Operations/Training
1. Mission
During the month of July 1966, 1st Battalion 4th Marines executed the following mission:
a. Defend the Hue/Phu Bai Vital Area.
b. Conduct operations and extensive patrol and ambush activity in assigned sector of TAOR to deny enemy passage through or built-up in that area.
c. Coordinate defensive efforts of all units within the vital area perimeter.
d. Be prepared to assume responsibility and command of the Hue/Phu Bai TAOR upon displacement of the 4th Marines Headquarters for operations outside the TAOR.
e. Maintain the Combined Action Company to provide security for assigned village/areas within the TAOR.
f. Maintain the Sparrow Hawk.
g. Maintain Combat Outposts on Hills 180 (YD 855133) and 225 (YD 848087).
h. Conduct a vigorous Civil Affairs program within assigned TAOR and those areas assigned for operations.
2. Operations
The battalion continues to be involved primarily in manning and coordinating the defense of Hue/Phu Bai Vital Area. This includes the perimeter positions and two combat outposts. In this report, the battalion has conducted numerous day and night patrols and ambushes; and established many LP’s and OP’s of particular concern has been the continuing effort to maintain constant surveillance at night, to the limit of 81mm/82mm mortar range within the TAOR. Throughout this period, enemy contact has been frequent, but the size of units involved has been small.
On 3 July, during a sweep in Loi Nong Hamlet conducted by CAC-7, augmented with engineers, FO Team and AO, Marines and PF’s made contact on two occasions with small (2-3) groups of VC. Fire was exchanged with negative results. Numerous trench lines and fortifications were discovered, most of which were destroyed by the patrol. Many VC propaganda leaflets were found throughout the hamlet.
On 4 July ‘B’ Battery 3/12, previously located within the Vital Area, relieved G Battery in the southern portion of the TAOR (YD 931059). G Battery returned to the Vital Area. At 041945H and at 042100H, contact was made with small groups of VC (2-3) at two widely separated locations. In both instances, Marines fired on the VC, and the VC fled the area.
On 6 July the Battalion furnished 45 Marines as truck guards for convoys to the Operation Holt LSA at grid square YD 6324. Later that day, CAC-7 relayed the information that a 60 year old woman had been assassinated the night before (5 July) by the VC for furnishing information about VC activity in her area (YD 8217). MCB-7 had two contacts on their lines. At 062135H, a Vietnamese male threw rocks at the defensive positions. A burst of 7.62mm fire forced him into the rice paddies where he was last seen, under illumination, ducking behind a dike. At 2335, movement was detected on the MCB-7 Seismic Intrusion Device at YD 898136. Once again the area was illuminated, and two rounds were fired at a Vietnamese male beyond the wire. In both cases the area was swept with negative results. CAC-7 patrol fired on 2 VC at 062210H at YD 819185. The VC broke contact and withdrew to the south.
Early on the morning of 7 July, at 0555H, a Vietnamese male was again throwing rocks at MCB-7’s lines. An M-79 round was fired, and the area swept with negative results. At 1000H, FSCC responsibility within the TAOR was assumed by the 4th Marines who had returned from Operation Jay. That night CAC-8 was the target of 3 to 4 VC who fired 10 rounds S/A and threw two grenades at the CAC CP. Marines illuminated, returned the fire, and swept the area with negative results.
At 082135H, a small group of VC attacked the CP of CAC-9 with 15 rounds of S/A fire. Marines returned the fire, and the VC fled to the east. MCB-7 was in action again when at 082320H they observed and fired at a VC near their defensive positions. Upon searching the area, a large opening in the protective wire was discovered.
At 090205H, MCB-7 again sighted one VC at their wire. They fired 3 rounds, and the VC disappeared.
10 July was marked with numerous small contacts. At 100045H, Company D LP received one incoming grenade. Two Marines near the grenade reacted quickly, and jumped into their hole before the grenade detonated. The Marines then returned grenades, and the area was swept with negative results. A little later, at 100115H, MCB-7 detected movement to their front, and threw two grenades with negative results.
Action shifted to the CAC squads that night. Three VC probed CAC-7 CP at 102215H, with S/A fire and a grenade. One PF was WIA in this incident. At the same time CAC-3 was being probed by 15-20 VC. Marines and VC exchanged S/A fire, and VC withdrew. A sweep of the area netted 20 expended cartridges.
Results of contact were much better that next day, 11 July, as Company M executed a successful ambush at 110145H, in their operating area. Of the 4 VC ambushed, 2 were KIA confirmed; two rifles, one grenade and some rice were recovered.
At 131100H July, Battalion FSCC assumed responsibility for FSCC functions within the TAOR as the 4th Marines Headquarters deployed to Operation Hastings.
The next few days saw a continuation of small contacts in various areas of the TAOR. In every instance, fire was exchanged with small groups of VC with negative results.
On 14 July B Battery displaced from positions at YD 931059, and moved north to participate in Operation Hastings. Company M continued to maintain a platoon on their vacated battery positions. Also on the 14th the battalion was visited by the Secretary of the Navy, who visited and inspected the CAC squad in Loc Song Village (YD 932085. Company D provided security in the village area during the visit.
At 160615H, Company D executed one of the three-convoy security missions assigned to the battalion during the second half of the month. These trips north to the Operation Hastings area and south to Da Nang proved to be an excellent opportunity for units of the rifle companies to move out of the immediate area and ‘stretch their legs’.
At 172045H an H&S Company patrol discovered about 20 VC in the process of setting up an ambush. A firefight ensued, following which the area was swept. H&S reported one probable VC KIA as a result of the action.
