10 November 1967
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division (rein) FMF
Via: Commanding Officer, 4th Marines
Ref: (a) Maps: Viet Nam, 1:50,000, AMS Series L7014 Sheets 6442 II and 6441 I
1. Code Name. Operation Granite
2. Dates of Operation. 260600H Oct 67 – 071700H Nov 67.
3. Location. Thua Thien Province, Phong Dien District, RVN.
4. Task Organization.
1st Ban 4th Marines (rein) LtCol E.A. Deptula
H&S Co Capt L.A. Brown
Company A (rein) Capt A.K. Thompson
Company B (rein) 26-27 Oct Capt R.A. Ross
28Oct-7 Nov 2nd Lt R.B. Morgan
Company C (rein) Capt J.A. Edwards
Company D (rein) Capt C.B. Sperry
Det, HQ Co, 4th Marines (Sniper Tms)
Det, Co A, 3rd SP Bn (HST Tms)
Co B (-), 3rd AT Bn
Plt, Co C, 3rd Tk Bn
Plt, Co B, 3rd Engr Bn
5. Supporting Forces.
a. General. Artillery and Air Support were used constantly throughout Operation Granite. Five Artillery Batteries were in general support of the Battalion and fixed wing, gun ships, and flare ships were utilized whenever possible. In some instances the support was completely satisfactory. Helicopters were utilized for all medical evacuation.
b. Artillery. From 25 October to 7 November, 1st Battalion 4th Marines engaged in Operation Granite received general support from G and H Batteries, 3rd Battalion 12th Marines, P and T Batteries 4th Battalion 12th Marines and A Battery 1st Battalion 12th Marines. A forward Artillery Support Base was set up to provide the depth of coverage needed during the operation. This Forward Support Base consisted of G, T and A Batteries, as well as a separate FDC. The following missions were fired in support of 1st Battalion 4th Marines from 25 October to 4 November.
Co A Co B Co C Co D FSCC Total
Missions 9 17 18 15 53 112
HE 176 371 369 1238 1480 3634
WP 8 62 12 21 35 138
Illum 159 0 7 259 15 440
Smoke 0 0 1 0 0 1
Due to the broken and hilly terrain in the area of operations, preplanned, unobserved fires were found to be of only limited value. Advancing behind a wall of prep fires, spaced 200-300 meters ahead of the lead elements, proved to be an excellent method for discouraging snipers and ambushes. The FO’s with the Forward Companies coordinated and adjusted these fires.
After Company B made solid contact with an NVA unit in the vicinity of YD 508225, heavy artillery fire was directed into the area over the next 36 hours and is credited with destroying 15-20 heavily reinforced enemy bunkers. A casualty count of enemy dead inside these bunkers was not conducted, as any bodies that might have been inside were under tons of rubble. It is probable that the same artillery fire kept the enemy from recovering or mutilating any of the dead Marines, weapons and equipment, which were not immediately recovered.
The major problem in connection with artillery support during Operation Granite were the long and numerous delays encountered in trying to obtain ‘Save-a-plane’ clearance to fire. On numerous occasions fire support was denied for 30 minutes or more due to helicopters in the area. Many times, these helicopters were resupply adjacent units and artillery clearance was denied so that they could cross the Gun-Target line. Recommendations concerning coordination of helicopter supply routes with artillery fire have been submitted to higher authority.
c. Air Support. The Air Team called in numerous air strikes, TPQ’s and med-evacs working directly with a variety of A/C including flare ships, gun ships, Puff, fixed wing and AO’s. Emergency and priority med-evacs and TPQ’s were timely and efficient while resupply med-evac helicopters and the majority of flare ships proved less than satisfactory on occasion.
Emergency med-evac helicopters performed a commendable job entering hot zones and hoisting wounded from tight zones while working under marginal weather conditions, heavy vegetation and high terrain frequently after last light.
AO’s were able to give only limited surveillance due to the high canopy. Control of fixed wing by the TAC (A) was accomplished in a professional manner in most instances. Had the TAC (A) more frequently used artillery WP rounds as a means of marking fixed targets, fixed wing accuracy would have been enhanced.
