they had been forced to abandon the bodies.  The allied forces were also hit hard: the Marine companies suffered three dead and 83 wounded, and the ARVN unit reported 25 wounded.  The 9th Marines intelligence section concluded that the heavy contacts of 3 and 5 September lent 'substance to the belief that the area south of the Song Thu Bon is considered by the Viet Cong to be one in which they may still operate in major unit strength, though with increasingly less impunity'.

This flare up of action in the first part of September was the last significant engagement during Macon. During the rest of the month, the Marines continued to encounter Viet Cong units of squad size or less, but always at a distance. After an initial exchange of fire, the enemy troops would break contact and elude Marine pursuit. The Marine battalion reported that the total number of incidents and friendly casualties for September decreased, although enemy mining and booby trap activity remained the same.

Macon Ends but Little Changes

In October, Operation Macon finally came to an end. During the month, the Viet Cong guerrillas continued to probe Popular Force and Regional Force outposts near the Marine positions, but Marine contact with enemy forces declined significantly. The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines encountered no major Viet Cong main force unit. On 27 October, General Walt authorized the termination of the operation and at noon the next day, Macon came to a close, 117 days after it had started. During this period, the Marines had killed about 380 of the enemy, while suffering 196 casualties, 24 of whom were killed.

The ending of the operation had very little meaning for the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. Although the 3d Marine Division moved north on 10 October, the 9th Marines remained behind and the 3d Battalion continued to operate in the An Hoa region, even after Macon had officially ended. Major MacLean's battalion provided security for Liberty Road, protected the river crossing, and assisted the South Vietnamese. Behind the Marine infantry, engineers and Seabees entered An Hoa and joined with the Vietnamese to finish construction of the industrial complex.