Operations/Training
Mission
1. During the period 1-15 August 1966, 1st Battalion 4th Marines executed the following mission.
a. Defend the Hue/Phu Bai Vital Area. On 16 August 1966 Operational Control of Company C was relinquished to 2nd Battalion 9th Marines who relieved 1st Battalion 4th Marines of the responsibility of the defense of the Phu Bai Vital Area. This Battalion displaced from Phu Bai to Dong Ha by motor convoy to participate in Operation Prairie.
b. Conduct Operation and extensive patrol and ambush activity in assigned sector of TAOR to deny enemy passage through or build up in that area.
c. Coordinate defensive efforts of all units within the vital area perimeter.
d. Be prepared to assume responsibility and command of the Hue/Phu Bai TAOR upon displacement of the 4th Marines Headquarters for operations outside the TAOR.
e. Maintain the Combined Action Company to provide security for assigned village/areas within the TAOR.
f. Maintain the Sparrow Hawk.
g. Maintain Combat outpost on Hills 180 (YD 855133) and 225 (YD 848087).
h. Conduct a vigorous Civil Affairs program within assigned area of TAOR and those areas assigned for operations.
Operations.
During the period 1 August through 15 August the battalion continued to man defensive positions and coordinate defense of Hue/Phu Bai Vital Area. This included manning perimeter positions and two combat outposts. Numerous day and night patrols and ambushes were maintained; also the establishment of many LP’s and OP’s with the intent to maintain constant surveillance of the operating area. This was coordinated to the limit of 81mm/82mm mortar range within the TAOR. Throughout this 15 day period enemy contact was frequent, but the size of the units involved was small.
During the period 16-31 August, the Battalion participated in Operation Prairie in the Dong Ha – Cam Lo area, conducting a tank/infantry search and destroy operation (one company reinforced), and a Battalion Reconnaissance in force operation.
On 1 August a patrol from Company C received heavy S/A fire, and 1 round of 60mm mortar fire at YD 819199. The patrol pursued the VC by fire and maneuver. At 1315H, the patrol requested an artillery mission and 81mm mortar fire at YD 841196, at VC trenches. At 1430, the patrol moved in to sweep the impact area. The results were blood trails and drag marks.
At 022155H, MCB-7 received one incoming grenade at coordinates YD 899136. Another grenade was received within ten minutes of the first one at the same coordinates. MCB-7 saw two Vietnamese with black clothing, but it could not be determined whether they were armed. The next morning the area was thoroughly searched with negative results.
At 030700H, Company A provided security for a convoy to Da Nang; Company D provided one reinforced platoon as a standby element.
At 031810H, CAC-7 heard S/A firing and sent two fire teams to investigate the area in the vicinity of YD 823175. The area was checked with negative results.
At 040650H, Company B provided one (rein) platoon as a 30 minute alert for emergency convoy reinforcement.
At 060615H, during a search and destroy operation Company B received S/A fire from coordinates YD 829197. The Marines returned fire immediately and the VC immediately broke contact. Again at 1400H, Company B received A/W fire from an estimated force of 20 VC located at YD 853193. 2 air strikes were executed detonating 4 secondary explosions, and an artillery mission was called in, expending 169 rounds of HE. After the supporting fire lifted Company B searched the area to find 4 VC KIA confirmed. Company B sustained 1 USMC WIA, not serious.
On the 7th of August at 0215H, Company C patrol received 5 rounds S/A fire. The patrol requested illumination and searched the area with negative results.
On 8 August at 0805H, Hill 180 received 4-5 incoming rocks from the west side of the hill. One VCS was seen running down a ravine on west side of hill. Marines returned fire, but results were unknown. At 1401H, patrol CAC-7B received 100 rounds of S/A fire at YD 836198, fire was returned and 81mm illumination was called in but contact was broken, Marines continued on patrol.
On the 10th of August at 2310H, a patrol sighted 6 VC at YD 822179. The VC initiated a short firefight, after which the area was swept. Marines found trails of blood and counted one VC WIA (probable).
On the 13th at 0500, the first County Fair Operation conducted by this Battalion was executed. Combined with ARVN Forces, Company D, and Company Lima/3/4 continued the County Fair until 1630. Results were considered to be highly successful.
At 1630 on the 13th, 1st Battalion assumed OpCon of H/2/9 and immediately deployed this unit to YD 853194 and YD 869183 to act as a blocking force for an ARVN operations being conducted on the northern boundary of the TAOR. The Company maintained position overnight, but had no contact and was withdrawn at 0730 on the 14th of August.
On the 16th of August at 0850, the Battalion departed the Phu Bai Enclave by Rough Rider Convoy for the Dong Ha – Cam Lo area. 2nd Battalion 9th Marines has assumed responsibility for defense of the Phu Bai perimeter on the 15th of August. The Battalion arrived at Dong Ha at 1520, and at 1620 assumed defense of the airfield at Dong Ha and artillery positions at Cam Lo.
Through out the period 16 to 23 August contact with the enemy consisted of small incidents on the lines at both Dong Ha and Cam Lo. There were instances of rock throwing and exchange of fires, and with negative results.
On the 23rd of August, Company A, with Company C, 3rd Tank Battalion in direct support conducted a tank infantry sweep north into the Con Thien area (YD 1372). This daylong operation resulted in three contacts; two mortar attacks and one ambush. Swift reaction by the tank/infantry team resulted in 9 VC KIA (prob). Marine losses were 3 KIA and 17 WIA. The tanks encountered mines on four occasions, with no personnel casualties. However, evacuation of the disabled tanks was not effected for another two days.
The heaviest contact of the month occurred on the night of 25-26 August. At 260340H, Company A, located at the artillery positions at Cam Lo began receiving heavy incoming mortar and S/A rounds. During the next 1½ hours, Company A’s lines were penetrated by an estimated 2 Companies of VC and NVA. By virtue of a determined resistance, quick and immediate unit response, and many cases of individual courage and initiative, the attack was repulsed, and the enemy was driven from the position. Final results were 75 VC KIA (confirmed); USMC 3 KIA and 13 WIA.
At 260610H, Company D was ready to be helo-lift to Company A’s area to block and/or sweep the area of the attack. The company lifted into position and swept the area with negative results.
From 26 to 29 August the battalion had no contacts, and at 0930 on 29 August began a reconnaissance in force to the area west and north of Cam Lo. This operation was still in progress as the month ended, but the battalion had no contact.
Training
Training consisted primarily of on-the-job, and familiarization of individual and crew served weapons.
The following is a breakdown of the number of personnel attending formal schools:
NCO Leadership School 2
Basic Weapons Repair School 1
This page last updated 19 August 2011