Fixed wing were hampered by low ceiling and moderate haze, which lingered in the target area throughout the operation. This was a contributing factor in the failure to get on target in most instances. Small area targets were often missed resulting in poor coverage. One A-6 flying a single pattern dropped its ordinance without a single hit on target. Preparatory fires by fixed wing scheduled for morning hours were often postponed, thereby delaying friendly tactical movement.
Flare planes with the call sign ‘Basketball’ proved unsatisfactory, dropping illumination great distances from the target area, flying too loose a pattern and dropping many duds. ‘Dream hour’ flare ship proved far more satisfactory working in direct conjunction with night med-evac helicopters. Puff was utilized once, expending 11,600 rounds 200 meters from the friendly perimeter. Gun ships were utilized on two enemy contacts, expending ordinance 50 meters from the friendlies.
Helicopters flying in the Area of Operation without checking in on the TAC net caused delay and confusion with artillery fires. Helicopters of the same type, often took various weight loads resulting in gear not being staged correctly and time lost on the ground while coordination between ground personnel and pilots was accomplished. Communications caused another problem. Air strikes were unable to be controlled on VHF because of the down status of the PRC-41’s. Had VHF capability been maintained, one flight of Puff would not have been diverted and direct communications with fixed wing by the ground controller would have achieved better results.
Total Sorties Operation Granite:
Med-evac sorties 27
Fixed wing sorties 35
TPQ’s 12
Gunship sorties 10
Puff 1
Flare ship 4
Resupply 45
6. Intelligence
a. Enemy Situation Prior to Operation Granite.
It was expected that this Battalion would encounter enemy forces up to and including company strength. It was further expected that the enemy would be NVA regular soldiers as opposed to VC guerrillas. These forces were expected to be well armed and equipped, and well disciplined and organized. The Battalion expected to encounter frequent mines and booby traps in the OA.
b. Enemy Situation During Operation Granite.
The enemy encountered during Operation Granite was proven to be NVA regular soldiers. Positive identification was made of the C-2 Company of K-12 Battalion. Contacts were sporadic and consisted of mostly snipers, with one exception. On 27 October 1967, Company B made contact with a well dug in enemy estimated to be two platoons of NVA. The enemy was well armed and organized and maintained contact by aggressive attacks and maneuvers. Mines and booby traps were encountered in the OA, but not in as large a number as was anticipated.
c. Cover and Concealment.
The terrain progressed from rolling lowlands to mountains and a variety of cover and concealment was found. In the lowlands, cover was sparse and consisted of paddy dikes and bomb craters. In the mountains cover was more readily available and consisted of large rocks, trees and bomb craters. Concealment was good throughout the OA. In the low lands it consisted of waist high brush and occasional tree lines. In the mountains concealment of dense undergrowth and heavy canopy, which rose as high as 70 feet, was found.
d. Observation and Fields of Fire.
Observation is good in the low lands and is poor in the mountains due to the density of the undergrowth. Fields of fire in the lowlands are generally good but are considered poor in the mountains due to the trees and thick brush.
e. Critical Terrain Features.
The most prominent terrain feature in the OA is the Co Bi Thanh Tan Ridge, which halves the OA.
f. Obstacles.
The major obstacle in the OA is the Co Bi Thanh Tan Ridge, which averages 300 to 400 meters in elevation. The perpendicular spurs jutting off the major ridges present a restriction to movement except on trails and in streambeds.
g. Avenues of Approach.
There are numerous avenues of approach in the OA. Trails are abundant but movement is hazardous during the monsoon season due to the treacherous footing. In addition all trails are invariably well bunkered.
h. Weather.
Temperatures ranged from a high of 82 degrees to a low of 70 degrees. Relative humidity averaged 80% and visibility was about 7 miles. Rain showers fell in the course of one late afternoon and evening.
7. Mission. The 1st Battalion 4th Marines commencing at H-hour on D-day in cooperation/coordination with the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) Forces and BLT 1/3, conducts Search and Destroy operations in the VC/NVA Base Area 11, vicinity Hill 674 (YD 5121) to capture/destroy logistic caches, installations, and equipment; obtain intelligence and kill or capture enemy encountered.
