Operation Durham Peak

On l8 July, Col. William J. Zaro realigned the battalions of his 5th Marines in preparation for a new operation. Two companies of the 1st Battalion relieved the 2d Battalion at Phu Lac (6) east of the Arizona Territory while the other two companies moved to the An Hoa Combat Base. There they relieved the 3d Battalion. Named 'Durham Peak', the new campaign would introduce Marines into Antenna Valley and the adjacent Que Son Mountains, about ten kilometers south of An Hoa. Rising from the lowlands of Quang Nam Province like a row of jagged stakes, the Que Sons tower more than nine hundred meters. Carpeted with a single canopy of jungle foliage and densely packed undergrowth, the range is cut by uncountable deep ravines. Intelligence reports indicated that enemy forces fleeing Dodge City and Go Noi Island were setting up in the rugged mountains. Besides his own 2d and 3d Battalions, Colonel Zaro would also have operational control of 2/1 for Durham Peak. South of the AO, units of the Americal Division took up blocking positions.

A platoon from Company H took heavy sniper fire on 25 July as it moved up a ridge finger leading to the peak of Hill 845. Enemy snipers on a rock ledge about one hundred meters above them plunked away at the Marines, dropping several with well-placed rounds. The platoon pulled back as an orbiting OV-10 Bronco loosed a barrage of rockets at the ledge. The snipers scattered. The next day another platoon from Company H returned to the area. An estimated company-sized unit of NVA ambushed them as they neared the battle site. The enemy was dug in along one side of the route of march. Because the dense foliage restricted visibility, the enemy aimed right along the ground, hitting the Marines in the lower legs. As they lay writhing on the jungle floor, an NVA sharpshooter shot them in the head or back. Six Marines were killed and sixteen were wounded before the platoon could pull out of range.  In the confusion of the fight the platoon's exact position could not be determined. Artillery was fired at the supposed enemy location but proved to be nearly a kilometer off. Rescue efforts faltered. While a med-evac helicopter waited, it was shot down. A platoon of Marines had to be diverted from the original rescue attempt in order to secure the crash site. Finally, though, the lost platoon was located. The relieving force held off the enemy while the casualties were pulled to safety through the trees. Then the two platoons moved out to join the rest of the company near the summit of Hill 845.

Though the companies continued to aggressively patrol the rugged mountains, this contact proved to be the only significant one of Operation Durham Peak. In order to stir the pot further, Colonel Zaro brought 2/5 into the operation on 3l July, but its patrols turned up only a few sick NVA stragglers. By 7 August, Colonel Zaro had decided to end the operation. Over the next week, the maneuver elements were pulled out of the field. Operation Durham Peak ended on 13 August.

But that didn't mean it would be ignored. Both the 2d and 3d Battalions, 7th Marines were assigned to defense and construction duties on the barrier in June 1969. And there was much work to be done. The DAIS had fallen prey to divided responsibility, the lack of manpower, unavailable material, and poor defensive coordination plans. As a result, older sections of the barrier were in a state of disrepair. In some places the brush had completely overgrown the cleared areas. Very few of the electronic sensors had been installed.

The clever local farmers capitalized on this by cutting numerous shortcuts to their rice paddies through the baffler. Faced with these violations of the baffler, both battalions focused the majority of their attention on revitalizing it.

While its sister battalions were so occupied, the regiment's 1st Battalion concentrated on maintaining a presence along Route 4. Constant squad and platoon sized patrols paid frequent dividends as the Marines caught roving bands of VC and NVA moving at night. This intense but low-key patrol and sweep activity continued throughout July and into August.

The relative quiet of recent weeks was shattered on the night of 11-12 August. Not only the 7th Marines, but every major unit in the 1st Marine Division AO was hit by enemy rockets or mortars. Most of these bombardments were followed by a ground assault. The heaviest fighting occurred in the Arizona Territory, where Lieutenant Colonel Dowd's 1/7 found itself in a three-day brawl reminiscent of 1/5's June fight.

