Mission

 

A.                 Mission.  During the period of this chronology the missions of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines continued to be as assigned by the 4th Marine Regiment Operation order 308-65 dated 20 December 1965; namely:

1.                  Occupy and defend in assigned zone of the 4th Marines sector.

2.                  Maintain combat patrol bases on Ky Hoa and Ky Xuan Islands.

3.                  Conduct and maintain surveillance of seaward approaches within sector to repel landings and prohibit infiltration.

4.                  Conduct aggressive operations and patrolling within assigned zone.

5.                  Be prepared to conduct operations outside the TAOR unilaterally or bilaterally with RVNAF.

6.                  Construct and maintain field fortifications required for protection of the vital area on Ky Ha Peninsula.

7.                  Establish a Peninsula Defense Command to coordinate activities among organizations on the Ky Ha Peninsula.

8.                  Conduct a vigorous Civil Affairs Program within assigned zone.

9.                  Provide liaison personnel to the Chief, Quang Tin Province, Tam Ky.

On 26 January 1966 this Battalion assumed the additional responsibilities outlined in the mission of the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines by physically occupying and defending strategic positions within that TAOR.  A forward command post of the Battalion set up operation in 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines CP along with two rifle companies.

All assigned missions were executed with vigor.  Aggressive saturation patrolling and ambush establishment precluded any large-scale enemy buildup intent upon attacking the vital logistic support areas in the rear.

B.                 Operations.  During the first twenty-five days of January this Battalion maintained two rifle companies along the MLR on the Ky Ha Peninsula, and one company on each of the two islands, Ky Hoa and Ky Xuan.  On the peninsula Companies A and C conducted vigorous saturation patrolling forward of the MLR and along the entire length of the Peninsula.  Patrols and ambushes were maintained at a maximum level during the hours of darkness.  Several of these were coordinated U. S. Marines/Popular Forces activities.  In addition, combined U. S. Marine/Self Defense Corps checkpoints were manned in the various hamlets to insure compliance with established curfew regulations. Company A provided security for the LST ramp (BT 522121) located on the northeast tip of the peninsula in addition to manning their portion of the MLR.  Companies B and D conducted aggressive patrolling on the islands of Ky Hoa (BT 5014) and Ky Xuan (BT 4810) respectively.  The patrol activities were in conjunction with an active pacification/rural reconstruction program.  Self Defense Corps checkpoints were maintained on Ky Hoa Island to insure compliance with established curfew regulations.

H&S Company continued to defend the Battalion Command Post.  In addition the company provided personnel as security for the waterborne patrol and to accompany the nightly Popular Forces ambush within the Ky Ha Village.  The 2nd Platoon, Company A, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion conducted nightly waterborne patrols throughout the various inland waterways within the Battalion’s TAOR.  The patrols primary mission was to insure compliance with the existing curfew regulations.  In addition to the above mentioned mission the LVT's provided logistic support to the patrol bases located on the islands of Ky Hoa and Ky Xuan. Tactical support in the form of amphibious landings was provided during the scheduled operations on Hoa Xuan Island (BT 4315).  Offensive operation for the Battalion consisted on one Battalion (-) operation and several platoon (rein) operations.  On 15 January 1966 Operation QUICK STEP, a Battalion (-) operation, was executed on Hoa Xuan Island (BT 4315).  Companies C (-) and D (-) were helo lifted into separate landing zones at (BT 423135) and (BT 409155) respectively to conduct search and clear operations along a west to east axis of advance.  One reinforced platoon from Company B moved by LVT to the vicinity of (BT 437157) and established a blocking position at those coordinates.  Prior to these three simultaneous landings combined fixed wing and helicopter preparatory fires were directed by a TAC(P) on the selected sites.  The coordination of air/ground employment was expectantly demonstrated on this operation.  Sporadic small arms fire was encountered but, as had been noted before, operations involving more then platoon size forces rarely, if ever, meet with heavy resistance/harassment from the VC on this particular island.  Eight VCS were apprehended on the sweep and the entire force retracted at 1400H from (BT 460147) by LVT and returned to its patrol base/MLR positions.

One additional development was the tactical employment of two scout/ sniper teams shortly after TET ended 24 January 1966.  The teams were dropped off at (BT 4516) and harbored overnight.  On sunrise of the next day the team spotted a VC sentry with a rifle near (BT 436157).  Four rounds were fired; the VC was hit by two of these.  A second VC moved up to give assistance to his follow comrade and he also was shot and apparently killed.  The team then moved southeastward to (BT 450156).  Three more VC were sighted moving into a tree line and were taken under fire by the snipers.  One VC dropped, attempted to get up, was shot again in the chest, and appeared to have been killed.  Moments later the remaining two VC were observed carrying a limp figure away.  The first tabulation was three confirmed VC wounded, with all three possibly killed.

The employment of the sniper teams seems to provide an effective psychological shock to VC who normally have no problem with their own security.  The attempt will be made on future operations to exploit the potential of the scout/sniper team more fully.

On 201600H, January 1966 the Battalion acquired the added responsibility of occupying and defending 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines TAOR in addition to its own.

 

This page last updated 23 August 2011