Operation Cameron Falls, Operation Utah Mesa, Operation Idaho Canyon, Operation Arlington Canyon
To see what Operations lead up to this/these Operations
After that fight, the 2d Battalion started a sweep to the northeast along the Da Krong while 3/9 proceeded southeast from FSB Shepherd, five kilometers to the north. The two battalions hoped to trap an NVA force reported to be on Hill 824. After moving through rugged terrain consisting of triple-canopied rain forest and four meter-high elephant grass, the two Marine columns converged on Hill 824. On 5 June, Company H, 2/9, was ambushed by a well dug-in force on the southern banks of the Da Krong. Intense fighting at close quarters raged for nearly twelve hours before the Marines broke through the enemy's defensive line. Upon policing the immediate area, battalion members found a sophisticated network of bunkers, caves, and living quarters and a wide variety of supplies.
Continued patrolling by the two Marine battalions in their AOs over the next two weeks failed to turn up any other large groups of the enemy. Operation Cameron Falls ended on 23 June, when the participating units were shifted farther west to participate in a new operation.
Acting on intelligence reports that enemy units had infiltrated the area south and east of the old Khe Sanh Combat Base, 3d Marine Division headquarters created a joint task force to deploy Marine, Army, and ARVN units into the area. Operation Utah Mesa began on l2 June, when 1/9 moved onto FSB Bison northeast of Khe Sanh. The 3d Battalion, 2d ARVN Regiment occupied nearby FSB Quantico. While these units swept west, three companies of U.S. Army mechanized infantry would advance west along Route 9.
The NVA reacted to this intrusion by launching a series of night attacks against the allied units. The first came against Company B, 61st U.S. Infantry on l8 June. Before dawn that day, the NVA hit the soldiers' night defensive position located just east of Lang Vei. After breaking through the perimeter, the NVA swarmed over the NDP, fighting the soldiers at close quarters. The NVA pulled out at dawn, leaving forty-one bodies behind. The U.S. Army units lost eleven killed and fifteen wounded.
A few hours later, a recon patrol from Company C, 1/9, was ambushed three kilometers southeast of Khe Sanh. The fight started when the NVA raked the patrol with .50-caliber machine-gun fire, instantly killing three Marines. The patrol's survivors then attacked, destroying the enemy machine gun. Soon joined by the remainder of Company C, the riflemen assaulted the enemy's defensive line, driving them southward into a wall of artillery fire.
Two days later, after having continued their westward push, the allied force was hit again. In three separate ground attacks the NVA assaulted the combined NDP of Company D, 1/9, and Company B, 1/61. Though they had to call in air strikes, artillery, and helicopter gunships, the Marines and soldiers held, killing twenty-seven NVA.
On 23 June, 1/9 was pulled out of the field and returned to Vandegrift Combat Base. There, the battalion's equipment was up graded and its personnel was mix-mastered. On 12 July, the battalion moved to Da Nang. Two days later, the unit boarded the USS Paul Revere and sailed for Okinawa.
The two remaining battalions of the 9th Marines continued their operations near Khe Sanh. Enemy contact was an almost daily event. Not only were small bands of determined NVA encountered during the day, but the enemy probed the Marines' NDPs nearly every night. One unit, Company K, 3/9, was hit on two successive nights, 24 and 25 June. Though the fighting was hard and raged for hours, the Marines held.
On 2 July, the NVA struck FSB Spark south of Khe Sanh, where 2/9 was headquartered, with a flurry of 82mm mortar rounds. The barrage wounded more than forty Marines. Four days later Operation Utah Mesa ended when both battalions were pulled back to the Vandegrift Combat Base to prepare for redeployment. The second major unit of the 3d Marine Division to be pulled out of the war zone was 2/9 on 1 August. It was followed by 3/9 on 13 August. In all, nearly eighty-four hundred Marines moved to Okinawa in this first increment of America's withdrawal from South Vietnam.
As July began, the 3d Marines were engaged in Operation Virginia Ridge in the area northwest of Dong Ha and below the DMZ. The rifle companies of 1/3 concentrated their efforts around Mutter's Ridge and in the Helicopter Valley area. To the southwest, 2/3 was spread thin covering the Khe Gio Bridge outside Dong Ha, protecting Route 9, and patrolling southwest of Dong Ha. The northern portion of the Virginia Ridge TAOR was the responsibility of the regiment's 3d Battalion. These Marines held the fixed positions from Alpha 4 to Cam Lo.
Combat action during Operation Virginia Ridge was mostly limited to brief encounters with small bands of NVA infiltrating south from the DMZ. Increased use of several types of new seismic intrusion devices planted along likely routes provided the Marines with an early warning system. Once the devices were activated, artillery barrages could be called in on pre-selected target areas. Often, too, CS gas crystals were sown along these routes to deny their use to the enemy.
