Operation Utah

While the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines moved to link up with the ARVN airborne troopers, Generals Lam and Platt brought additional forces into the battle. Having found that the 21st NVA Regiment was more than willing to stand and fight, both commanders wanted to take advantage of the opportunity to surround and destroy the enemy unit. During the early morning, General Lam ordered the 37th Ranger Battalion, supported by his Strike Company and an APC troop, to move from Quang Ngai to form blocking positions, 1,500 meters west of the railroad track and 3,000 meters east of Chau Nhai (4). The South Vietnamese Airborne Task Force Alfa command group and the 5th ARVN Air borne Battalion was to be airlifted from Saigon to Quang Ngai. On its arrival, General Lam planned to land the 5th ARVN Airborne in the same landing zone where the 1st ARVN Airborne Battalion and the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines had landed the previous day. From there, the newly inserted ARVN unit was to attack northeast, joining the 1st ARVN Airborne. Utter's 2d Battalion, 7th Marines was to secure the landing zone for the Vietnamese unit, clear its battlefield of the previous day, and serve as the Task Force Delta reserve battalion. General Platt also had alerted Lieutenant Colonel James P. Kelly's 1st Battalion, 7th Marines command group for movement to Binh Son and had inserted "P. X." Kelley's 2d Battalion, 4th Marines into the southern Utah area to close out any avenue of escape for the enemy regiment.

The 2d Battalion, 4th Marines began landing shortly after 0830 on a small hill near An Tuyet (1), 3,000 meters north of the Tra Khuc River. Despite air preparation of the landing zone, Communist gunners contested the helicopter landing of the Marine battalion. Heavy machine gun fire put several MAG-36 helicopters out of commission and caused repeated transfers of leadership during the lift. Lieutenant Colonel Mervin B. Porter, Commanding Officer, HMM-261, the first flight leader, was hit several times on his third trip into the landing zone and was forced to retire. Major David A. Spurlock then became flight leader, but the enemy gunfire forced his aircraft down in the landing zone. Captain James P. Kenny from HMM-261 took over as leader, and with eight other pilots completed the battalion lift, but not before another UH-34 crashed in the LZ. Major Snyder, the Task Force Delta operations officer, wrote:

American advisors to the 2d ARVN Div had warned me when planning 2 /4's lift into the LZ selected that a VC Battalion (Provincial Force) had long operated in that area and that we might receive substantial trouble. What with the tempo of operations, it was determined that this was a necessary calculated risk.

Lieutenant Colonel Kelley's battalion met stiff resistance on the west and in the villages northwest and southwest of the landing zone. Two of Kelley's companies were engaged at close quarters until 1100. At that time, General Platt ordered the battalion commander to continue the original mission of closing the southern flank of the objective area. Kelley disengaged the two companies, G and H, from the firefight and began a sweep to the north. Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, attached to Kelley's command for the operation, remained in the landing zone to provide security for the downed helicopters. The battalion's forward companies and command group reached Lieutenant Colonel Utter's battalion without incident and established night defensive positions.

While these events were going on in the southern Utah area, Lieutenant Colonel Young's battalion in the north encountered major enemy opposition shortly after 1030 while trying to link up with the 1st ARVN Airborne Battalion. Company M on the 3d Battalion's eastern flank came under heavy fire just north of Chau Nhai (3). Company L skirted the Company M fight and one of its platoons was ordered to 'join the ARVN' on Hill 50. As the 3d Platoon moved to carry out these orders, it soon became clear that the NVA not the ARVN held Hill 50. The enemy confronting both companies had the advantages of prepared positions and terrain; they held the high ground. Bamboo fences and hedgerows masked the enemy position from the Marines. Having constructed an extensive tunnel network which connected bunkers and spider traps, the enemy lay in wait in elaborate entrenchments protected by minefields and booby traps.

Despite these formidable defenses, the Marine battalion pressed the attack. Eventually reinforced by the 1st ARVN Airborne, Company L succeeded in taking Hill 50 after a three-and-a-half-hour engagement. Near Chau Nhai (3), Company M, however, made little headway against an estimated NVA battalion. With Company M stopped, Lieutenant Colonel Young sent his reserve company, Company I, into the action; it passed around Company M's positions and tried to push into Chau Nhai (3) from the east. At the same time, the 5th ARVN Airborne Battalion advanced toward Young's battalion in a pincer movement from the southwest. Plans called for them to relieve Company L on Hill 50. As darkness fell, both Companies L and M withdrew well to the north, while Company I consolidated its position on the eastern edge of Chau Nhai. Lieutenant Colonel Young's battalion's casualties were 32 killed and 90 wounded during the day's fighting.