Another successful ambush was executed at 180340H; this time by the CAC squad operating out of Loc An Village (YD 966063). This action resulted in 2 VC KIA confirmed, four grenades, two automatic weapons, and miscellaneous papers. One Marine was KIA in this action.
Later that day the battalion was visited by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, who inspected the CAC unit at Loc Song Village (YD 932085). Company A provided security on this occasion.
At 201000H OpCon of M/3/4 was released and OpCon of K/3/4 was assumed.
Contacts during the period 19-21 July continued to be small and widely scattered; and produced negative results. On 22 July, it was reported through ARVN Channels that VC were attempting to withdraw into the TAOR away from an ARVN operation to the north. An AO was launched at 221030H. OpCon of Sparrow Hawk was requested and approved from Regiment. Company D was alerted to 30-minute stand-by. However, the AO could observe no VC and the Alert status was secured at 221155H.
At 221915H, the CAC squad at Thu Duong Village (YD 797194) was reinforced with four M-60’s and crews from H&S Company. Intelligence information stated that the CAC CP was to be attacked the next night by 120 VC. Reinforcing units remained in the village area until 25 July. No attack materialized.
On 23 July, between 1600 and 1700, a sniper fired at aircraft arriving and departing Hue/Phu Bai Airport, killing one Marine and wounding an ARVN. The location of the sniper was unknown. An AO and CAC squads searched suspected locations with negative results.
On the night of 23 July when informed of the VC attack on Marble Mountain Air Facility, the battalion went to a 75% alert status, with 75% of all companies manning positions in the defensive perimeter. The only contact that night was again by a CAC squad. The CAC-5 patrol, at 232335H observed and fired upon an unknown number of VC at YD 920114. They observed one VC being dragged away, and found 3 sets of footprints.
On the morning of 24 July, in response to a request from 4th Marines S-3, a patrol was dispatched from Company K to locate, and provide security for a helicopter, which had gone down inside the TAOR as a result of engine failure. Enroute to the helicopter, the squad encountered VC snipers, but by passed them in order to expedite their arrival. The squad arrived at 240934H and established security until 241800H when the helo was lifted out by another Marine helicopter. During the last phase of this operation, a gunship returned fire with rockets, killing six Vietnamese. Two of the Vietnamese were subsequently identified as VC.
Earlier in the afternoon, Company A and Company D conducted a sweep 2,000 meters to the front of their lines in an effort to locate mortars and ‘Cannon’ reported by a PF. Results of this sweep were negative.
On 27 July, reliable intelligence indicated that one VC Company would attempt to enter the southern portion of the TAOR by boat from positions at ZD 030106; and that 2 squads were located at YD 976074. Company K moved a reinforced platoon into position at 272245H to ambush the VC as they attempted to land. CAC-11 searched the area for the 2 VC squads. Company K’s platoon remained in the ambush position until 280700H. On both operations, results were negative. Meanwhile, a platoon from Company B, sent to Company K’s CP to assist in local security during the period of the ambush, exchanged grenades with an unknown number of VC in the vicinity of Truoi Bridge (YD 966063). Two Marines were slightly wounded in this contact. The area was swept with negative results. All other contacts during this period were small and scattered.
At 201430H, VC threw two grenades into a bar located in CAC-7’s area (YD 819178). The resulting explosions killed one Vietnamese civilian female, and wounded a civilian female, a Marine and an Air Force enlisted man. In addition, an Air Force vehicle was damaged. Later at 302145H, as the damaged vehicle was being towed back to the Vital Area, both vehicles were fired upon from ambush; the lead vehicle sustaining 34 hits. The driver accelerated and made it into the Vital Area perimeter without further incident.
As the month ended, elements of the battalion were maintaining surveillance over the canal located along the northern boundary of the TAOR while the 3rd ARVN Regiment was conducting sweep in the area directly across the boundary.
This action resulted in one contact, when at 311800H; an element of CAC-7 discovered an unknown number of VC who had slipped across the canal. A firefight ensued, forcing the VC back across the canal, and out of the TAOR, where contact was lost.
3. Training
Training consisted primarily of firing individual and crew served weapons for familiarization and proficiency.
Advantage was taken of the proximity of the ARVN Dong Da Training Center and the availability of its range facilities for firing on weekends. Weapons fired by members of the battalion included the M-14 rifle, .45-caliber pistol, the 60mm and 81mm mortar, the M-60 machinegun, the 3.5 rocket launcher and the M-72 LAAW. Firing of the M-14 was primarily directed toward obtaining battle sight on all individual weapons. A total of 691 Marines participated.
Seventy-nine personnel attended a two-day course of instruction on the regimental level dealing with mine warfare and booby traps.
Instruction conducted by staff section representatives included radio procedures and operation of the ‘Seismic Intrusion Device. Orientation and indoctrination briefings were conducted for all personnel joining the battalion.
The following is a breakdown of the number of personnel attending formal school:
Field Radio Operators Course 1
Field Wireman Course 1
NCO School 2
Vietnamese Language Course 1
The battalion staff conducted an exercise in staff functioning based on a hypothetical situation. The initial situation given was developed through staff estimates and culminated with the writing of a standard five-paragraph operations order.
On 26 July 1966 a command post exercise was held in the field. Tending and communication facilities were set up. Artillery, air request, med-evac, and resupply request procedures were exercised. Message handling and routing procedures were covered. Both this and the aforementioned exercise materially benefited the Battalion for any future field operations.
This page last updated 24 August 2011