Operation Starlite

Throughout July the 3d Marine Division's S-2 (Intelligence) office had repeatedly turned up information regarding a large Viet Cong buildup south of Chu Lai. Even MACV's intelligence staff reported that the VC might attack the Marines' garrison at Chu Lai with as many as three regiments.

The enemy's intent became clear on 15 August when a member of the 1st VC Regiment surrendered to the ARVN. During his interrogation the enemy soldier revealed that his regiment, numbering almost fifteen hundred men with supporting units, had established its base in the Van Tuong village complex, fifteen kilometers south of Chu Lai and about two kilometers inland. The attack on Chu Lai would be launched from there.

Once General Walt learned of this, he sprang into action. Meeting with his senior commanders, Walt made it clear that he wasn't going to wait for the enemy to strike. He now had the authority and enough troops at his disposal to go on the offensive. In a whirlwind of activity over the next forty-eight hours, Walt's staff put together the attack plan. Two battalions would be involved. Three companies of 3/3 would make an amphibious landing at Green Beach to the south and east of Van Tuong, blocking the VC's southern escape routes. The battalion's fourth company, Company M, would move overland from Chu Lai to setup a blocking position four kilometers northwest of the landing beaches.

Just after the amphibious landings, Marines of 2/4 would be air-assaulted into three landing zones (LZ's) forming an arc southwest of Van Tuong. LZ Blue, the southernmost of the LZ's, sat two thousand meters west of Green Beach. Company H, 2/4, would touch down there. Two thousand meters northwest, Company E, 2/4, would land at LZ White. LZ Red, two thousand meters farther north, would accept the helicopters carrying the Marines of Company G. Once on the ground the three companies would attack northeast toward Phase Line Banana, just short of Van Tuong.

General Walt selected Col. Oscar F. Peatross, the commander of the 7th Marines, as overall commander of the assault. Peatross's 3/7, then the Special Landing Force, would. act as reserve. Because 3/7 was then at Subic Bay in the Philippine Islands, 18 August was selected for D day, allowing them ample time to arrive offshore. (Historically, Marine regiments had operated with their own organic battalions. Beginning with Operation Starlite, III MAF began the practice of shuffling battalions, and even individual line companies, among regiments without regard to their historical lineage. Although this habit allowed quick response to developing tactical situations, it created many morale problems. Subordinate commanders had little chance to develop a working relationship with their superiors, or the regimental staff. Combat commanders frequently operated without knowing who commanded the adjacent units. As companies and platoons were switched around, confusion over the proper chain of command often resulted.)

In the planning sessions the operation was designated 'Satellite'. However, a harried operations clerk, working by flickering candle light due to a generator failure, typed the name as 'Starlite'. Rather than redo all the stenciled forms, the name Starlite was accepted.

Operation Starlite began when Company M, 3/3, left Chu Lai on the morning of 17 August aboard amphibious vehicles. They landed near their blocking position, then began their inland trek. Before dawn on 18 August. they were in position and ready.

The first 155mm artillery shells slammed into the LZ's at 0615 on 18 August, throwing earth and vegetation skyward. Within minutes, hundreds of shells had ripped into the ground. Then twenty Marine A-4 Skyhawks and F-4 Phantoms screamed in at low level. Tons of bombs and gallons of napalm blanketed the target area. Thick rolls of black smoke filled the air.

At Green Beach another flight of Skyhawks sprayed the target area with deadly 20mm cannon shells. Just off shore heavy machine guns, mounted on the amphibious craft, added their fire to the din.  Under this covering fire Companies I and K, 3/3, hit the beaches at 0630. Facing only intermittent sniper fire, the anxious Marines quickly moved through An Cuong, the hamlet closest to the sea. By 0730 battalion commander Lt. Col. Joseph E. Muir had set up his command post a kilometer west of the village. He was soon joined by Colonel Peatross and his staff. The battle was going well.

Inland, the staccato beat of helicopter rotors signaled the arrival Company G, 2/4, at LZ Red at 0645. Forty-five minutes later the men of Company E and the command group of 2/4, including Lt. Col. Joseph R. Fisher, jumped from their helicopters at LZ White. At about the same time, Company H alighted at LZ Blue. The cordon around Van Tuong was in place.

