Communications

From: Commanding Officer

To: Commanding Officer, 4^th Marines (-)(rein)

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation QUICK STEP)

Ref: (a) RegtO 3120.3

Encl: (1) Overlay of the Operation

(2) Intelligence Recapitulation

1. Type of Operation. The operation consisted of searching, clearing and destroying the Viet Cong, his supplies and installations, based primarily on receipt of intelligence which indicated the possession of at least one 60mm mortar.

2. Duration. The duration of the operation was from H-hour 150700H to R-hour 151400H January 1966.

3. Location. The operation was conducted on Hoa Xuan Island, centered (BT 4315) in Ly Tin District, Quang Tin Province, Republic of South Viet Nam.

4. Command Headquarters. 1^st Battalion (-)(rein), 4^th Marines (-)(rein), 3^rd Marine Division (rein), FMF.

5. Reporting Officer. Lieutenant Colonel R. E. Sullivan.

a. Subordinate Unit Commanders.

(1) 1^st Lt. J. J. Clancy III, Company A (-)(rein)

(2) Capt. R. B. Alexander, Company B (-)(rein)

(3) Capt. P. A. Lo Presti, Company D (-)(rein)

6. Task Organization.

1^st Battalion (-)(rein) LtCol Sullivan

H&S Co (-)

Company A (-)(rein) Lt. Clancy

Company A (-)(rein)

Det, H Btry, 3/12

Interpreter

Company D (-)(rein) Capt. Lo Presti

Company D (-)

Plat (rein), Company A

Det, H Btry, 3/12

Interpreter

Battalion Reserve Capt. Alexander

Plat (rein), Company B

Det, Btry, 3/12

7. Supporting Forces

a. Battalion Artillery Group, Btry G, 3^rd Bn, 12^th Marines

b. Marine Air Group 12

c. Marine Air Group 36

d. Company A (-), 1^st AmTrac Battalion

e. Company B (-), 3^rd Engineer Battalion

f. Popular Forces from Ky Ha Village

g. Vietnamese Interpreters

8. Intelligence. See enclosure (2).

9. Mission. 1^st Bn (-)(rein) landed at L-hour and H-hour on D-day, and conducted a search and destroy operation to capture the VC and his supporting arms on Hoa Xuan Island (BT 4315).

10. Concept of Operations

a. See enclosure (1).

b. At H-hour on D-day two rifle companies (-)(rein) and one platoon (rein) landed as follows: one company landed by helicopter in landing zone MERCURY at (BT 410156); one company landed in landing zone MARS at (BT 425195); one platoon moved by LVT to landing point at (BT 440160) and moved into blocking position at (BT 437157). The two companies conducted a thorough clearing operation during which a detailed search was conducted for weapons, caches, and tunnels, within assigned zones of action along designated axis of advance to the limit of advance. Upon completion of the operation, and on order, the companies and the platoon retracted via LVT from vicinity (BT 460145), and returned to the MLR and /or permanent patrol bases.

c. Attached units as shown in paragraph six above moved with individual assault companies. Artillery Forward Observers and Forward Air Controller Teams moved with Companies A and D. One Forward Observer moved with the platoon from Company B.

d. Support units operated as follows:

1. Battery G, 3/12 displaced to a firing position north of Hill 69 (BT 469069) to support the operation.

2. MAG-12 and MAG-36. MAG-36 provided helicopter transportation to the LZ's and furnished LZ prep fires in MERCURY and MARS. MAG-12 flew air cover for the helicopter movement, conducted one preplanned bomb mission and provided on call close air support.

3. Company A, 1^st AmTrac Battalion provided two LVTP-5’s and one LVT-1E to transport Company B’s platoon to its blocking position. The LVT-1E was provided as an on call anti-mine support vehicle. Two LVTP-5’s were used as potential support for a fast reaction by the Battalion Reserve if necessary. Eight LVTP-5’s and one LVT-1E were provided to return the two companies to the Battalion’s splash point upon completion of the operation.

4. Company B, 3^rd Engineer Battalion provided an engineer demolition team to each company.

5. One Popular Force Squad was assigned to each rifle company to assist in search and clearing and handling of the local populace. Two squads from Ky Ha were utilized.

11. Execution.

Operation Plan 003-66 was originated on 14 January 1966 and executed the following day in order to take advantage of the recently acquired intelligence gained as a result of the previous days platoon patrol.

