Operation Taylor Common

Of particular concern to both MACV and III MAF in late 1968 was a major NVA staging area identified as Base Area 112. Located in the rugged mountains southwest of An Hoa, BA 112 provided training and logistical facilities for the NVA forces threatening the area between Da Nang and Tam Ky. Among the enemy units that intelligence sources identified as occupying part of BA 112 were the Front 4 Headquarters and Headquarters Military Region 5, which controlled NVA and VC activities in Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai Provinces, plus the 21st Regiment, 2d NVA Division, and the 141st NVA Regiment. Faced with this lucrative a target, MACV urged III MAF to conduct an operation in the area.

Accordingly, the 1st Marine Division activated Task Force Yankee under assistant division commander Brig. Gen. Ross T. Dwyer, Jr., on 4 December. As planned, Operation Taylor Common would have three phases. First, elements of TF Yankee, in conjunction with ARVN units, would conduct clearing operations from the Liberty Bridge south to An Hoa. Next, a series of fire support bases would be opened southwest of An Hoa along the approaches to BA 112, leading to the penetration of the base area by the infantry elements. Finally, once the base area was cleared, task force units would conduct recon operations farther west in order to interdict enemy in filtration routes from Laos.

The deep roar of CH46 helicopter rotors echoed over the rice paddies north of An Hoa as all four companies of BLT 2/7 headed for their LZ in the Arizona Territory on the morning of 7 December. In short order the four rifle companies were spreading out from the landing zone, ever alert for any sign of the enemy. Fortunately, there were none.

Once established on the ground, the battalion headed northeast. Across swollen streams and mucky rice paddies, and through thick tree lines, the riflemen advanced, searching for the foe. Meanwhile, elements of the 5th Marines started their search and clear sweeps from the Liberty Bridge to An Hoa. Although enemy contact was light and sporadic during this phase, the Marines did take casualties. A number came from booby traps, but more, including five deaths, came from friendly fire. Regrettably, this problem would plague the maneuver elements throughout the operation.

On 9 December, TF Yankee was augmented by the 1st and 3d Battalions, 3d Marines, on loan from the 3d Marine Division. General Davis had made the battalions available because Operation Taylor Common was the 1st Marine Division's first 'high-mobility"\' operation, a concept developed and fostered by General Davis, and he thought that Simpson's division would benefit by having some experienced battalions around.

Phase Two of Taylor Common opened on 11 December, when 3/5 landed on Hill 575, about ten kilometers southwest of An Hoa, and established FSB Lance. Once the supporting artillery battery was in place, the rifle companies of 3/5 fanned out from the fire support base in clearing operations. Over the next week, this pattern was repeated as other TF Yankee units established FSB Pike (2/5), two kilometers northwest of Lance, and FSBs Spear (1/3) and Mace (3/3) to the southwest.

With four rifle battalions now on the ground along the eastern edge of BA 112, the search and destroy operations began in earnest. Although actual contact with enemy forces over the next two weeks was sparse, the Marines did uncover and destroy a number of enemy base camps, hospitals, supply facilities, and even an enemy POW camp. All of the facilities were unoccupied, because the enemy had fled westward.

For the men of the 1st Marine Division, this campaign in the mountains was vastly different from what they had experienced so far in the war. Most of the men had not operated in the mountainous, triple-canopied jungle. One rifleman later noted, 'The density of the woods, the vines, the jungles; it's really thick and it's nagging and tiresome to work in, and everything is against you'.

The final phase of Operation Taylor Common began on New Year's Day 1969, when 3/5 established Combat Operations Base (COB) Javelin about seven kilometers west of FSB Mace, at the western edge of BA 112. (A combat operations base was similar to a fire support base but did not include artillery.) Two weeks later, 1/3 secured Hill 508, six kilometers north of COB Javelin, and set up FSB Maxwell.

Using helicopters to drop into select LZs, the infantry companies fanned out on search missions from their bases. From COB Javelin 3/5 advanced generally southward, leapfrogging from one new combat operations base to another. At the same time, the rifle companies of 1/3 advanced on a parallel axis north and west of Maxwell. As before, any actual contact with the enemy was light. Most of the time the action involved a platoon or less of fleeing NVA holding rearguard positions. However, several large arms caches were found, including one that contained several dozen 122mm rockets, thousands of mortar rounds, and several dozen smaller rockets.