When the 9th Marines redeployed, the operational area of the 3d Marines was extended westward. Regimental commander Col. Wilbur F. Simlik ended Operation Virginia Ridge on l6 July and immediately replaced it with Operation Idaho Canyon to include the new TAOR
During the beginning stages of Operation Idaho Canyon, enemy activity continued to be small in scale and brief in duration. However, toward the end of July, the NVA became much bolder. On 25 July, Company I, 3/3, was suddenly bombarded with 60mm mortar rounds, RPGs, and small arms fire as it patrolled a few kilometers west of Charlie 2. Responding with artillery and air strikes, the Marines killed more than twenty NVA. Two days later, in what might have been a retaliatory attack for the beating it took at the hands of Company I, the enemy hit the night laager site of Company K. The platoon of NVA damaged the three tanks that had been operating with Company K and killed three Marines before being driven off. At first light, only two enemy bodies were found, though a large number of blood trails and drag marks disappeared into the nearby brash.
The action then shifted westward. While patrolling about seven kilometers north of the Rockpile on 7 August, Company F, 2/3, came upon two well-dug-in NVA companies. Though supported by air and artillery, Company F's repeated attacks against the enemy's positions were unsuccessful. Suffering six killed and more than twenty wounded, Company F was reinforced at dusk by a platoon from Company A, 1/3. The next morning, the combined unit resumed the attack. Meeting only light resistance, it took the enemy's position. The defenders had fled, leaving behind the bodies of fortysix of their comrades.
Quiet reigned over the area for the next two days, then the enemy hit Company E's 3d Platoon, which was protecting the battalion's 81mm mortar platoon at a position several kilometers to the northwest of Company F's fight. Attacking with grenades, satchel charges, and small arms fire, the fanatical NVA swarmed over the NDP. They immediately focused on the command post, peppering it with a multitude of explosive charges. As a result, communication with the beleaguered force was lost for more than an hour, forcing the supporting artillery to cease firing its barrages. Though the enemy was finally driven off, the attack cost the Marines thirteen dead and fifty-eight wounded; the enemy lost seventeen.
Simultaneously, Company E's 1st Platoon, dug in less than a kilo meter to the south, was struck by a heavy ground and mortar attack. Barely able to hang on, the Marines were able to beat back their attackers only with the timely arrival of air support. Nineteen enemy bodies were later found; the 1st Platoon suffered six killed and seventeen wounded.
As a result of this battering, Company E was pulled out of the field for rest and rebuilding; Company A, 1/3, replaced it. Also, Colonel Simlik issued orders for his regiment that prohibited all but company-sized NDPs within five kilometers of the DMZ; individual platoons were forbidden to establish night laager sites within that zone. General Jones thought that this was such an effective way to reduce unnecessary casualties that he extended the order division-wide. To keep the NVA from pinpointing a unit's position, Jones further ordered units to move at least one kilometer per day. Though this order immediately became unpopular, it did help keep down the casualty rate during the division's final months in South Vietnam. General Jones also banned all independent platoon operations.
Following Company E's ordeal, another lull of several weeks occurred before activity in the AO increased again. On 28 August, Company B, 1/3, began a five-day-long series of engagements as it moved toward Mutter's Ridge. Early that morning, despite taking all the necessary and required precautions, the company was hit by a particularly violent RPG, hand grenade, and small arms attack. When the NVA sappers killed a platoon leader and breached the perimeter, Capt. Gerald H. Sampson raced through heavy enemy fire to rally the battered grunts. Leading them in a counterattack, he restored the torn perimeter. He was killed a short time later. Sampson's gallantry resulted in the award of a posthumous Navy Cross, the last for a 3d Division Marine.
Over the next four days, Company B fought a number of short but sharp fights with enemy troops trying to block their progress to Mutter's Ridge. The last engagement came on 1 September as the company finally crested the long-fought-over ridge. Four enemy snipers were killed before the Marines took the top of the hill.
This pattern of quiet followed by a flurry of enemy attacks continued for the next several weeks. Nearly every company of the regiment was hit at least once. Planning for more aggressive operations against the enemy was under way when, on 19 September, division headquarters ordered the 3d Marines to cease all further offensive operations and prepare for redeployment from South Vietnam. As a result, Operation Idaho Canyon ended that same day. Unlike the 9th Marines, who moved to Okinawa, the 3d Marine Regiment would be returning directly to the United States. On 6 October 1969, the 3d Marines departed South Vietnam for Camp Pendleton in California.
An interesting episode occurred during the regiment's redeployment that clearly illustrated the frustration of fighting a political war. Because it was reported that President Nixon desired to greet the returning Marines at the El Toro Marine Corps Air Station in southern California, Colonel Simlik was ordered to personally lead a contingent of his men back to the States. 'We wiped the mud off our boots and took one hundred fifty men down to the air base at Da Nang', Simlik said.
Somehow the supply people rounded up new helmets, starched fatigues, and spit-shined boots. Simlik recalled, 'We practiced getting on and off a 707 for three days so we would look sharp for the president. And so we flew back to the States, changing into our new uniforms fifteen minutes from El Toro. Of course, the president was not there; Undersecretary of the Navy John Warner was. It was a strange war indeed'.
Because Colonel Simlik had not completed his tour, he re-boarded the 707 for a return trip to Dong Ha. When the 9th Marines were pulled out of South Vietnam in July, the 4th Marine Regiment was engaged in Operation Arlington Canyon. The AO for this operation included the valleys and mountains northwest of Vandegrift. The 4th Marines' operation was, in fact, very similar in character to the adjacent 3d Marines' operation non-numerous company-sized sweeps intent on blunting any enemy infiltration into the area.