MAG-36 landing pad was designated the staging area from which the two companies pre-loaded their first wave at 0600H, and staged their second wave for immediate embarkation upon return of the initial wave of helicopters. The first wave lifted off at 0645H and arrived at the LZ's at 0705H with the second wave landing 20 minutes thereafter. Company B’s platoon embarked aboard LVT’s at 0614H and moved along the ocean side of Ky Hoa Island (BT 4914) to ORANGE Beach (BT 440160). After 10 minutes of A4-E air prep, the platoon landed at 0703H and preceded immediately to their blocking position at Hill 10, (BT 432157) arriving at 0720H. Upon completion of their consolidation of the hill and establishment of the blocking position, they received four rounds of incoming small arms harassing fire at 0730H. After the initial receipt of fire, an individual was seen fleeing at (BT 437153) and was immediately taken under fire by a moderate amount of Marine small arms fire and 3.5 rocket rounds. One HE round and one WP round were fired at the fleeing subject but to no avail. In quick retaliatory action, a squad was dispatched to check the area, however, found nothing of any significance and no trace of the suspected sniper.

During consolidation of the landing zone (BT 412157), Company D discovered two dead Vietnamese believed to have been killed by the landing zone air prep. Both Vietnamese appeared to have been killed by HU-1E/H-34 machine gun fire. Upon completion of Company D’s landing, at 0750H, the Company began to move along its designated axis of advance. As the lead elements approached (BT 416158) at 0815H two VCS were apprehended due to lack of proper identification. Company A started its search and destroy operation along their designated axis of advance at 0725H. Upon departure from the LZ the Company’s lead elements apprehended two VCS who were without proper identification. At this time a VMO-6 helicopter reported a VCS lying on the ground at (BT 427135). A fire team was dispatched to the area and apprehended an additional Vietnamese male lying on the ground with his white shirt hidden under his body. This was evidently done to preclude his discovery by the low flying aircraft. Later in the morning at 1018H, Company A apprehended two additional VCS at (BT 416158) once again due to improper identification.

As the search operation continued, Company D apprehended one VCS in the vicinity of (BT 427158) at 1030H who possessed no identification card but did have on his person an old Company B POW tag. He was found hiding beneath a pile of wood. At 1110H, a steel spike punji trap with Vietnamese warning signs was located at (BT 431159) by Company D’s sweeping elements. Moving ahead, no further contact was made until 1130H when one small arms round was heard to the rear of the Company D force and adjacent to the Command Group, vicinity (BT 435163). A squad maneuvered into and searched the area from which the round was thought to originate, but was unable to locate the insurgent. At 1200H, Company D linked up with the Company B platoon and assumed operational control of that unit. Moving down the southeast finger of the island at 1235H two booby-trapped grenades and one booby-trapped mortar round were discovered by the Company at (BT 460146). The engineer team detonated the traps in place rather than risk the danger inherent in disarming them. The grenades were placed adjacent to a foot trap covered with a bamboo mat into which the trip wire was woven. Thus when the mat was stepped on, the pressure of the foot would collapse the mat thus triggering the trip wire and the booby trap. The 60mm mortar trap was placed in front of a pathway through a cut in a barbed wire fence and was located by a Marine moving through the gate. Company A met no further activity during the remainder of the operation.

At 1400H both Companies and Company B’s platoon embarked aboard LVT’s at (BT 460147) and returned to their patrol bases/MLR positions arriving at the splash point (BT 517117) at 1430H.

12. Results

Friendly Casualties – None.

2 VN killed by landing zone preparatory fires.

8 VCS apprehended

8 VCS turned over to the Chu Lai Collection Point.

13. Administrative Matters. No major administrative problems were encountered.

14. Special Techniques. None.

15. Commanders Analysis/Lessons Learned

a. Once again this operation indicated that large scale (company size or larger) operations result in less insurgent contact than smaller units (squad and platoon size). It is a known fact that the VC will not engage the Marines with more than harassing fire unless they feel sure they have the element of surprise on their side and have a force large enough to insure victory.

The movement of a large force requires transportation elements, which can be seen or heard far enough in advance to permit the Viet Cong to mingle with the local populace, go underground or infiltrates prior to the initial landing. The solution to this particular problem lies in occupation of this Island on a continuing basis. In the interim period small unit operations must be continued.

b. Tagging of VC/VCS upon capture/apprehension can be expedited by having the tags prestamped through the use of address-o-graph plates. Upon capture/apprehension of the VC/VCS information can be furnished rapidly by merely filling in the blank spaces.

c. Current policy concerning communications procedures states that coordinates of all enemy contacts are to be sent in the clear to preclude compromise of the tactical system. The coordinates of apprehension sites of VCS, even though initially considered as enemy, should be sent encoded, to preclude the possible plotting of the units axis of advance by the enemy.

d. During the operation, the assault troops were preloaded at the MAG-36 helicopter pad. Transportation to the pad was accomplished by truck convoy. This method of embarking proved highly successful. Accordingly it required less fuel, which in turn permitted the initial wave to accommodate nine combat loaded Marines. The end result placed six to twelve additional Marines into the landing zone in the first wave. This method of preloading ensure timely meeting on L-hours, and in operations in close proximity to the enclave, permits maximum troop lift capability with minimum fuel load.

This page last updated on 22 August 2011