Operation Oklahoma Hills

Lying just north of Base Area 112, the scene of the recently concluded Operation Taylor Common, were the new areas of focus, known to the Marines as Charlie Ridge and Happy Valley. Charlie Ridge, and its northern neighbor Worth Ridge, were both high, narrow ranges cut by deep ravines and gorges and covered by multi-canopied tropical jungle. Happy Valley, to the west of Worth Ridge, was carpeted with dense underbrush and elephant grass growing more than seven feet high. Any movement through the area would thus be severely restricted. As Col. James B. Ord, commander of the 5th Marines, noted: 'The enemy always has the advantage of operating in the jungle. You only get a point-to-point contact. You can not maneuver on a broad front.. . your observation is limited and your fields of fire are limited. . . it is difficult to make use of supporting arms. And this being the case we have no advantage'.

General Simpson selected Col. Robert L. Nichols's 7th Marines to conduct Operation Oklahoma Hills. As finally planned, two battalions would attack westward along Worth and Charlie Ridges. A third battalion would secure the southern flank to prevent enemy forces from moving into or out of the area. This preparatory portion of the operation began on 21 March when Lt. Col. John A. Dowd's 1/7 headed west along Highway 4 from FSB Rawhide (Hill 65) to take up these blocking positions. At Hill 52, ten kilometers west of FSB Rawhide, Dowd's men set up FSB Mustang. Soon Battery K, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines had set up shop.

The operation officially commenced on 30 March when 2/7 moved west from Hill 10 to the approaches of Worth Ridge and 3/7 started down Charlie Ridge from its jump-off positions at Hill 40, four kilometers south of Hill 10. This opening move was unique because the Marines moved into the area of operations by foot under the cover of darkness. After starting off at 2000, by early the next morning the advancing columns were well into the jungle. As Capt. Paul K. Van Riper of Company M, 3/7, said, 'The NVA had no idea that we had moved that far and no idea of our location'. It was very satisfying to be one up on the enemy for a change.

The next morning, members of 3/26 were delivered by CH46s into the western end of Happy Valley. By the end of the day they had been joined by a battery of 4.2-inch mortars from 1/13. Fire Support Base Robin was officially opened.

On 1 April, the efforts of Operation Oklahoma Hills received an unexpected boost when two enemy soldiers were taken. A recon force working deep within the tangled jungle captured a senior sergeant from the 141st NVA Regiment. Later that day, Company K, 3/7, took as prisoner an officer from the 31st NVA Regiment. Both captives provided information pinpointing the specific locations of their units' respective base camps. Colonel Nichols immediately opted to act on this information, altering his plan in order to exploit the new intelligence. He ordered the infantry battalions to rapidly move to the identified base campsites, bypassing other suspected enemy camps. At the same time, he initiated planning to have the battalions later reverse direction and search the bypassed areas.

From FSB Robin, Lt. Col. Edward W. Snelling's 3/26 moved southeast toward Hill 1166 and the base camp of the 141st as rapidly as the rugged, broken terrain permitted. Unfortunately, the Marines' movement was no secret: small groups of NVA harassed the column as it struggled through the dense vegetation. At the same time, 3/7 pushed forward along Charlie Ridge from the east, hoping to catch the NVA while they still occupied the camp. Despite the inhospitable terrain, by late afternoon of 7 April the lead companies of both battalions had reached their respective objectives on either side of the deep ravine holding the 141st NVA Regiment's base camp.

At first light the next morning, Company L, 3/26, eagerly crept down the steep hill into the ravine. Company K, 3/7, held its position on top of the ravine, prepared to block any enemy escape attempt. As soon as Company L reached the bottom of the gorge, it found the first base camp—it was empty. A little farther in the dense jungle the Marines found a well-equipped dispensary. The point squad had just entered the jungle on the other side when a flurry of AK47 rounds snapped through the foliage. The Marines hit the ground. Responding instinctively, they sprayed the jungle before them with hundreds of rounds from their Ml6s. Then silence returned. A quick recon revealed that the enemy attackers had fled, apparently intent only on buying time to make good their comrades' escape.

That afternoon Company I, 3/26, made it to the bottom of the ravine. The two rifle companies spent the next few days thoroughly searching the area and its numerous offshoot canyons. Small bands of stay-behind NVA soldiers harassed the Marines almost constantly but could not keep them from uncovering a number of base camps.