During most of the summer, enemy activity in the Arlington Canyon AO, and the adjacent Georgia Tar AO to the south, was very light. Only occasional contact with small bands of recon-type NVA forces was experienced. The Marines spent many days humping the rugged terrain searching for the enemy, only to be frustrated as their efforts repeatedly failed.
As the division worked on plans for its redeployment, the 4th Marines received orders to destroy any of its fire support bases that were unwanted by either the U.S. Army units replacing them or the ARVN. In addition Colonel Goggins was ordered to destroy all the fire support bases in the vicinity of Khe Sanh. Goggins was also told to prepare for the closing of the Vandegrift Combat Base and Ca Lu. He assigned 1/4 to these tasks.
In the Arlington Canyon AO, 2/4 conducted frequent patrols to locate and destroy the enemy units known to be operating in the area. Unfortunately, the division's rules of engagement severely handicapped the patrols' effectiveness. For example, all patrols within three kilometers of the DMZ were now completely prohibited. The rifle companies still had to move one click per day; regardless of the ruggedness of the terrain or the adversity of the weather, the companies still had to move. Not only did this rule greatly tax the infantrymen, the accomplishment of the one kilometer movement frequently became a goal unto itself. Companies were often forced to rush along their assigned route of march in order to 'make their Hick', paying little heed to signs of the enemy.
On 20 August, all offensive operations within the Arlington Canyon AO were halted. The main fire support base, Russell, northwest of the Rockpile, was ordered leveled. When that was completed on 22 August, Operation Arlington Canyon officially ended. The campaign had resulted in just twenty-three enemy dead and eight weapons recovered. Marine casualties were ten killed and twenty- three wounded.
With a shrinking TAOR, the 4th Marines now concentrated their activities in the vicinity of Mutter's Ridge. Intelligence sources indicated that the 9th NVA Regiment had re-infiltrated the area after the 3d Marines left. The rifle companies of 2/4 vigorously patrolled the region but made contact only once.
On 26 September, Company G was hit by a mortar and ground attack at its NDP at LZ Dixie Pete three kilometers north of the Rockpile. Unable to obtain artillery support due to confusion over map coordinates, company commander 1st Lt. William H. Stubblefield rallied his men to fight off the attack with their M-16s and M-60s. Not until just before dawn was the hard-pressed company successful in repulsing its attackers. A first-light sweep of the perimeter revealed a number of blood trails but no bodies. Company G lost two killed and fifty-nine wounded in the fight. ,,'
The regiment's 1st Battalion received orders on 1 October to dismantle the Vandegrift Combat Base. When that task was completed, the battalion moved to Quang Tri to prepare for redeployment to Okinawa. On 22 October, the battalion boarded ships at Cua Viet and sailed east.
The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines was now not only responsible for the security of the Elliott Combat Base and Ehe Gio Bridge on Route 9 but also for conducting all offensive operations north of the highway all the way to the DMZ. On one such patrol, the regiment experienced its last engagement of the war. On the night of 9 October, 2d Lt. Danny G. Dennison's 3d Platoon, Company L was hit by a surprisingly strong ground attack at its hilltop position a few kilometers northeast of Elliott. Two enemy platoons struck the NDP with grenades, satchel charges, and automatic weapons fire. Dennison said, 'Three men moved up to the main part of the wire throwing Chicoms [grenades] and satchel charges. To the left of the CP a ten-man engineer detachment moved up." Almost immediately, two of the Marines' machine guns were destroyed. The NVA exploited this loss by breaching the platoon's perimeter and swarming over their ammo dump, destroying it. A reaction platoon arrived from the Khe Gio Bridge, about two kilometers away. With their help Dennison's men threw the enemy out of their perimeter. At dawn, Marine air support pounded the NVA and they fled, leaving ten dead bodies strewn around the Marines' position. Friendly casualties were eight dead and seventeen wounded.
On 22 October, 2/4 was ordered to Quang Tri. One company remained at Elliott to destroy that combat base. The entire battalion sailed for Okinawa on 6 November.
The last infantry battalion of the 3d Marine Division remaining in South Vietnam was 3/4. Since early October, the battalion's rifle companies had been protecting the Dong Ha Combat Base and patrolling along the Cua Viet River. On 2 November, they received word to cease all combat operations and prepare for redeployment. Two weeks later the battalion moved to Da Nang. There they boarded ships on 24 November and sailed for Camp Courtney on Okinawa the same day.
The end of 1969 saw Marine strength in South Vietnam at a little less than fifty-five thousand. Sandwiched between the massive Tet fighting of 1968 and the major de-escalation of American involvement in the war that occurred in 1970, the year 1969 marked a major change in U.S. policy in South Vietnam. Overall, it was a successful year: the Marines consolidated their positions and continued to pursue both combat and pacification goals. The next year would witness a further reduction in the Marines' presence in the war zone as the Nixon administration continued to fulfill its pledge of turning over more of the combat load to the South Vietnamese.