8. Concept of Operations. On D-2, 1st Battalion 4th Marines move one company by foot to vicinity YD 519260 to secure assembly area, conduct search and destroy operations and carry out extensive reconnaissance patrols. On order, on D-1, move one Company with tanks and Ontos to vicinity YD 501289 as security for forward artillery position. On D-1 two Companies and Command Group move by foot under cover of darkness to assembly area. At first light on D-day conduct search and destroy operations along designated axis toward Battalion Objective 1 and 2. On order continue attack toward Regimental Objective A and C.
9. Execution. Companies C and D and Command Group departed Camp Evans at 2000H on 25 October 1967 and moved by foot to the vicinity YD 505287. Guides from Company B guided the Battalion (-) into the designated assembly area (YD 519260) arriving at approximately 260300H.
At 260645H the Battalion (-) crossed the LD and began Operation Granite. Company D and the Command Group with Company B (YD 512245 and YD 519245) and commenced the attack toward Battalion Objective 2*. Company C commenced the attack toward Battalion Objective 1 (YD 501235) via the high ground in the vicinity of YD 508246. Company B followed in trace Company D.
October
26 At 1010H lead elements of Company D received 20-30 rounds of A/W fire from YD 513223 resulting in three WIA (med-evac). The lead elements returned fire with S/A and M-79’s at close range. The enemy broke contact immediately and fled. There were no apparent enemy casualties.
At 1355H, the lead elements of Company D, near YD 5142 received 10-15 rounds 60mm mortar fire from the vicinity of YD 510230 resulting in one minor WIA. Returned fire with 60mm and 81mm and enemy mortar fire ceased.
At 1520H, 2nd Platoon, Company D, vicinity YD 511235 discovered 6-8 bunkers with interconnecting tunnels. The bunkers and tunnels were destroyed.
Company D received approximately 15 rounds of A/W fire from YD 509234 resulting in three WIA. Fire was returned with S/A, M-79 and 60mm mortars.
27 At 0725H, Company C in the vicinity of YD 502236, discovered two bunkers, three canteens, two sticks of dynamite and one light ChiCom machine gun. All gear was destroyed and the machine gun was returned to Bn S-2.
At 1120H, the point of Company B, vicinity YD 508225 heard movement approximately 50 meters to the right flank. The point fired to the front and right flank with 150 rounds S/A and 300 rounds of M-60 machine gun. An estimated 6-10 enemy returned fire with approximately 150 rounds of A/W fire and then broke contact. An artillery mission was fired and a subsequent area sweep produced negative results.
3rd Platoon, Company C received approximately 100 rounds of A/W fire and grenades from VC dug in on ridge line in the vicinity of YD 505225. Fire was returned with S/A, M-79 and M-60 machine guns. An artillery mission was called on the fortified position. Two WIA were sustained in the action.
At 1436H, point elements of Company B made contact at YD 508224 receiving 30 rounds of A/W fire. Fire was returned resulting in one NVA KIA (C) with one AK-47, one pack, E-tool, cartridge belt, personal diary and ID papers captured. The diary disclosed that the C-4 Company of the 800th NVA Bn had been in the area three months with a mission of guiding and scouting for the 800th Bn.
At 1445H, Company B at YD 508222 made heavy contact while advancing toward Objective A with an unknown size NVA force. The Company Commander was wounded during the initial contact but remained in control of the company. An estimated 50-100 NVA firing S/A, A/W and RPG’s tried to surround the company. A 81mm mortar and artillery mission was sent in along with a gunship request.
At 1620H, Company B again requested an artillery mission but the request was denied due to planes and helicopters in the area. Gun ships were utilized with good results.
At 1630H, Company B was still receiving S/A and MG fire from the east and west slopes of the ravine. Company B reported that ammunition was getting low.
At 1647H, Company B was advised to consolidate into a tight perimeter and that Company D (-) was being dispatched to aid them in disengaging from the enemy and to assist them in removing casualties.
At 1708H, Company B radio operator called in the first artillery mission that was adjustable. Company B was now in a tight perimeter and attempting to remove casualties.
At 1714H, Artillery fired for effect around Company B.
At 1730H, Battalion CP at YD 513235 had improved the LZ and completed all possible preparations to receive casualties.
At 1731H, Company D (-) made contact with Company B.