While the mountains west of An Hoa were being prowled, other units swept the eastern area of the Taylor Common AO. On 10 February, BLT 3/26, Special Landing Force Bravo, was deployed to the Arizona Territory, relieving an ARVN ranger group. From the time those seaborne Marines touched down, they were tracked and pursued by relentless NVA snipers. Any halt in their march resulted in sniper rounds and an occasional rifle grenade shattering the quiet. Not until 26 February were they able to extract some revenge. Company L, 3/26, cornered a platoon of NVA in an abandoned hamlet. Though the enemy force peppered the Marines with fire from two .50-caliber machine guns, high-explosive bombs from supporting Marine F-4B Phantom jets blew the WA to pieces. The grunts advanced, easily overrunning the remaining defenders. Seventy-five NVA bodies were found scattered throughout the area.

By mid-February, BA 112 had effectively been neutralized. Brigadier General Samuel Jaskilka, who had replaced General Dwyer as commander of TF Yankee on 14 February, ordered all Taylor Common forces except Companies L and M, 3/5, to return to An Hoa by 16 February. Because of increased enemy activity along the DMZ, both battalions of the 3d Marines immediately returned to Dong Ha.

No sooner had the rifle companies returned to the An Hoa area than the enemy attacked it. In the early-morning darkness of 23 February, a barrage of enemy mortar rounds slammed into the base's northeast corner. This was followed by a ground assault that penetrated the base's perimeter defenses. Once inside the base, the sappers used long bamboo poles to fling explosive charges into the ammunition dump. A series of sharp explosions destroyed most of the dump and threw hot rounds for hundreds of meters. While some Marines ignored the danger to battle the fires, others chased the intruders. Not until well after dawn was the last sapper hunted down and killed. To prevent any future attacks on An Hoa, 2/5 was deployed to Liberty Bridge. There its rifle companies took up positions that screened the base.

To the west, enemy pressure against the two companies remaining in BA 112 increased in late February. Almost nightly, Companies L and M were hit by mortar barrages and ground assaults. In the pitch-black darkness just after midnight on 1 March, FSB Tomahawk, the westernmost base, was attacked. Four Marines in a listening post first heard the enemy moving toward them in the thick jungle. As they radioed a warning to the fire support base, a satchel charge flew out of the jungle toward their position. Private First Class Daniel D. Bruce, a mortar man from the Headquarters and Service Company, 3/5, caught the explosive device in mid-air, then shouted a warning to his buddies as he leaped from the bunker. Intent only on protecting his fellow Marines, Bruce held the device to his body as he ran into the jungle. Before he could dispose of the charge, it exploded. Bruce absorbed the full and deadly blast, but his buddies survived to fight off their attackers. Bruce would receive a posthumous Medal of Honor for his valor.

As a result of these frequent attacks, the rest of 3/5 returned to the western region of BA 112 on 28 February. It had been there but a few days when General Jaskilka, reacting to the continued pressure against An Hoa, ordered the battalion to withdraw. Planned as a one day operation, the withdrawal turned into a three-day fighting disengagement.

Late on 3 March, Company M, while on a final patrol northeast of FSB Tomahawk, was suddenly hit by a heavy blast of small arms and automatic weapons fire from a well-entrenched enemy force. Three Marines died in the opening seconds. The bodies of two of them could not be recovered due to the intensity of enemy fire. The company commander called for artillery fire and air support. The jets managed to drop a few bombs before darkness forced the air craft to depart. The artillery pounded the enemy positions through out the night. The next day one body was retrieved, but surprisingly intense enemy fire prevented Company M from recovering the remaining corpse. A third recovery attempt was made on 5 March; however, after losing two more men whose bodies also could not be recovered, Company M pulled back into defensive positions. At the same time, operations were under way to close FSBs Tomahawk and Maxwell. Helicopters extracted the artillery from Tomahawk and, late on 5 March, the last of the infantry. Low clouds, however, delayed the closing of Maxwell.

On 6 March, Company M made another attempt to recover its dead. Despite the hundreds of artillery rounds that had pounded the enemy, once again their fire proved too intense. Rather than risk more casualties, Company M finally' withdrew. (Sometime later a force recon patrol recovered the three bodies.) The rugged terrain, bad weather, enemy fire, and the burden of carrying their wounded slowed the company. They didn't reach FSB Maxwell until well after dark, too late to be airlifted to An Hoa. After enduring frequent probes throughout the night, the weary Marines of Company M were finally pulled out on 7 March, still under sporadic sniper and mortar fire.

The next day Operation Taylor Common was closed down. The three-month operation cost the Marines 183 killed and 1,487 wounded. Of these casualties, 27 dead and 386 wounded were the results of booby traps; 26 were killed and 103 were wounded by errant friendly fire. Enemy casualties exceeded 500 dead. Although the Marines captured huge quantities of enemy arms and supplies, forcing the NVA out of Base Area 112, as soon as they departed the AG, the enemy began returning. Such was the war in South Vietnam.