Operation Pipestone Canyon

In mid-May, General Simpson was briefed by Col. Charles S. Robertson, commander of the 1st Marines, on a campaign designed to deny the enemy continued safe haven in the two areas. In his briefing Colonel Robertson stressed that Operation Pipestone Canyon was a natural sequel to Operations Taylor Common and Oklahoma Hills.

As planned, the operation would begin with two battalions, BLT 1/26 from SLF Alpha, and 3/5, attacking eastward into the operational area. Designed as a feint, these two battalions would then establish blocking positions. Once this had been accomplished, five battalions (1st and 2d Battalions, 1st Marines; 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion; and the 1st and 4th Battalions, 51st ARVN Regiment) would attack southward into and through Dodge City, then on into neighboring Go Noi Island. This movement would be executed in coordination with two Korean Marine Corps battalions holding positions on the southern edge of the AO. The effort would be a true allied operation.

The contiguous areas of Dodge City and Go Noi Island lay ten to twenty kilometers south of Da Nang and six to twenty kilometers west of Hoi An. The combined area was bordered on the west by the south fork of the Song Vu Gia; on the north by the Song Al Nghi, Song Lo Tho, and Song Thanh Quit; on the east by Route 1; and on the south by the Song Thu Bon, Song Ba Ren, and Song Chiem Son. A north-south railroad berm bisected the area. Most of the land was flat, but it was covered with rice paddies, thick brush, tangled hedgerows, and vast expanses of tall elephant grass. Nearly two dozen villages and hamlets dotted the region.

The morning of 26 May opened with a blistering bombardment of the AO's western region. Heavy 8-inch shells from the offshore USS Newport News and artillery fire from the cannons of 1/11 ripped into the terrain with an explosive fury. Following this bombardment, the members of Lt. Col. George C. Kliefoth's 1/26 and Lt. Col. Harry E. Atkinson's 3/5 stepped off on their eastward attack. The first few days of the movement resulted in only minor contact. However, as the Marines moved closer to Dodge City and Go Noi Island, enemy resistance picked up. By mid-afternoon on 30 May, the two battalions had set up their blocking positions just west of the railroad berm.  They had killed sixteen NVA but lost a total of ten dead and more than a hundred wounded. All of the friendly casualties had been caused by mines or booby traps.

The next day the five allied battalions stepped off from their positions on the Song Lo Tho. The southward attack was preceded by an intense artillery and naval gunfire bombardment. As concussion waves rolled over the waiting riflemen, they hoped that the bursting shells would not only get the enemy soldiers but would detonate any mines and booby traps waiting for them. Soon after crossing the river, the lead rifle platoons started uncovering well-built bunker complexes generously salted with booby traps. These brutal devices would become even more prevalent the deeper the infantrymen drove into enemy territory. Actual enemy contact during the first few days, however, was light. All the evidence indicated that the enemy troops were fleeing to the south and west, toward the blocking force. Then, on 2 June, enemy resistance suddenly stiffened. Company G, 3/5, was hit by a shower of enemy mortars as it approached a small bunker complex. The company commander quickly ordered up a pair of the accompanying M48 tanks. After the armored giants had pumped more than a dozen deadly 90mm shells into the heart of the enemy position, the riflemen attacked. The tanks had done their job well. Only a handful of enemy soldiers resisted the Marines. In minutes it was over. Seven NVA lay dead and one wounded enemy soldier was captured.

Three days later the attackers reached the Song Ky Lam, which divided Dodge City from Go Noi Island. With the second phase of Pipestone Canyon over, the attacking forces paused to re-supply and reposition themselves for the third phase. During this interim period Marine jets pounded Go Noi Island with an unrelenting fury. More than 750,000 pounds of high-explosive bombs chewed up the ground in front of the attackers.

The new phase began on 10 June. While General Simpson and the new 1st Marines commander, Col. Charles E. Walker, watched from a command post atop Hill 119 just south of Go Noi Island, twenty-two helicopters carried in Marines from 2/1 and a force of Korean Marines. The CH46s touched down unmolested in two LZs on the southern edge of Go Noi Island. Once formed, the combined force began sweeping north. That same afternoon the rifle companies of 1/1 began moving eastward from the Liberty Bridge area.

Once again, enemy contact proved light. The Viet Cong and NVA were scattering, breaking into small groups and sneaking past the advancing attackers to head south into the Que Son Mountains. Occasional brief firefights did break out, but these were mostly the futile efforts of small stay-behind forces. A number of prisoners were taken, but they were primarily wounded or nearly starved enemy soldiers.

By l3 June, the major sweeps had been completed. While the allied battalions established company-sized AOs, the Provisional Land Clearing Company moved into eastern Go Noi Island. Equipped with a wide variety of bulldozers and tractors, the provisional company began plowing up eastern Go Noi. Able to clear 250 acres at a time, the company would eventually level more than eight thousand acres on the island, denying the enemy a major sanctuary.