At 0415 on 12 August, a listening post from Company D and an ambush squad from Company B both opened fire on a force of two dozen enemy soldiers moving between their adjoining positions. When the enemy responded with a heavy volume of small arms fire, the two patrols pulled back to their respective company's positions. An eerie quiet then descended upon the four company NDP. Alert to the threat of the enemy's presence, Dowd's men maintained a constant vigil. Then, measured bursts of heavy small arms fire sprayed the company's positions. The generous use of preplanned artillery kept the NVA at bay, preventing them from massing for a ground attack against any one company. A dawn sweep of the nearby area uncovered more than fifty dead NVA and more than two dozen weapons.

Unwilling to concede the area to the enemy, Dowd sent his companies in pursuit. Company C found them first. The NVA were emplaced in bunkers in a nearby village complex. The fight raged for several hours, with neither side able to gain the upper hand. Finally, at 1330 Dowd ordered Company D to move up and join the attack. The two companies engaged a determined foe in a slugfest that raged for several more hours. By late afternoon, the resolute Marines had broken through the enemy's main trench line and routed the remaining defenders. As artillery chased the fleeing NVA, Dowd's battle-weary companies dug in for the night. The next day they would count 145 dead NVA in the battle area.

Reinforced by Company L, 3/7, and Company I, 3/5, Dowd continued his pursuit of the NVA on 13 August. Around noon the four attacking companies again became embroiled with the enemy. The resulting seven-hour fight was a near duplicate of the previous day's action. The two sides battled from mere meters away. When they could, artillery and air support lent their massive firepower to the battle. By the time the fight ended, seventy-five NVA were dead. Five Marines were killed and another thirty-three were wounded. Lieutenant Colonel Dowd was one of the dead. His posthumous Navy Cross citation noted how he had been struck down while advancing to the site of the heaviest fighting.

Undeterred by the severe losses they'd taken, the NVA tried one last time to beat the Marines. Just after midnight on 14 August, the NVA launched an attack on the command post of Lt. Col. Frank A. Clark, the new battalion commander. Using a full array of defensive weapons, Clark's headquarters Marines easily beat back the attack. A dozen dead NVA were found around the perimeter the next day. It had been a tough three days for the enemy. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines killed more than 225 members of the 90th NVA Regiment, forcing it to withdraw from the battlefield.

Within hours of this engagement, Col. Gildo S. Codispoti received orders from III MAF and Division Headquarters to take his 7th Marines 55 kilometers south to the Que Son Valley. This southward expansion of the 1st Marine Division's TAOR would be a permanent one. The regiment began the move on 15 August and finished the relocation by the twenty-third.

The U.S. Marines had been battling the NVA and VC in the strategic Que Son Valley since 1965. In 1967, as the III MAF moved its forces north to meet enemy pressure along the DMZ, the region came under the operational control of the U.S. Army's Americal Division. On 20 August 1969, the army handed back to the Marines the responsibility for that portion of the Que Son Valley lying to the north of the Song Ly Ly. The two major bases that the 7th Marines inherited were LZ Baldy, at the intersection of Route 1 and Highway 535, where Col Codispoti set up his headquarters, and FSB Ross, at the village of Que Son, sixteen kilometers to the west. Within days of their arrival, the members of the 7th Regiment would be involved in some of the heaviest fighting of the year.

On 21 August, Colonel Codispoti was asked to lend assistance to the Americal's 4/31. This battalion had been embroiled with the 1st VC Regiment and the 3d NVA Regiment, a component of the Marines' old nemesis, the 2d NVA Division, for several days. In heavy fighting in the shrub-covered hills northeast of Hiep Duc, the soldiers had killed more than three hundred enemy but still were unable to advance. That afternoon Companies F and G, and a forward battalion command group of 2/7, left FSB Ross and headed west along Highway 535, actually a narrow dirt road running west from Route 1 to Que Son. Early on the morning of 22 August, the two companies completed a sweep of Hill 441, which sat north of Phu Binh (3) at the northern edge of the Marines' route. Moving as fast as the enervating one-hundred-plus-degree heat allowed, by the morning of 23 August, the two rifle companies had set up blocking positions stretching more than fifteen hundred meters across the valley floor. West of them, the U.S. soldiers were moving east, sweeping the enemy before them.