Colonel Nichols described one camp as made up of bunkers 'reinforced with logs, eight to fifteen inches of dirt, then another layer of logs. [Some had] a trap door and a subterranean space below that, providing additional individual protection. Each generally accommodated eight to ten soldiers.., tunnel complexes connected these. Very careful preparations were made to ensure that cookhouses were well camouflaged, and smoke conduits, to abort any evidence of smoke coming through the jungle, had been laid throughout'.

In the meantime, Lt. Col. Neil A. Nelson's 2/7 advanced along Worth Ridge to the area that the prisoner pinpointed as holding the base camp of the 31st NVA Regiment, about five kilometers east of the 141st NVA Regiment's base camp. As Company E stealthily approached the area on 11 April, the point platoon took a burst of heavy machine-gun fire. The Marines deployed, slugging it out with the enemy. Again, the foe was a relatively small stay-behind force. It was easily destroyed, and the Marines entered the NVA camp. It quickly became obvious that this was a large camp, larger than the others; more than two hundred structures were hidden in the thick foliage. The riflemen were surprised, but very grateful, that the camp was abandoned.

The next several days passed in relative quiet as both base camps were thoroughly searched. Although a considerable quantity of documents and other items of great intelligence value were uncovered, enemy contact had evaporated by 15 April. As a result, four days later 2/7 was ordered to return to the Da Nang area to fill the void left by 1/26, which had returned to duty as part of the Special Landing Force. The 1st Battalion, 51stARVN Regiment would take the place of 2/7.

Once the exchange of forces was completed, Operation Oklahoma Hills shifted into its second phase. The participating battalions were given specific zones in which to search for the enemy. The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines essentially reversed direction and retraced its route along Charlie Ridge, looking for any bypassed enemy positions. The 3d Battalion, 26th Marines concentrated its search in the vicinity of the 141st NVA Regiment's base camp. Colonel Nichols wanted to make sure that all enemy facilities making up this camp were uncovered and destroyed. Once that was accomplished, 3/26 was pulled out of the AO on 2 May.

While these searches continued, enemy activity picked up in the AO's southern portion. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, still holding its blocking positions, was advised of the movement of a large force of enemy soldiers north out of the Arizona Territory. Lieutenant Colonel Dowd had his three companies set up a series of platoon sized ambushes on the north side of the Song Vu Gia. Sure enough, on the evening of 21 April, an ambush squad from Company C spotted a group of men moving west to east along the river's south bank. Captain Joseph M. Romero quickly alerted the other company commanders of the intruders.

At 1945 a squad from Capt. James W. Huffman's Company B, about three kilometers downriver, saw a handful of NVA emerging from the thick foliage on the south bank. The enemy squad appeared to be inspecting a long, wide sandbar that hugged the river's southern edge. Wisely ordering his men to hold their fire, Huffinan quickly moved several of his outlying platoons closer to this site. He also ordered his 3d Platoon, three hundred meters upriver, to turn its .30-caliber machine gun toward the enemy soldiers. Then he alerted his supporting artillery.

About thirty minutes later the first group of enemy soldiers slipped back into the vegetation. All was quiet for another thirty minutes. In their ambush positions hidden deep in the wild hedgerows bordering the north bank, Huffinan's riflemen waited nervously. The jungle's night sounds only added to their anxiety.

Then, without a sound, a force of some two hundred NVA materialized across the river. Clustered in platoon-sized groups of about forty men, the first carried a number of small, round, woven boats.

The enemy scuffled across the sandbar and entered the water. Using light-enhancing starlight scopes, Huffinan's men watched as four or five of the North Vietnamese entered each little tub. Then, guided by a pair of men, the boats floated across the water. About twenty-five NVA remained on the sandbar.

As soon as the boats reached mid-river, Huffman called the artillery battery for an illumination round. Seconds later the shell burst over head, bathing the jungle in a brilliant white light. Huffinan's Marines opened fire with all they had. The sound of dozens of M-16s and M60s firing, the machine gun chopping out rounds, and mortar and artillery shells exploding nearly drowned out the screams of the panicked enemy soldiers. They jumped from their boats, taking to the water in mostly vain attempts to escape the killing field.

Unfortunately, the illumination rounds were not continuous. As darkness again blanketed the river, many of the enemy escaped. Still, the bodies of fifty-seven enemy soldiers, clad in fresh, new uniforms, were found in the river or along its banks the next morning. Two of Huffman's men received slight wounds.