While the bulldozers turned the soil on eastern Go Noi Island, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines turned its attention to the western portion of the island. At dawn on l9 June, Company C headed west from the railroad berm. Within a short time the deep karumph of an exploding booby trap shattered the morning. That one was soon followed by a second, then a third, then a fourth. It seemed that whichever way the Marines moved, the enemy had sown an explosive device. To reduce the frustration of dealing with these hidden killers, the battalion peppered its forward areas with artillery and an aerial bombardment. Infantry units took to riding atop tanks. But there was no way to completely avoid the antipersonnel devices. Only a constant state of awareness could combat the deadly mines.

After sweeping to An Quyen, 1/1 was replaced by 2/1 on 2lJune. Determined to clear western Go Noi of the enemy, the fresh Marines conducted daily search and clear operations. As had the Marines before them, the men of 2/1 found few enemy troops but many booby traps.

Company G had it particularly tough. Fifty-nine of the seventy dead and wounded that it suffered during this period resulted from booby traps and mines. As Capt. Frank H. Adams pointed out, the threat of death or injury from these devices severely demoralized the troops. 'It gets to the point', he said, 'where each individual says, 'They put them out there, we have got to sweep ... ultimately I'm going to hit one.' When you get to that point, as a leader you're lost'.

After a particularly bad day with booby traps, Adams had to pull his company off the line to give them a pep talk. It went surprisingly well. He finished up with a prayer and returned to the sweeps. The upturn in morale made him tremendously proud to be a Marine.

By late June, General Simpson had decided that eastern Go Noi would be permanently occupied. The 3d ARVN Battalion, 51st Regiment, and the 1st Battalion, Korean Marine Corps would occupy two new combat bases that covered the eastern portion of Go Noi. At least one U.S. Marine rifle company would patrol the island's western half.

For the rest of June and into early July, enemy activity waned in the Pipestone Canyon AO. Then, intelligence reports indicated that the enemy had returned to eastern Dodge City. On 14 July, elements of 2/1 air-assaulted into four landing zones in that area. As the troop laden CH-46s came into the LZs, all took heavy enemy fire. Seven were hit and one was forced to make an emergency landing; fortunately, it was near a Korean Marine position. At two of the LZs the enemy fire was so strong that the helicopters were forced to divert to alternate landing zones. This caused a one-hour delay in establishing a cordon around the abandoned village of Tay Bang An, which was believed to harbor the enemy.

Once the Marines were in position, aerial observers reported seeing nearly fifty enemy troops moving around the village. By mid morning all four companies of the battalion had engaged the enemy. Company F had the hardest time, losing two dead and seven wounded to machine-gun fire and RPGs as they neared the village's western edge. The fight to defeat the enemy continued into the next day. Fleeing enemy soldiers reportedly tried to break out through the part of the cordon held by Company G, but they were easily repulsed. The next day sweeps of the village and its environs failed to uncover any sign of the foe. As a result, late on 17 July, the battalion was pulled out.

The Marines continued their sweeps and patrols of various zones of the Pipestone Canyon AO throughout the rest of the summer.  During this time actual contact with the enemy was limited. Most of the friendly casualties still resulted from booby traps. Enemy sightings did pick up in late September. To eliminate them, several companies from 1/1 were rushed into the Dodge City area north of Route 4 on 25 September. Again, though the grunts uncovered numerous bunkers, only a few enemy soldiers were spotted. After four generally fruitless days of patrolling the area, the battalion pulled out.

This frustrating pattern continued until Operation Pipestone Canyon officially ended on 7 November. Though no major combat action had occurred, the campaign did drive the VC and NVA out of Dodge City and Go Noi Island. The land clearing operations transformed Go Noi Island from a heavily vegetated tract into a barren wasteland, free of tree lines and other cover long used by the enemy to conceal his movements across the island. The participating forces claimed 852 enemy dead and 58 captured. Marine casualties numbered 71 killed and 600 wounded, the vast majority of which were caused by booby traps.

Throughout May and into early June, enemy contact in the Arizona Territory was light. Then, at dawn on 7 June, NVA sappers attacked the An Hoa Combat Base. Shortly after midnight a dozen 82mm mortar rounds fell out of the sky, erupting with sharp explosions across the base. As the base's defenders raced to their fighting positions, the NVA sappers sprayed the base with automatic weapons fire, RPGs, and B40 rockets. The sappers focused their assault on two sectors, breaking through the defenses in both places. The victory didn't last long. Responding rapidly, An Hoa's defenders rushed forward, attacking the sappers before they could exploit their break through. It was nearly dawn before the pop-pop of Ml6s ended, but the sappers were thrown back. In all, nineteen NVA died and two were captured. No Marines were killed and only three were lightly injured.

That same night, a force from the 90th NVA Regiment attacked the night defensive position held by Company A and Lt. Col. William J. Riley, Jr.'s battalion command group about six kilometers west of An Hoa. Attacking the NDP from three directions, the enemy soldiers drew close enough to toss hand grenades into the Marines' bunkers. Hard pressed, the defenders had to call on aerial gunships to stop the attackers. A search of the ground around the NDP at first light turned up eleven dead and three wounded NVA. Though the enemy had been unsuccessful in their drive to overrun the Marines, they continued to harass them throughout the day with mortar fire and sniper rounds.

