26 October 1965

From:         Commanding Officer

TO:            Commanding Officer, 4^th Marines (-)(rein)

Subj:           After Action Report #20 (Operation SNAGGLE TOOTH)

/REF:  (a)        Maps:  Viet Nam 1:50,000 AMS Series L701 Sheets 6757 III, 6757 IV

(b)              3^rd MarDiv OpO 321-65

(c)               4^th Mar OpO 305-65

(d)              1^st Bn, 4^th Mar OpO 224-65

Encl:    (1)            Operation Overlay

            (2)            Intelligence Summary

1.         Units Involved.

a.                 Company A (rein), 1^st Bn, 4^th Marines (-)(rein). (Off/Enl) (7-190)

(1)               1^st Plat (rein) (1-43

(2)               2^nd Plat (rein) (1-47)

(3)               3^rd Plat (rein) (1-45)

(4)               Company Headquarters  (2-17)

(5)               FO Team, Battery H, 3^rd Bn, 12 the Marines (1-2)

(6)               FAC Team  (1-4)

(7)               Squad, 1^st Plat, Co B, 3^rd  Engr Bn (0-11)

(8)               Interpreter (ARVN)  (0-1)

(9)               Ky Ha Popular Forces Detachment (0-10)

b.                 Company B (rein), 1^st Bn, 4^th Marines (-)(rein).  (8-146)

(1)               1^st Plat (rein)  (1-34)

(2)               2^nd Plat (rein)  (1-37)

(3)               3^rd Plat (rein)  (1-33)

(4)               Company Headquarters  (1-17)

(5)               FO Team, Battery H, 3^rd Bn, 12^th Marines  (1-2)

(6)               FAC Team  (1-2)

(7)               Squad (rein), 1^st Plat, Co B, 3^rd Engr Bn.  (1-10)

(8)               Interpreter (ARVN)  (1-0)

(9)               Ky Ha Popular Forces Platoon (-)  (0-11)

c.                  2^nd Platoon (rein), Company C, 1^st Bn, 4^th Marines  (1-51)

d.                 Elements, H&S Company, 1^st Bn, 4^th Marines  (5-81)

(1)               Section (rein), 81mm mortar platoon  (0-29)

(2)               Det, 106mm Recoilless Platoon  (0-34)

(3)               Det, Company Headquarter (Liaison Team Junk Div 15)  (1-4)

(4)               Command Group  (4-14)

e.                 Heavy Section, 1^st Plat, Co B, 3^rd AT Bn  (0-9)

f.                    Det, 1^st Plat, Co B, Recon Group Alpha  (0-2)

g.                 Company M, 3^rd Bn, 3^rd Marines  (4-103)

h.                  2^nd Plat (rein), Co A, 1^st AmTrac Bn.  (2-58)

i.                    Battery H, 3^rd Bn, 12^th Marines  (3-15)

j.                    USMC Advisor, Ly Tin District (0-1)

k.                  Det, 3^rd ITT  (0-2)

l.                    Det, 7^th CI Team  (0-2)

m.               744^th Regional Force Company  (1-70)

n.                  Two Platoons, PAT  (0-35)

o.                 Ky Chanh Popular Force Platoon  (0-45)

p.                 Junk Division 15, VNN  (1-36)

2.         Time.  Units directly involved in Operation Snaggle Tooth from 231500H  October 65, when 81mm mortars were in position, until 250030H October 65, when 1^st Battalion (-)(rein), 4^th Marines returned to defensive positions on Ky Ha Peninsula.

3.         Place.  Extreme western portion of 1^st Battalion, 4^th Marines TAOR within area bounded by coordinates (BT 4418), (BT 4016), (BT 4113), (BT 4410), (BT 4513), and (BT 4814).

4.            Operational Summary.

a.                 Friendly Casualties – none.

b.                 Enemy Casualties – 4 VCK.

c.                  Enemy Captured – 64 VCS and 1 VCW.

d.                 Weapons Captured – none.

e.                 Caves Destroyed – 3.

f.                    Punji Man Traps Destroyed – 21.