At 1733H, Company D (-) called an artillery mission to support movement of Company B to Battalion CP.
At 1752H, An AO observed NVA massing casualties on hill. An air strike was requested but was denied due to proximity of friendly troops.
At 1755H, Company B started movement with wounded to Battalion CP. Company D continued its efforts to retrieve Company B dead from the battlefield.
At 1915H, Company C in the vicinity of YD 503226 received S/A fire and one incoming grenade resulting in one WIA.
At 2040H, Company C in the vicinity of YD 505230 received 15-20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. No casualties were taken and no counter mortar was possible at that time due to helicopters in the area.
Company D received approximately 100 rounds of A/W fire and grenades while retrieving Company B casualties. Company D sustained two KIA and two WIA in the action. Fire was returned with S/A and an artillery mission.
At 2330H, all elements of Companies B and D had returned to the Battalion CP with the exception of nine Company B dead who could not be reached on the battlefield. Med-evacs were in progress.
28 At 0030H, all priority and emergency med-evacs were completed. Summary of casualties for Company B action on 27 October 67 stood at 5 KIA, 4 MIA, 31 WIA and 8 NBC. Enemy casualties were 13 NVA KIA (C) and 10 NVA KIA (P).
At 1055H, a fixed wing strike of the valley complex where Company B made contact commenced.
At 1405H, Company A completed a helicopter move from forward artillery position to Battalion CP.
At 1855H, Company C secured the crest of Objective 2 in the vicinity of YD 505226. Eight unoccupied bunkers were uncovered with great amounts of blood estimated to be one day old. Bunkers were destroyed. The Battalion CP was relocated at YD 513232 with Companies A, B and D providing perimeter security. Company C remained at Objective 2.
29 At 0930H, Company D commenced movement to a position to start sweep of valley complex where Company B had made contact.
At 1150H, Company D commenced search of the valley in the vicinity of YD 507225.
At 1307H, Company A commenced movement to sweep east side of valley while Company D swept west side. Company C remained on top of Hill 300 as a blocking force.
At 1430H, Forward elements of 3rd Platoon, Company A received heavy A/W fire from an unknown number of NVA while moving toward mouth of draw in the vicinity of YD 509229. Fire was immediately returned and Company A commenced moving to flank of enemy.
At 1445H, Company A commenced receiving extremely accurate sniper fire from a high-powered rifle.
At 1519H, Company A requested the Bn CP to send stretchers and stretcher-bearers up to assist in removing dead and wounded from the battlefield.
At 1528H, Company D commenced movement to aid Company A. Company A reported that NVA were in trees and bunkers with carefully planned and cleared killing zone.
At 1645H, Company A assumed blocking position at YD 509229 while Company D, YD 509223, and Company C YD 507226, swept south on both sides of valley towards Company A.
At 1730H, Company D contacted Company A and commence collecting wounded, dead and equipment. Company A killed one NVA and captured one AK-47 in their contact.
At 1830H, Company A while setting in night defensive positions tripped an unknown explosive device resulting in one KIA and one WIA.
At 1831H, Company D swept the bunker complex and recovered all bodies of friendly MIA’s and KIA’s. The sweep revealed 20-30, two to four man bunkers, the majority of which had been destroyed by air strikes and artillery fire. Time prevented detailed inspection of the area; however, a heavy odor of death prevailed.
30 At 0030H, Company D returned to the Battalion CP. Company A’s contact on 29 October 67 resulted in 8 friendly KIA and 16 Friendly WIA.
At 1015H, Company C, vicinity YD 508226 received S/A and A/W fire from YD 509228 resulting in one WIA. Fire was returned and enemy fire ceased.
At 2150H, four to five rounds of friendly artillery landed in Company A’s position in the vicinity of YD 508225 causing 3 WIA’s all emergency med-evacs.
31 At 0650H, Companies A and C commenced attack toward Objective A.
At 0715H, point element of Company A found a hut at YD 508222 containing 400 lbs of rice. The hut and rice were destroyed.
During Search and Destroy operations toward Objective A. Companies A and C discovered 11 huts on the side of Hill 674 between YD 508222 and YD 511215. The huts were well constructed, four to five months old and each capable of sleeping 25 people. All were burned.