Despite the beating they'd taken, the NVA weren't done. In another attempt to throw the Marines out of the Arizona Territory, they hit Company A and Riley's command group again the next morning. In the predawn darkness, enemy sappers crept close to the unit's NDP and poured a heavy volume of small arms fire at the Marines. Before the enemy could close on the perimeter, pre-registered artillery was called up. Under a barrage of high-explosive rounds, the attackers fled.

While relocating that same afternoon, Company A came under heavy enemy fire from .30 and .50 caliber machine guns. Following an air strike on the enemy positions, Capt. Phillip H. Torrey ordered his men into the attack. Not only did the NVA respond with intense machine-gun fire, but they now added mortars to the din. Despite this, Torrey's lead platoon battled forward. Defying a withering fire, it gained a toehold on the southern edge of the enemy's perimeter. The Marines battered the well-emplaced NVA with automatic weapons fire, rockets, and small arms fire for more than an hour and a half before being called back because of darkness. Torrey reorganized his company and settled down for the night, but Marine air and artillery kept up their fire until dawn.

After a heavy barrage the next morning, Company A, reinforced by a platoon from Company C, resumed the attack. Fighting raged for several hours, but the determined Marine riflemen persevered. When the fight ended, more than eighty dead NVA were scattered across their position. Documents found in several bunkers revealed that the site was a battalion command post defended by two rifle companies.

While Company A inventoried the spoils of its victory, Company B, a short distance away, was hit by heavy enemy fire. Reacting quickly, the Marines attacked. Charging boldly across three hundred meters of open rice paddies, the grunts overran the enemy position, killing seventy-five NVA and capturing a large number of weapons.

Undeterred by the beatings they had taken, the NVA continued to hit Riley's battalion. Over the next four days they rarely passed up an opportunity to strike, using mortars, RPGs, and small arms fire. Gutsy as they were, however, the enemy never seriously threatened Riley's units. Fire superiority in the form of aerial bombardment and massed artillery barrages prevented the NVA from overrunning any of Riley's rifle companies. Indeed, the enemy lost nearly one hundred more dead, whereas the Marines' casualties were a handful of wounded.

As a result of these losses, enemy activity subsided beginning on 12 June; however, just after midnight on 17 June, the NVA struck again. Two full companies hit the battalion's night position. In a fight that lasted more than five hours, the Marines, again well supported by air and artillery, held off the attackers, who finally retreated at dawn. Riley's men found more than thirty enemy bodies around their position in the morning.

After having lost more than three hundred men in ten days, the enemy withdrew from the Arizona Territory. The tired men of 1/5 had their first uneventful night in nearly two weeks.

On l8 July, Col. William J. Zaro realigned the battalions of his 5th Marines in preparation for a new operation. Two companies of the 1st Battalion relieved the 2d Battalion at Phu Lac (6) east of the Arizona Territory while the other two companies moved to the An Hoa Combat Base. There they relieved the 3d Battalion. Named 'Durham Peak', the new campaign would introduce Marines into Antenna Valley and the adjacent Que Son Mountains, about ten kilometers south of An Hoa. Rising from the lowlands of Quang Nam Province like a row of jagged stakes, the Que Sons tower more than nine hundred meters. Carpeted with a single canopy of jungle foliage and densely packed undergrowth, the range is cut by uncountable deep ravines. Intelligence reports indicated that enemy forces fleeing Dodge City and Go Noi Island were setting up in the rugged mountains. Besides his own 2d and 3d Battalions, Colonel Zaro would also have operational control of 2/1 for Durham Peak. South of the AO, units of the Americal Division took up blocking positions.

A platoon from Company H took heavy sniper fire on 25 July as it moved up a ridge finger leading to the peak of Hill 845. Enemy snipers on a rock ledge about one hundred meters above them plunked away at the Marines, dropping several with well-placed rounds. The platoon pulled back as an orbiting OV-10 Bronco loosed a barrage of rockets at the ledge. The snipers scattered. The next day another platoon from Company H returned to the area. An estimated company-sized unit of NVA ambushed them as they neared the battle site. The enemy was dug in along one side of the route of march. Because the dense foliage restricted visibility, the enemy aimed right along the ground, hitting the Marines in the lower legs. As they lay writhing on the jungle floor, an NVA sharpshooter shot them in the head or back. Six Marines were killed and sixteen were wounded before the platoon could pull out of range.  In the confusion of the fight the platoon's exact position could not be determined. Artillery was fired at the supposed enemy location but proved to be nearly a kilometer off. Rescue efforts faltered. While a medevac helicopter waited, it was shot down. A platoon of Marines had to be diverted from the original rescue attempt in order to secure the crash site. Finally, though, the lost platoon was located. The relieving force held off the enemy while the casualties were pulled to safety through the trees. Then the two platoons moved out to join the rest of the company near the summit of Hill 845.