So far, the Marines' only casualties had come from the oppressive heat. At midday, patrols from both companies set out to reconnoiter the terrain to their front. On the left, or south flank, Company F found nothing. On the right, however, the squad-sized patrol from Company G came under deadly sniper fire as it moved across a small hill mass running off Hill 441. In short order, three Marines were killed. Company G sent a platoon to attempt to recover the bodies, but it was unable to do so. So accurate was the sniper fire that anyone who tried to reach the bodies was immediately a target. Even when Company H arrived as reinforcement late in the day, the enemy fire was too intense to effect a recovery. Not until the next morning could the three bodies be recovered.

On the morning of 25 August, the three companies of Lt. Col. Marvin H. Lugger's 2/7 moved out to the west to effect a linkup with the 31st Infantry. Almost immediately they came under heavy fire from what proved to be two NVA regiments. On the right, Companies C and H ran into a brutal wall of deadly fire, took heavy casualties, and had to pull back. They spent the rest of the afternoon recovering and evacuating their casualties. On the left, Company F suffered a vicious pounding from enemy mortar, RPG, and automatic weapons fire. Lugger's command group suffered, too, as enemy soldiers swarmed out of the tall elephant grass. They closed to fifty meters before hastily ordered air strikes burned the foe with napalm.

Company F was locked into a close-quarters battle on the left flank. Despite five-hundred-pound bombs dropped by screaming, low-altitude jets, the beleaguered company couldn't pull back with out abandoning its casualties. Lugger had no choice but to call in his Company E to help.

Enemy tracers slashed colorful swatches across the darkening skies as CH-46s ferrled the fresh rifle company into Company F's position. While AH-1G Cobra gunships raked the enemy positions with massive volumes of firepower, Company E helped gather up the casualties, organize a column, and head to Lugger's CP.

Though night had fallen, daring medevac helicopter pilots ignored the continued enemy fire to evacuate the casualties. Then, as the battered and exhausted survivors of the two companies collapsed around the CP, the enemy dropped a barrage of heavy mortar rounds right on them.

Lugger noted, 'It was a very grim lesson we learned. After an intensive fight, there is a tendency for people to let down because they feel they have given their all'.

The barrage killed four and wounded twenty-six. Once those casualties were handled, the wiser Marines hurriedly dug in.

Despite this pounding, Lugger received new orders a short time later. His battalion would advance two kilometers west to complete the linkup with 4/31. soon as it was light enough on the morning of 26 August, Lugger started his men forward. The advance didn't last long.

While Companies G and H easily secured the high ground on the right flank, Companies E and F ran into a firestorm of enemy resistance. A blistering hail of small arms and mortar fire forced both companies to the ground. The Marines barely advanced six hundred meters. Ordered to continue the advance regardless of the cost, Lieutenant Colonel Lugger brought Company G over from the right flank to help. The NVA spotted the movement and turned their mortars on the advancing companies. Before it had covered half the distance to Companies E and F, Company G had been shattered by the exploding rounds.

With all forward movement of 2/7 blocked, Colonel Codispoti ordered Lugger to hold his positions. While 2/7 consolidated its positions and handled its casualties, Lt. Col. Ray G. Kummerow's 3/7 came into LZ West, on the high ground south of 2/7, on the afternoon of 26 August. That same evening Lt. Col. Joseph E. Hopkins replaced Lieutenant Colonel Lugger as commander of 2/7.

