Operation Washington
The Continuing War
Operations Washington and Colorado — The September Election —
The Marine TAORs, July -December 1966
In the less densely populated sector of the 1st Marine Division at Chu Lai, the Marine command continued to concentrate its efforts on the elimination of the Viet Cong-North Vietnamese main force military structure in southern I Corps. During the early summer, General Fields and his staff completed their preparations for the much postponed campaign in the Do Xa region, the suspected location of the enemy Military Region V Headquarters. With the close out of Operation Kansas at the end of June, on 4 July Fields informed III MAF that he was prepared to carry out the operation, codenamed Washington, in the Do Xa. According to the 1st Division plan, the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion was to make an extensive reconnaissance of the Do Xa, with the capability of calling in air and artillery on appropriate targets of opportunity. If the reconnaissance Marines determined a large enemy presence in the Do Xa, a two-battalion Marine strike force at Chu Lai stood ready to exploit the intelligence. Thus, Fields planned to use the same tactics that had worked so well earlier in Operation Kansas—first, reconnaissance and then, exploitation.'
General Walt agreed to the operation and obtained the necessary concurrences from MACV and the South Vietnamese I Corps command. Westmoreland readily approved the concept and later exclaimed to Admiral Sharp that the enemy could not feel safe in any of his base areas The South Vietnamese were less exuberant. In his concurring letter, which was dated 6 July and arrived after the operation already had begun, the I Corps Chief of Staff saw no difficulty with the operation, but requested that the Marines coordinate their activities very closely with the 2d ARVN Division 'in order to avoid mistakes'.
On the morning of 6 July, Marine helicopters transported Lieutenant Colonel Arthur J. Sullivan, commander of the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, together with his command group and Company A, to the district town of Hau Duc in the northern fringes of the Do Xa sector, some 30 miles west of Chu Lai. With the establishment of the base camp for the operation, Marine CH-46s brought into Hau Duc the following morning two 105mm howitzers from Battery E, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines to provide artillery support. Another 105mm platoon from Battery D, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, located since Operation Kansas at the Tien Phuoc Special Forces Camp 17 miles to the north, was in position to reinforce the fires from Hau Doc.
For the next eight days, the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion with three of its companies and reinforced by a platoon from the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company ranged over a 280-square-mile area of the Do Xa. Despite the rugged mountainous terrain and the paucity of landing zones, all of the patrol insertions with one exception were by helicopter, with the pilots faking two insertions for every one made. When beyond the range of the supporting artillery, the reconnaissance Marines were able to call in close air support through the use of an airborne radio relay in a C- 117 dedicated to the operation. All told, in 46 sightings, the reconnaissance patrols observed 201 VC. As a result of ground combat and supporting arms fire, the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion accounted for 13 VC KIA and four prisoners. The most significant encounter occurred on 10 July when a patrol from the 1st Force Recon Company platoon ambushed a group of VC below the Song Tranh, about 10,000 meters west of Hau Duc. Of the nine VC caught in the ambush, the Marines killed two, captured four (two men and two women) while the remaining three escaped. The prisoners, apparently couriers, had documents on them relating to the Communist organization in Quang Tin Province.
With relatively few sightings of organized enemy forces, the 1st Division ended Operation Washington on 14 July without inserting any infantry units into the operations area. Lieutenant Colonel Sullivan, the reconnaissance battalion commander, believed that his unit had disrupted the enemy lines of communication. General Fields, however, was dubious about the importance of the Do Xa region. He stated at a commander's conference that as a result of Operation Washington, 'We found that there is nothing big in there [the Do Xa]'.
At this point, the 1st Marine Division again became concerned about the 2d (620th) NVA Division which had once more penetrated the strategic Que Son Valley along the Quang Nam and Quang Tin border. Intelligence sources in mid-July reported that the enemy division, which during Operation Kansas had retreated into the mountains north and southwest of Hiep Duc, was once more on the move.
It's 3d NVA regiment, part of which had engaged Sergeant Howard's platoon in the fight for Nui Vu, had departed its mountain bastion south of An Hoa and advanced southeast toward the coastal plain. The 21st NVA was believed to be near the district town of Que Son, while the division's remaining regiment, the 1st VC, was positioned somewhere between Que Son and Thang Binh, a village 20 kilometers north of Tam Ky on Route 1.