Operation Maine Crag

For preceding events/Operations to this Operation

See Operation Dewey Canyon

The tactics of this operation, named "Maine Crag," would follow the pattern of Operation Dewey Canyon. First, fire support bases reaching successively deeper into the salient would be established. Then, infantry patrols would clear the area around each fire support base before leapfrogging farther south. This time, though, the Marines would be supported by a U.S. Army task force and an ARVN regiment.

In preparation for the operation, 2/3 airlifted into FSB Hawk, just south of Route 9 and about halfway between the Vandegrift Combat Base and Khe Sanh, on 10 March. That same night they began a rare overland trek to FSB Snapper, seven kilometers to the southwest. "It was a moonless night," recalled battalion commander Lt. Col. James J. McMonagle. "There were quite [a few] streams to cross and a heck of a lot of elephant grass. It was really amazing how they [the point company] were able to find this place going through elephant grass at that time of evening." The next morning, McMonagle's men searched the nearby area but found no sign of the enemy.

Operation Maine Crag officially began on 15 March when 2/3 started an overland push from Route 9 south into the salient all the way to FSB Saigon, which overlooked Route 616. For the first few days, the Marines encountered only occasional snipers. Then, on 18 March, a patrol from Company G ambushed a convoy of enemy trucks moving along Highway 616. The next day the company ambushed seven NVA soldiers sent out to check on the convoy.

On 20 March, three companies of 1/3 helilifted into FSB Saigon. These fresh Marines headed southwest to block Route 616 to the west of 2/3. McMonagle's battalion then worked its way eastward along the road. On the twenty-first, Company H uncovered a large cache of foodstuffs, including more than 350 tons of rice.

This proved to be the only major success of the operation. Though the maneuver elements of Operation Maine Crag thoroughly searched their AO, and even extended eastward into the old Operation Dewey Canyon AO, enemy contact was limited to occasional sniper rounds and a few mortar shells fired from Laos. Several more supply caches were uncovered and the foodstuffs extracted. By the end of April, the 3d Marines had been relocated to the central portion of Quang Tri Province, where they took up positions below the DMZ to begin Operation Virginia Ridge.

During this period the command of the 3d Marine Division changed. After eleven months as the division's commander, Maj. Gen. Ray Davis's tour was coming to an end. Davis's tenure had done wonders for the division, putting it on the move and driving it deep into enemy-controlled territory, where the Marine infantry kept the NVA off balance. Davis's replacement, Maj. Gen. William K. Jones, took command on 15 April. A decorated veteran of the bloody World War II island battles of Tarawa and Saipan, as well as Korea, Jones completely agreed with Davis's mobility philosophy and saw no need to institute any change.

Despite the success of the 9th Marines during Operation Dewey Canyon, the enemy quickly returned to the area. Aerial reconnaissance confirmed that the NVA were repairing Route 922. Long-range recon patrols reported the presence of two NVA infantry regiments, the 6th and the 9th, as well as supporting units, including artillery, in the area. Headquarters XXIV Corps responded to this news by ordering a major campaign in the region. The 3d Marine Division would return to the southern Da Krong Valley and the U.S. Army's 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) would operate in the adjacent A Shau Valley. The operation was code-named "Apache Snow."

The 1st and 2d Battalions, 9th Marines were assigned the task of occupying the lower Da Krong Valley to prevent any NVA from slipping away from the A Shau Valley via Route 922. Operation Apache Snow began for the Marines on 10 May when 1/9 airlifted into Operation Dewey Canyon's old FSB Erskine, overlooking Route 922. Sporadic enemy fire greeted the incoming Marines. One troop-laden helicopter was shot down, killing seven and injuring five men. At the same time, 2/9 landed at FSB Razor, another old Dewey Canyon site.

The rifle companies of the two battalions immediately fanned out to search for the enemy. It soon became apparent that there were no major NVA units operating in this AO. Contact with enemy forces was limited to brief engagements with small bands of enemy soldiers.

The companies of 1/9 vigorously patrolled Route 922 and the surrounding mountains but found only a few NVA.  While members of the 9th Marines were wishing they could find the enemy, members of the 101st Airborne Division wished they hadn't. Soon after they entered the A Shau Valley, the soldiers encountered the NVA on Hill 937, known locally as Dong Ap Bia and soon nicknamed by the soldiers "Hamburger Hill." The 101st's fight to drive the enemy off Hill 937 lasted more than a week and engulfed five battalions. The American soldiers prevailed but at a cost of more than three hundred casualties, including forty-four dead.  Operation Apache Snow ended for the 9th Marines when the two battalions returned to Vandegrift Combat Base on 27 May.

In January 1969, a new administration took office in Washington, D.C., and with it came a new direction for the war in Southeast Asia. President Nixon had campaigned on a promise to end the war in South Vietnam. Although he had no specific plan to do so then, by the time he took the oath it was obvious that no solution could be found in a negotiated settlement. Nixon"s only other option was to begin the withdrawal of U.S. troops and turn over the war to the forces of South Vietnam.  After a complete and careful review of the entire military situation, and a visit with South Vietnam's leaders, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird recommended that fifty thousand Americans be pulled out of South Vietnam in the latter half of 1969. Included for redeployment in this first stage was the 3d Marine Division.