Company G easily moved off their LZ. They encountered only minor resistance as they searched two hamlets near their touchdown site. Continuing to the northeast, they linked up with Company M, 3/3, by early afternoon.  To the south Company E ran into trouble as soon as it moved off LZ White. From a ridgeline north and east of the LZ, the VC used mortars and automatic weapons fire to stifle the company's advance. Diving for cover, the Marines aimed their M14 rifles and M60 machine guns uphill. Maneuvering by squads, the company crept up the hill. Together, grizzled noncommissioned officers and baby faced, inexperienced enlisted men destroyed one enemy bunker after another. Finally, after several hours of dogged fighting, the Marines threw the VC off the hills. After evacuating their casualties the company resumed its northeast advance.

In the meantime, along the coast, Company K, 3/3, had advanced nearly two thousand meters north, halting at Phase Line Banana.   There, VC forces entrenched on the high ground between them and Van Tuong drove them to the ground. Responding rapidly, Colonel Muir ordered Company L forward from its reserve position at Green Beach. Following a blistering mortar barrage, the two companies stormed the hill. Sharp, close-quarters fighting raged across the hill as the Marines used rifle fire and grenades to dig out the VC. Not until mid-afternoon was the fight over. The Marines then dug in for the night.

So far, Colonel Peatross was pleased. The battle was developing as planned, his forces were in position and advancing, casualties were light, and the enemy was cornered. His troops would be in Van Tuong (1) the next morning. Then word of the plight of Company H, 2/4, reached the colonel. His optimism faded.

Landing Zone Blue straddled the boundary between the two assault battalions. This one-square-kilometer area was bounded by three hamlets: An Thoi (2) on the north, NamYen (3) on the south, and An Cuong (2) to the east. The ground was a patchwork of rice paddies, meandering streams, hedgerows, woods, and built-up areas, all interspersed by a maze of twisting trails. Two small knolls dominated the area: Hill 43, about three hundred meters southwest of Nam Yen (3), and Hill 30, four hundred meters north of An Cuong (2). Landing Zone Blue sat between Hill 43 and Nam Yen (3). To the planners it seemed an ideal site for Company H, 2/4, to land and start its movement to the northeast. What the operations staff didn't know was that the 60th VC Battalion already occupied the area.

The first incoming UH-34 helicopters carrying Company H caught the VC by surprise. The aircraft dropped their loads and departed safely.  It was a different story for the following flights. Vicious enemy machine-gun fire from Hill 43 sliced through the formations. The choppers' thin aluminum skin offered little resistance to the heavy slugs. The firing was so intense that one helicopter pilot later remarked, 'You just had to close your eyes and drop down to the deck'. The riflemen pouring out of the helicopters formed a rough defensive perimeter. Not yet fully aware of what he faced, company commander 1st Lt. Homer K Jenkins sent one platoon to handle the enemy on the hill. The other two platoons started toward Nam Yen (3). Violent blasts of enemy small arms fire drove both groups of men to the ground. Realizing now that he didn't have the strength to take both positions at once, Jenkins pulled his platoons back to the LZ.  As they regrouped Jenkins called for help. Soon jets were strafing and bombing both the hill and the village. When they finished Jenkins sent all three platoons up the hill. The fighting was fierce. Well- entrenched Viet Cong sent a hail of small arms fire down on the Marines. Finding little cover on the hillside, the attackers pressed forward, moving by leaps and bounds. The novice but well-disciplined Marines went after their foe aggressively. Unused to a bold enemy, the VC soon broke under the pressure. Fleeing into the nearby underbrush, the enemy left behind more than a dozen dead, a heavy machine gun, forty rifles, and one wounded man.

To avoid casualties from the air strikes called in by Lieutenant Jenkins on Nam Yen (3), Company I, 3/3, moving inland from Green Beach, halted along a streambed about one kilometer east of Nam Yen (3). Despite this caution, two Company I members were lightly wounded by friendly bomb fragments. At the end of the bombing run, Capt. Bruce D. Webb advanced his Marines northward along the streambed until they reached a point opposite An Cuong (2). Enemy fire immediately slashed through the company's ranks. Webb requested permission to attack An Cuong (2) even though it lay in 2/4's territory. Colonel Peatross agreed.

Consisting of twenty-five to thirty huts, An Cuong (2) was surrounded by heavily wooded areas and bamboo thickets. A camouflaged trench line connected a series of interlocking tunnels. An Cuong (2) was a perfect VC stronghold.

Webb led his Marines in clearing the first few huts. Halfway through the village a Viet Cong guerrilla rolled a grenade at Webb's feet. The intrepid captain died in the blast. Three other Marines fell wounded. Seconds later two enemy mortar rounds exploded nearby.