Kummerow's battalion started for Hopkins's position before darkness cloaked the valley. As they neared 2/7s reported position, Kummerow's Marines were surprised to find its rifle companies already pulling out and headed back to FSB Ross. Quickly adapting to the unexpected tactical change, Kummerow's battalion dug in for the night at 2/7's farthest point of advance. At dawn the next day, the new battalion entered the North Vietnamese Army's meat grinder.

Company L, on the right flank, was cut up by heavy automatic weapons fire from well-dug-in NVA. Suffering numerous casualties, the company was unable to move. Kummerow ordered Company K to push through the pinned-down company and continue the attack. In a series of violent assaults, Company K's Marines rolled over the entrenched NVA, killing thirteen and capturing several enemy machine guns. The intensity and violence of the attack is attested to by the valor of individual Marines who overcame tremendous odds to achieve their goals. One of the enemy machine guns was captured by LCpI. Jose Jimenez. He aggressively attacked the enemy position, killing a number of NVA. Despite the fact that several other enemy machine guns now concentrated their fire on him, Jimenez continued his single handed attack. His bold actions caused the destruction of one more enemy emplacement before he was cut down in a hail of small arms fire.

Not far from Jimenez, Pfc. Dennis D. Davis charged another enclosed NVA bunker. He raced across ten meters of open ground and jumped atop the bunker. Just as he shoved a grenade into an aperture in the bunker, he was gravely wounded by fragments from an enemy grenade. Despite this, Davis then entered the position and used the enemy's weapons to fire on a nearby NVA position. Later, he pulled a wounded Marine to safety and used that casualty's weapon to charge yet a third position. He was cut down before he reached it.

Second Lieutenant Richard L. Jaehne ordered his platoon to join the attack. Almost immediately one of his platoons was ripped by bursts of deadly fire from an enemy machine gun. As his men hunkered down alongside a paddy dike, Jaehne crawled forward while slugs from the automatic weapon whizzed by within inches of his head. From behind a dike he tossed several grenades at the machine gun nest. Then he pushed up from the dike and dashed forward. Blazing away with his .45-caliber pistol, the young officer killed those North Vietnamese who had survived his grenades. Minutes later he was severely wounded by a burst of small arms fire, but he refused to give up his command.

When Cpl. Clarence H. St. Clam saw Lieutenant Jaehne fall, he immediately ordered the members of his squad forward. They laid down a base of fire that allowed corpsmen to reach the officer and patch him up. When St. Clam noticed an enemy position spraying rounds across the battlefield, he low-crawled toward it. His well placed grenades destroyed the weapon but not before a burst of enemy fire ripped into his body. Undaunted, St. Clam started inching his way toward a second enemy position but immediately became the target for other NVA weapons. He died just meters from his objective.

Jimenez received a posthumous Medal of Honor, and Davis and St. Clam posthumous Navy Crosses; Lieutenant Jaehne lived to receive his Navy Cross. The gallant actions of these men and others allowed Kummerow's battalion to effect a linkup with the 31st Infanny before dusk on 27 August. Over the next several days, Colonel Codispoti deployed his forces north of Hiep Duc into the rugged Que Son Mountains in pursuit of the NVA. Although the troops found numerous signs of an enemy presence, few NVA soldiers were spotted. Later, intelligence sources revealed that the enemy units had fled west rather than north and thus evaded the pursuing Marines.

The 7th Marines spent the rest of 1969 patrolling various areas of the Que Son Valley. Though they found and fought the enemy on numerous occasions, the resulting battles never reached the intensity or frequency of those experienced in August. The continued presence of the Marines greatly limited the enemy's control of the rich valley, but, as in the past, it would prove to be but a temporary reprieve.

On 15 December 1969, the division received a new commander: Maj. Gen. Edwin B. Wheeler replaced General Simpson. A Marine since 1941, Wheeler had first experienced combat as a member of the famed Marine Raiders in World War II. He later saw service during the Korean War as an infantry battalion commander. During 1965 he commanded the 3d Marines in the Da Nang area. In June 1969, he had returned to South Vietnam to serve as the deputy commander of the XXIV Corps.