5.         Nature of Action.  Battalion (-)(rein) search and clear operation in coordination with Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces, Peoples Acton Teams and Vietnamese Navy Junk forces.

6.         Time Chronology.

            231700H          Section of 81mm mortar platoon in firing position.

            240100H          2^nd Plat, Co C, departed company patrol base (BT 512125)

240330H          2^nd plat, Co C, commences crossing channel (BT 475144) by rubber boats.

240400H         Companies A, B, and Liaison Team to Junk Division 15 commence movement to splash point (BT 521119).

240535H          2^nd plat, Co C, completes crossing of channel.

240535H         Companies A, B, and Command Group depart splash point (BT 521119) aboard         LVTs.

240555H         Four motorized junks depart Junk Base.

240630H         Company M, 3^rd Bn, 3^rd Marines in blocking position.

240640H         2^nd plat, Co C in blocking position.

240645H         Company A landed (BT 456140).

240655H         Company B landed (BT 456146).

240655H         2^nd plat, Co C received S/A fire.

240700H          Junk Division 15 in blocking position.

240710H          RF, PF, and PAT units in blocking positions.

240710H          Motorized junk received S/A fire.

240745H          Company A and B received sniper fire.

240830H          Company A and B received sniper fire.

240930H          2^nd plat, Co C received sniper fire.

240930H           Province informer and intelligence agents arrived by helo on island.

241500H           Company B kills and wounds VC.

241545              VCW evacuated by helicopter.

241614H           Company A received S/A fire.

241757H           Company M, 3/3 departed blocking position.

241800H           Junk Division 15 departs for base.

241845H           Company A, Company B, and Command Group commence retraction from Hoa Xuan.

241855H           Company D platoon secured from reserve status.

242335H           Company A, Company B, and Command Group returned to splash point.

250030H           Companies A,B, and Command Group in positions along MLR.

7.                  Narrative.  Intelligence had intermittently placed a VC Company on Ky Chanh Island.  On 20 October information was at hand that the Province Chief had a captive who could and would point out the location of some of the main reported caves and tunnels on the island, which had been partial swept by 1/4 on 12 September without finding any caves or tunnels. Plans for a detailed sweep operation were formulated, involving LVTs for transportation to and from the island; partitioning blocking forces, consisting of a reinforced platoon from 1/4, a company from 3/3, a company of Regional Forces, two Peoples Action Team Platoons, one Popular Forces platoon, a platoon of LVTs, and four motorized junks of VNN Junk Division 15; positioning a direct support artillery battery and one section of the 81mm mortar platoon; and delivery of the informer to the sweeping force; and attachment of the Ky Ha PF platoon to the Marine rifle companies.  All details were coordinated in advance with Province and District Headquarters, 3/3, and with 2/4, MACS-7, and MAG-36, which provided troops to man the 1/4 MLR in the absence of the two companies on the operation.  The operation was placed ‘on call’, to be executed when intelligence indicated that the VC target company was on the island.

At 231200H, responding to new intelligence and confirmation provided by an inconclusive fire fight between some 9 VC and a reconnaissance platoon of A/1/4 at about 231000H in GS (BT 4414 and 4415) CO, 4^th Marines ordered the operation executed.

At 240300H, the blocking platoon from Company C departed its harbor site at (BT 476145) and commenced its covert move to assigned blocking positions.  The move across the water at (BT 475145) was conducted in two rubber boats provided and propelled by men from Recon Group Alpha.  The platoon moved in total silence and successfully manned its positions at (BT 430173) and (BT 437170) by 240640H.

At 240400H, A and C Companies commenced movement to the embarkation point, A by foot, B by truck, liaison party was sent to the junk force to assure radio contact and mutually supporting and coordinated operations.  At 240525H, the Popular forces had been received and assimilated and the companies and the Command Group (including 10 men for use in handling captives) embarked; the striking force launched at 240530H from (BT 521121).