At this point, Generals Lam and Platt believed they had the enemy regiment surrounded and could tighten the ring the next morning. In addition to the two ARVN airborne battalions and the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines closing in on the Hill 50 area, the two generals had moved other units into blocking positions to the east and south. The 2d Battalions of the 7th and 4th Marines were to the south and the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines was to the northeast. A 2d Division task force, consisting of the 37th Ranger Battalion and 1st Battalion, 5th ARVN Regiment, was along the railroad due east of the battle area. General Platt had already reinforced the artillery at Binh Son with the command group of the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines and a 105mm howitzer battery.

Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, far from the previous fighting, was still providing security for one of the downed helicopters near An Tuyet. Paradoxically, the heaviest action of the night and early morning hours of 5-6 March occurred at this relatively isolated position. At 2300, Captain Robert C. Prewitt, the company commander, reported to the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines that he was under mortar and heavy small arms attack. According to Lieutenant Colonel Kelley, "Prewitt advised me that he was dangerously low on ammunition." The battalion commander informed General Platt of the situation and asked for an emergency re-supply for the company. The task force commander approved the mission and two HMM-364 helicopters took off from Quang Ngai to deliver the needed ammunition.

*General Peatross commented on the rationale for leaving Prewitt's company behind to guard the downed helicopters. He declared that the question 'To leave or not to leave a helicopter had been a subject as old as the first helicopter in the testing stage, in the Marine Corps Schools, in writing of the manual Helicopterborne Operations, in training exercises . . . and other operations.'  Peatross recalled that General McCutcheon during a visit to the Task Force Delta CP suggested destroying the aircraft, but that 'I felt otherwise. We discussed that matter in ... detail and concluded that we should not leave one unless the helicopter was already destroyed beyond repair'. According to Peatross, there were two major reasons for this decision: The first was to keep up the morale of the helicopter crews who knew they and their craft would be protected and 'the other point was that a downed helicopter almost invariably drew enemy action near it or to it every time one went down. . . . as we were constantly searching for the enemy in our daily activities in Vietnam, why leave the helicopter when we knew that the enemy was going to come to it'.  Peatross remembered General McCutcheon calmly stating that if, 'it did not interfere with pursuit of the bigger enemy force, to do what we saw fit about the downed helicopter. This we did'. MajGen Oscar F. Peatross, Comments on draft MS. dtd 1Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

As the aircraft approached the landing zone, they both came under heavy fire and were unable to land. According to Major Snyder, who was in radio contact with Company B, the lead pilot, First Lieutenant TerijI J. Richardson, radioed Prewitt;  and regretfully announced that they would not be able to land. After Prewitt informed him of the severity of the need (less than 100 rds of rifle ammo left in the company) the pilot (Richardson] said in effect that they would get the ammo in somehow. The result was that the two helos came across the zone a few feet off the ground and at about 10-20 mph while the crewmen kicked the ammo boxes out the doors. Both aircraft were hit by ground fire, but managed to flounder back to Quang Ngai.

On the ground, Prewitt's company came under increasing pressure. Supported by mortars and automatic weapons, two North Vietnamese companies closed in on the Marine perimeter. About 0130, the enemy attacked the Marine positions from three directions — north, south, and west. With the help of Marine artillery at Binh Son and an ARVN 105mm battery at Quang Ngai, the newly replenished Marines repulsed the NVA attack. Even after the attack failed, the North Vietnamese continued to subject the Marine company to heavy mortar, small arms, and automatic weapons fire until early morning.

The heavy fighting anticipated in the northern Utah area never developed. The night of the 5th was relatively quiet. On the morning of 6 March, Company I pulled back to join Companies L and M, and the two ARVN airborne battalions pulled back from forward positions to allow for the employment of supporting arms. After an intensive two-and-one half-hour air and artillery bombardment, which lasted until 1240, the three battalions advanced. The North Vietnamese were no longer there.

The North Vietnamese regiment had sustained heavy losses during the three-day fight. Lieutenant Colonel Young's Marines found 100 enemy bodies when the 3d Battalion reoccupied Hill 50 on 6 March. Later that afternoon, the battalion found an enormous cave complex, which apparently had served as the NVA regimental command post. The extensive tunnel network, still largely undamaged despite the allied bombardment, contained weapons, supplies, and documents. Earlier, Lieutenant Colonel Utter's battalion had discovered a similar defensive complex in its sector, consisting of "caves, trenches, foxholes, wire barricades, and deep, deep shelters." Utter remarked that some of the shafts went straight down for 15-to- 20 feet and then swerved off in two to four directions. The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines found.'43 enemy bodies in one of these tunnels. During Utah, allied forces claimed to have killed nearly 600 North Vietnamese soldiers and captured five prisoners and 49 weapons, including three 12.7mm machine guns and two mortars. Marine casualties were 98 dead and 278 wounded, while ARVN forces lost 30 killed and 120 wounded.

Operation Utah ended on 7 March after Lieutenant Colonel Young's battalion, assisted by Marine engineers, destroyed the enemy's defensive complex. Lieutenant Colonel Utter characterized the NVA enemy by saying, 'they're not supermen. But they can fight. And they will fight when cornered or when they think they have you cornered'.