At 1300H, Objective A secured. No enemy contact or evidence of recent enemy activity was found in the area.
At 1730H, Companies A and C returned to YD 508224 and set in night defensive positions.
November
1 At 0930 a helicopter lost power while hovering over LZ at YD 508225 and was forced down. Chain saws were brought into area to clear a zone to remove the helicopter. Company D provided security at the site until the helicopter could be removed.
At 1400, Company B at YD 518229, while enroute to Objective 5, found large bloodstains and NVA type bandage wrappers along trail.
Lead elements of Company B, at YD 518232, found two bunkers with connecting tunnels and a hut above ground containing ammunition clips, cartridge belts, canteens, packs and clothing on clothesline. It was estimated facilitation 4 to 5 NVA. NVA fired on lead elements with S/A. Fire was returned, the area was investigated with negative results and the mission was continued. 2 friendly WIA (non-evac).
At 1730H, the Battalion CP and Companies A, B and C arrived at Objective #5.
2 At 0930H, one squad, third platoon, Company D at YD 507225 spotted 8 to 10 VC. The squad fired at enemy resulting in an estimated 6 to 8 enemy wounded. Enemy returned fire with S/A and RPG. Company D lost communications with the squad. One squad was sent to reinforce the squad in contact. The area was searched out resulting in the discovery of an RPG fin assembly but no bloodstains or drag marks were found. 6 Friendly WIA (1 non-evac).
At 1200H, Company B at YD 518228 providing security for water detail received one burst of A/W fire from one NVA on a platform in a tree. Fire was returned with S/A resulting in 1 NVA KIA (C) and 1 friendly WIA (non-evac).
At 1805H, Company D arrived at objective 5.
3 At 0815H all 1/4 units began moving toward objective 6. At 1550 Objective 6 was secured.
4 At 0630H, Company D with Command Group commenced move towards Camp Evans.
At 0720H Company A and B moved out to execute a sweep of the Co Bi Thanh Tan Valley.
At 0945H Company D arrived at Camp Evans with the Command Group.
Company C at YD 536257 tripped a 105mm round rigged as a mine with a pressure-firing device. 1 Friendly KIA.
2nd Platoon, Company C, at YD 530240 found a bunker complex of 3 bunkers and connecting tunnels. The bunkers were destroyed.
At 1302H Companies A and B crossed the LOD.
At 1930H, all units arrived in perimeter at Camp Evans terminating operation Granite, Phase I.
At 2000H OP order 17-67 was issued on Phase II of Operation Granite. Companies C and D provided blocking forces for ARVN search and destroy operations beginning 050930H Nov.
5 At 1000H two sections of 81mm mortars returned to Camp Evans from Hill 674.
At 1110H Companies C and D arrived in blocking positions Anvil and Forge IAW 4th Mar OP order 50-67.
6 At 1700H, Companies C and D arrived at Camp Evans terminating Operation Granite.
10. Results.
a. Friendly Losses.
(1) The following is a recapitulation of friendly casualties sustained by the Battalion during Operation Granite covered the period 26 October 1967 to 4 November 1967.
USMC USN
Off/Enl Off/Enl
KIA 0/21 0/1
WIA 5/55 0/6
MIA 0/0 0/0
DOW 0/3 0/0
(2) There were no major items of equipment or material losses.
b. Enemy Losses.
VC/NVA KIA (C) 17
VC/NVA KIA (P) 19
Wpns Captured 2 AK-47’s
1 RPD
Booby Traps/Destroyed 2
S/A Ammo captured 30 rounds AK-47 Ammo
Bunkers Destroyed 70
Huts Destroyed 13
Rice Captured 400 Pounds
11. Administrative Matters. Resupply of Classes I and V were preplanned to the maximum extent possible. Resupply by helicopter commenced on D+2 on a routine basis as scheduled; however, initial resupply was not completed until the following day due to Med Evacuation. All resupply was received but the timeliness, due to helicopter availability, was not always desirable. A total of 45 lifts for such Class II items as jungle utilities and nylon stretchers were needed. Adequate LZ’s could not be found in many areas and resupply had to be ‘kicked’ out of the helicopter. Body bags were an item found to be needed at the LZ for use by Med Evacs. The only item of resupply that became critical was 81mm ammunition for the mortar platoon on Hill 674.
a. Supply techniques. Supplies were adequate for this operation. A Basic Allowance of Class V was carried by all personnel.
b. Maintenance. Maintenance was performed at Camp Evans.
c. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation and Hospitalization.