Three more Marines went down. Lieutenant Richard M. Purnell, the executive officer, quickly assumed command. After reorganizing his rattled men, Purnell led them through the village. A short time later the company had punched through the enemy's defenses. Company I held An Cuong (2). The Marines killed more than fifty VC in the process. After the friendly casualties were evacuated, Colonel Muir ordered Purnell to head northeast to help Company K with its fight near Phase Line Banana.

In the meantime, Lieutenant Jenkins brought his company forward from Hill 43 toward An Cuong (2) to link up with Company I. He bypassed Nam Yen (3) to the east, mistakenly believing that Company I had cleared it, too. Jenkins learned the unfortunate truth when VC in Nam Yen (3) and on Hill 30 pounded his company with small arms and mortar fire. The savage fire badly wounded five men in the lead platoon. Frantic calls of 'Corpsman up!' echoed across the field. Accurate Viet Cong automatic weapons fire prevented any corpsmen from reaching the wounded. Fully mindful of the danger, L/Cpl. Joe C. Paul picked up his M60 machine gun and splashed across a paddy. Taking up an exposed position between the casualties and the enemy, Paul unleashed burst after burst of fire into the enemy's positions. His selfless action diverted the VC's fire long enough for corpsmen to pull the wounded men to safety. Struck by enemy fire and knocked from his gun, Paul ignored his painful wounds and crawled back to his weapon. Firing again and again, he was mortally wounded before he could return to cover.

Jenkins, realizing he again faced more enemy than he could handle, now ordered his company back to LZ Blue. They started back about 1400. Then, unexpectedly, medical evacuation helicopters began landing amidst the company, scattering the men. The lead platoon was isolated in the resulting confusion. As the men maneuvered, concealed VC took them under fire. They were pinned down. Surprise relief for the trapped platoon came in the form of two squads from Company I that had been left behind to protect a downed helicopter.

During the ensuing firefight one of the Company I squad leaders, Cpl. Robert E. O'Malley, who had already distinguished himself in the fight at An Cuong (2), bravely charged the enemy emplacement. His deadly M14 fire drove the VC from their position.  O'Malley was hit twice in this encounter but still helped pull several other casualties to safety. Fighting together, the two small Marine units made it to An Cuong (2). Meanwhile, Jenkins and his remaining platoons fought their way back to LZ Blue, arriving there at 1630. They were ordered to dig in and await reinforcements. The reinforcements never made it to Jenkins. Instead, they were diverted to rescue a supply column that had been ambushed just west of An Cuong (2).  Just after noon the column, consisting of five LVTs (landing vehicle, tracked) and three tanks, left the 3/3 regimental command post (CP) to resupply Company I, which had just cleared An Cuong(2). Somehow, the little force got lost in the thick woods. They ended up on a trail that took them between An Cuong (2) and Nam Yen (3). There VC recoilless rifle fire and a mortar barrage suddenly blasted the unsuspecting supply train. Viet Cong infantry swept out of the foliage. The column's radioman called for help, but in his panic he kept the microphone's transmit button depressed the whole time. As a result, the supply column's exact position was unknown. For more than an hour the radioman cried that the men were surrounded and needed help.  A relief force consisting of the nearly spent Company I, some headquarters personnel, and the one remaining tank was hurriedly organized at the regimental CP. Led by Maj. Andrew G. Coiner, 3/3's executive officer, the Marines headed for the column's last known position about an hour after it was attacked. Just after they crested Hill 30, the VC opened fire. A recoilless rifle round slammed into the tank, disabling it. Seconds later VC rifle fire and mortar shells saturated the area. Within minutes, five Marines were dead and seventeen were wounded. Coiner called in supporting artillery and air strikes. The high explosives scattered the enemy.

Coiner then ordered Lieutenant Purnell to take Company I through An Cuong (2) to find the supply column. Initially, Purnell experienced only light resistance. As he neared the trapped men, however, the enemy fire increased. Soon he was pinned down. Meanwhile, Coiner and his command group were hit by intense enemy small arms fire from a wooded area to their right front. They took cover in the nearby rice paddies.

At this juncture, the two errant squads from Company I and the platoon from Company H, 2/4,joined Coiner. He sent the two Company I squads to Hill 30 for evacuation and kept the Company H platoon with him.

While Lieutenant Purnell struggled to fight his way to the trapped supply column, Colonel Peatross obtained the release of Company L, 3/7, from the SLF reserve force aboard the Iwo Jima, anchored off Green Beach. After checking in at 3/3's CP, Company L headed out, following Coiner's route. Enemy fire hit them as they neared An Cuong (2) from the east. Four Marines were killed and fourteen were wounded. Recovering quickly, Company L drove forward, finally forcing the VC to break contact as night fell.