Despite the extremely dark night; the LVTs made planned progress.  While the striking force was enroute, the artillery battery reported it was in firing positions vicinity (BT 4310) and ready to fire, Company M/3/3 reported it was in assigned blocking locations along the coast from (BT 432117) to (BT 416132), and the Junk force took patrol/block positions in the Song Cho from (BT 423165) to (BT 416130).

Company A landed at (BT 454138) at 0645 and Company B at (BT 458146) at 0655.  At the same time the blocking force at (BT 430173) reported receiving fire from across the river to the south and was returning fire.

This exchange lasted only 2 or 3 minutes, but reoccurred intermittently during the morning.  The striking force proceeded NE without contact to vicinity (BT 430146) where it received some inaccurate sniper fire from hamlet Phu Vinh to its direct front.  Firing stopped before Marines could close.  Detailed search of hamlet disclosed no caves or weapons; several VCS were apprehended.  Company B located 21 punji man traps on and around the topographic crest of Hill 10 (BT 438156).  While searching for more such traps it was taken under long range fire from vicinity Hill 12 (BT 426158).  Fire was returned and a platoon was sent to envelope the VC; however they broke contact before the Marines could close.  As Company B commenced to search and clear from East to West generally along E-W grid line 16, it discovered a trail with 3 mines/booby traps.  After clearing these, the company was joined by the informer/agent who located a total of 3 well concealed tunnel/caves varying length from 40 meters to 150 meters.

These caves were located above and parallel to stream lines or canals, entrances were extremely well concealed, they were securely riveted (constructed in sand) and covered with stringers, bamboo mats, thick sand, and growing crops.  Their average depth was 4 feet and height 2½ - 3½ feet, width 2½-4 feet.  They were obviously used as hideouts, no firing ports or defensive works were connected with the caves.

As the attached engineers commenced destruction of these installations, Company B proceeded with a slow and thorough search and clear operation.  It subsequently located 4 more booby trapped grenades along the East-West trail.  Both companies found and destroyed many foot-punji traps, some placed as barriers and others as traps.

As the companies proceeded they received intermittent sniper fire.  Each company succeeded in killing one VC and wounding one.  The Junk Division also killed one VC.  At about 1615, M/3/3 reported a VCS captive, brought to them by a PF unit, who offered to show the location of some hidden weapons on the island.  An LVT picked up the captive and a PF squad and delivered them to (BT 425122).  By the time a Marine element could arrive at the site, time was running short (241730H) and the captive indicated that the weapons cache was some 3000 meters away.  The captive was returned with the request that he be retained at District so that he will be available for planned operations on the island in the next few days.

Totals for the highly successful operation, which concluded with retraction at dark from (BT 425122); no Marine or friendly force casualties; 3 VC killed (one by Junk Division 15); 2 VC wounded (one of which has since died of wounds); 75 VCS (7 by Junk Division 15); 14 of whom were returned after interrogation in the field by ITT and CI interrogators; approximately 300 meters of caves destroyed, 7 mines and booby traps destroyed or disarmed, and numerous punji traps of various description destroyed.

8.            Lessons Learned.

a.                 Intelligence reports of VC domination of Hoa Xuan Island were confirmed by the numerous man-traps and; punji stakes, fences, booby traps and mines, and sniper activity.

b.                 The VC continue emplacing booby traps and mines in areas previously used by patrols.

c.                   Caves/tunnels reported by coordinates are extremely difficult if not impossible to find without firm intelligence giving precise locations or an agent/informer to pinpoint locations.

d.                 The coordination of some sixteen different units involved in an operation of this type results in an extremely difficult and complex control for an infantry battalion (considerable short of T/O both officer and Staff NCOs).

e.                 Two AN/PRC-25 radios were used on a test basis during the operation and are considered a definite improvement over existing battalion equipment. The two radios were used on the Battalion Tactical Net and the Regimental Tactical Net. Reliable communications were maintained with the AN/PRC-25 at a range of better than 12,000 meters.  Previous operations in the same area proved the AN/PRC-10 totally unreliable for such distance even when used in open, sandy areas.