Huffman requested LVTs that morning so he could cross the river. Following an air strike by F4s at 0900, Company B boarded the amphibious vehicles and chugged across the water. Sweeping to a depth of several hundred meters on the south bank, the Marines found fourteen more enemy bodies. Numerous blood trails provided evidence that a large number of casualties had been carried away.

Anxious to follow up this successful action, Colonel Nichols planned a quick thrust into the northern portion of the Arizona Territory to find the enemy. Once permission to operate in their AO was received from the 5th Marines, 1/7 prepared for the operation. On the night of 29 April, Companies B and D, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Dowd and his battalion command group, crossed the Song Vu Gia.

At first light the force began moving southeast. Almost immediately Captain Huffman's company, on the right flank, was hit by a fusillade of small arms fire. While they tried to extract themselves from the ambush, the rest of the column wheeled to the northeast to face two more NVA companies. The fighting was fierce as the well emplaced enemy force battered Dowd's men with small arms and mortar fire. The thick, nearly impenetrable jungle greatly reduced the Marines' ability to effectively fight back or use air and artillery support. Finally, once Company B disengaged, the force reversed direction and attacked back toward the river. There they pivoted left to continue their drive along the south bank of the river. The two infantry companies fought side by side throughout that day and into the next, calling air strikes and artillery onto each succeeding tree line.

On the morning of 1 May, the rifle companies of Lt. Col. Thomas E. Bulger's 3/1 moved overland from the Liberty Bridge area and took up blocking positions west of Dowd's force. Not long after Dowd's two companies renewed their attack, they bumped smack into an unmovable NVA force. Struggling forward against the near constant blaze of enemy fire, the Marines had gained only two hundred meters by noon. As a result, 3/1 began an attack to the east, catching the NVA by surprise. By the end of the day, less than a kilometer of tangled jungle separated the two battalions.

Responding to the ever changing tactical situation, the two battalion commanders agreed that Dowd's force would hold its position the next day while 3/1 attacked toward them. Bulger's Marines pushed off at 0600 on 2 May. To their disappointment the NVA had sneaked away during the night. The two battalions linked up early that afternoon. Both then began a drive to the northeast. They reached the south bank of the Song Vu Gia without further significant contact. By nightfall both units had crossed to the north side of the river.

The foray into the Arizona Territory had cost nine Marines their lives and sixty more had been wounded. The NVA casualties were set at sixty killed. This proved to be the last significant enemy contact of Operation Oklahoma Hills. By 12 May, only one Marine battalion, 3/7, remained in the operational area. One ARVN unit, 1/51, worked with them.

For some time NVA POWs had mentioned in their interrogations that the Ken Valley was a major arms and ammunition storage depot. A number of prisoners reported traveling to this valley, twenty five kilometers west of the 141st NVA Regiment's base camp area, to pick up rockets that were eventually launched on Da Nang. After a period of relative calm from 12 to 20 May in the Oklahoma Hills AO, Colonel Nichols decided to shift his forces westward to exploit this information. On the morning of 21 May, a fleet of the new CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters deposited Marines from Company L in the Ken Valley. Subsequent airlifts brought in Company M and the 51st ARVN's recon company. The three units then fanned out in different directions. Over the next five days, the allied companies conducted a thorough search of the valley. They found no evidence of a major enemy presence. On only two occasions were enemy soldiers spotted. On 25 May, all units were extracted.

Over the next few days, the Marines of 3/7 spent their time closing down the principal fire support bases used in the operation. On 29 May Operation Oklahoma Hills ended. In all, 44 Marines were killed and 439 were wounded seriously enough to require evacuation. More significant, however, was the large number of non battle casualties, 456 in all. The vast majority of these were broken bones, sprains, and serious lacerations caused by falls in the rugged, slippery jungle terrain.

Intelligence agencies estimated that Dodge City and Go Noi Island harbored between seven and nine enemy battalions. Total enemy strength was estimated at between twenty-five hundred and three thousand, the majority of whom were North Vietnamese Army regulars. These enemy soldiers not only regularly sniped at and harassed friendly forces but were quite capable of attacking allied installations in strength. The 1st Marine Division headquarters decided that it was time to clear the region of enemy forces, once and for all.