Deciding that it was too risky to continue searching for the supply column, Colonel Muir now ordered Company L, 3/7, to reverse direction and link up with Companies K and L, 3/3, near Phase Line Banana. Company I, 3/3, pulled back the the regimental CP. Purnell's company had suffered particularly heavy casualties that day, losing 14 dead and 53 wounded of its 177 members. The supply column, no longer in danger, was ordered to remain in place for the night. That evening Colonel Peatross brought the two remaining reserve companies, I and M, 3/7, ashore.

The next day, Peatross issued his orders to continue the battle. He planned to keep on tightening the cordon around Van Tuong (1) and the adjacent Phuoc Thuan Peninsula. Companies K and L, 3/3, and Company L, 3/7, were to attack north toward Van Tuong (1), the original objective. Companies E and G, 2/4, would advance eastward, eventually linking up with the Marines moving northward. Companies I and M, 3/7, would rescue the supply column, then set up blocking positions at An Thoi (2) to prevent any VC from slipping southward. Company H, 2/4, and Coiner's group were ordered back to the regimental CP; Jenkins's company suffered fifteen killed and thirty wounded in the fighting. Company M, 3/3, would maintain its blocking position on the north.

The renewed attack commenced at 0730 on 19 August. The various companies found pockets of stiff resistance as they advanced across the rugged terrain. The region was thick with rice paddies ringed by dikes and hedgerows, which hampered control, observation, and maneuverability. The VC fought back from well-concealed bunkers, trenches, and caves. Frequently, Marines would complete sweeping an area only to be fired on by VC from the rear as they moved on. The Marines would then reverse direction and dig the enemy out or blow up their tunnels. Nonetheless, by 1030 Companies E and G, 2/4, had linked up with the 3/3 units near Van Tuong (1). The combined force then swept the rest of the peninsula. Organized enemy resistance on Phuoc Thuan Peninsula had ceased.

Meanwhile, at 0900 Companies I and M entered An Cuong (2). The enemy had fled. A short time later remnants of the supply column were found. Of twenty-three men originally with the column, five were dead and nine were wounded. The Marines counted sixty dead VC in the area. After evacuating the survivors, the two companies continued to An Thoi (2).

Operation Starlite continued for five more days because General Walt felt that some enemy soldiers remained behind in underground hiding places. Before beginning this mop up phase, Colonel Peatross released 2/4 and 3/3 on 20 August, replacing them with 1/7. The fresh Marines, together with 3/7 and units from the 2d ARVN Division, killed another 54 VC before Operation Starlite officially ended on 24 August. In all, 614 VC were killed, 9 prisoners were taken, and 109 assorted weapons were captured. The Marines suffered 45 dead and 203 wounded.

Despite some confusion, the Marines won the battle of Chu Lai. Credit belonged not only to the infantry but to the supporting arms as well. Masterful employment of both artillery and close air support, brought to within two hundred meters of pinned-down infantry, frequently proved decisive in breaking the VC's defenses.

At the same time, the Marines learned that the VC were far more than a ragtag collection of rebellious peasants. Indeed, the Viet Cong were well-armed, well-led, brave, and resourceful. They employed excellent battlefield techniques, quickly isolating small units and punishing them with massed firepower. They exploited every opportunity given them, including using as bait a pinned down unit, then ambushing the relief force. The VC were not afraid of the Marines and would not be easily beaten.

The young, mostly inexperienced Marines learned that they were the equal of their fathers and older brothers who had fought a crafty foe in World War II and Korea. They could take what the VC dished out and give it back to him with a vengeance. Though they made skillful use of their supporting firepower, it was individual heroism that often made the difference. Six Navy Crosses, including a posthumous one to Captain Webb, would be awarded to Marines for their bravery in Operation Starlite. Corporal O'Malley and Lance Corporal Paul earned Medals of Honor, the latter posthumously.

Other lessons were learned as well. The allotted two gallons of water per man per day proved woefully inadequate in South Vietnam's oppressive heat. The quota was immediately doubled. The M14 semiautomatic rifle proved too heavy and bulky. A search for a lighter weapon began immediately.

Operation Starlite was a major moral booster for the Marines. They had met the VC in a pitched battle and defeated him. They had passed the first big test. What they didn't know was that there would be many more tests in the future.