First echelon medical care was performed in the field by Corpsmen attached to the line companies. Those patients who required further treatment but not requiring hospitalization were evacuated to Regimental Aid Station, Fourth Marines, Camp Evans, or Company A, Third Medical Battalion, Phu Bai.
There were one hundred and two patients seen at the Battalion Aid Station during this period.
The following is the break down of casualties for the period:
21 Marine Enlisted KIA
1 Navy Enlisted KIA
3 Marine Enlisted DOW
5 Marines Officers WIA
55 Marines Enlisted WIA
6 Navy Enlisted WIA
Significant Medical Entities were:
Diarrhea 6 Tonsillitis 4
Immersion Foot 10 Fungal Infection 8
Cellulites 11 Headache 3
Anxiety reaction 2
d. Transportation. Vehicular transportation was not used.
e. Communications.
(1) Communications were satisfactory throughout Operation Granite. In the late afternoon of 27 October, during the time Company B was engaged in a heavy fight with the enemy, some interference was received on the 81 COF net for about ten minutes. On the same day, Company B lost one AN/PRC-25 with an H-138 handset and two whip antennas. The radio had been shot twice and the operator turned it off frequency, so there was no compromise. On 29 October all UHF-TAD capabilities were lost due to bad PRC-41’s.
(2) FM radio nets activated during the period covered were: Battalion TAC, Regimental TAC, TACP local, Arty COF, and 81 COF, and HST net. Relay on Hill 674 was available for all nets except the Battalion TAC.
(3) Wire and sound power phones were utilized for communications between the COC and Company CP’s located in the vicinity of the Battalion CP. This means proved satisfactory for the entire operation.
f. Medical Evaluation.
Minimum difficulty was experienced with respect to adequate and immediate medical care during Operation Granite. Evacuation of casualties was prompt and reliable. Much valuable assistance was rendered by the Regimental Aid Station, 4th Marines, and Battalion Aid Station, 3rd Battalion 26th Marines.
13. Commanders Analysis.
a. General. Operation Granite was characterized by slow movement in rugged, boulder-strewn terrain with steep gradients, medium to high canopy and heavy undergrowth. Movement was much slower than anticipated due to the terrain. A realistic rate of movement in the area proved to be 1000-1500 meters per day. Enemy activity consisted of small delaying actions and sniper activities with occasional strong points along likely avenues of approach. Two means were utilized to thwart this tactic. One was to stay off all existing trails and to utilize flank security regardless of the density of undergrowth. The other was to keep advancing behind a wall of artillery prep fire spaced 200-300 meters ahead of lead elements.
The mission assigned to 1st Battalion 4th Marines was successfully carried out. The number of enemy kills is undoubtedly higher then the final figure shows as the bunker complex in the valley between Hill 674 and 340 (YD 6022) was smashed and buried by artillery and air strikes. No assessment of enemy dead was made due to the time element and tactical commitments, but a heavy odor of death was present, indicating that enemy dead were in the bunkers.
No Civic Action was conducted during the operation and all PSYOP’s activities were initiated at Regimental level.
b. Problems Encountered.
The most significant problem, from a tactical viewpoint, was the interference of artillery fire by air traffic. This has been covered in paragraph 5 above. Another problem encountered was the difficulty of being resupplied on a timely basis due to non-availability of helicopters and the limited number of landing zones. On several occasions this delayed friendly troop movement. A third problem noted was the effect of the long tactical foot march into the operation area. After moving most of the night of D-1 and all day on D-day, the troops were not as fresh as desired upon nearing Objectives 1 and 2.
14. Recommendations. For future operations conducted in the Granite area, it is recommended that all friendly elements be lifted into the objective area by helicopter. This will enhance tactical surprise, ensure the optimum physical condition of the troops, and facilitate the closing of natural enemy escape routes.
This page last corrected 29 August 2011